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EXISTENTIALISM AND EXISTENCE

I. AN HISTORICAL FRAMEWORK

MODERN man, in the recent words of Max Picard,[1] is a schizoid personality. The symptoms of his split—the war of rationalism with religion, science with philosophy, the individual with the social, one economic class with another—all are familiar themes for historians and philosophers alike, from Hegel and Spengler to Sorokin and Northrop, from Gilson and Dawson to Toynbee and de Reynauld. Contemporary philosophers—typified by Russell, the logician, and Nagel, the naturalist—end, when their strokes are followed through, in a method without matter. The existentialists, working up from experience to reason rather than, like scientific method, from reason to experience, never disengage a method for their content. Being and truth, on the one hand, are so far separated that they are no longer convertible; and on the other hand, they are so tightly united that they cannot

[1] Cf. *Hitler in Ourselves*, New York, 1947.

be distinguished. One group lays its whole weight on essence, ignoring existence; the other never gets beyond existence. That reality is a union of essence and existence—being is that which is—forms a balance between the extremes. But such a realism, as both theory and practice today bear witness, is largely ignored.

In a climate like that in America where the empirical method is still dominant and where any other approach is regarded as a "failure of nerve," [2] Descartes and Kant are seen almost exclusively in the light of their formalism. But these two men did much more than point the way to what Bergson labelled "scientism." They are also forbears of existentialism. The split in man's present approach to existence, for whatever philosophical factors that aggravated it, is owed to them. Each is a kind of fork in the road, inviting the traveller to go two ways but taking him, at any rate, off the highway. Men like Hook and Northrop still holding the torch of the Enlightenment are appealing for more science to save man, more method to cure madness. But in the words of Sartre, "We are travellers, and we have lost our way." [3] Descartes and Kant, the essentialists, are as far from Descartes and Kant, the existentialists, as the poles to which their forking branches lead. Scientism and existentialism are not new directions but simply new distances on old roads.

The discursive tendencies of Descartes and Kant are too well known to bear repetition. Scientism does not hesitate to claim them as leading spirits. Descartes, describing a world of original—though in his case created—chaos out of which order was made,[4] stands like the contemporary physicist, accepting nothing but what he can lead by his own hand from indeterminism, chaos, nothingness, into being. Descartes' use of deduction was made possible by his discovery of *cogito, ergo*

[2] Cf. his essay in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit* (ed. Y. Krikorian), New York, 1944, pp. 40 ff.

[3] *No Exit and the Flies*, New York, 1947, p. 65.

[4] *Oeuvres* (ed. Adam and Tannery), Paris, 1897-1913, v. 6, pp. 45 ff.

sum, " the first principle that I was seeking." [5] His love for mathematics, freshly primed by subsequent developments in the problem of infinity, resulted finally in the substitution of a *mathesis universalis* for a logic that begins inductively. The Porphyrian tree was no longer vertical, sweeping man's thought through a hierarchy. It was levelled like firewood, dead.

Descartes wrote a discourse on method, as though method could be divorced from matter. Kant aimed to isolate for study *die reine Vernunft*, reason purified of content. Maritain's reference to the " delusive purism " [6] of the logical positivists applies alike to Descartes and Kant. Kant stressed the categorical, the architectonic, the regulative, the systematic, and other such methodological, discursive, formal considerations. Randall's reference to Thomism as an " undynamic formalism " [7] applies in reality to Kant and the scientism which he abetted, including naturally Randall's own approach.

But Descartes was not a mere essentialist, even by his formal admission. Jaspers has argued that reality always seemed ambiguous for Descartes.[8] A rationalist, he did not seem finally content with mere rational evidence. In his first principle, the *sum* is an existential fact rather than an empty thought. Descartes was moving in the *cogito* from representation to existence, form to matter. It is precisely the *sum* which the existentialists emphasize. Descartes' notion of intuition is likewise at variance with the larger lines of his philosophy. His voluntarism does not blend with the primacy which his epistemology accords to method in the life of man. To view will as wider in sweep than intelligence, to point to will as an indivisible sounds much more like existentialism than the doctrine of the man who wedded algebra to geometry.[9]

[5] *Ibid.*, v. 6, p. 32 ff.

[6] " Science, Philosophy, and Faith " in *Science, Philosophy, and Religion: A Symposium*, New York, 1941, pp. 170 ff.

[7] Review of *Education at the Crossroads* by J. Maritain in *Journal of Philosophy*, XL (1943) 32, p. 612.

[8] *Descartes und die Philosophie*, Berlin, 1937, p. 101.

[9] For the doctrine of will in Descartes, cf. Gilson, E., *La Liberté chez Descartes et la Théologie*, Paris, 1913.

A similar existentialist harmonic can be heard in Kant. It was Kant who thrust the problem of the transcendental into modern philosophy, the problem which occupies Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre. Heidegger points out Kant's influence as being even more specific: he injected the finite at the very beginning of the inquiry, examining knowledge first and attempting to solve at the very outset the question of epistemological limits.[10] In a more general sense, Kant recognized practical reason as being deeper and more ontal in force than speculation. Hume had denied to reason the power of discerning causes, but Kant restores this force to will.[11] The moral law within Kant was worlds apart from the starry skies above him. Knowledge is always mediate, a synthesis. Will is something immediate, to be trained into goodness for the sake of good will itself.[12] Kant's critical philosophy is static and formal. His moral thought is concerned only with the faculty at work. Pure duty, law for the sake of law, categorical imperatives, the formalism of the Stoic virtue for virtue's sake—these are the principles in the ethics of Kant, a system that is embodied today in the tendency of scientism to stress what is called "open-mindedness," good will toward everybody and everything, good will for its own sake because knowledge has nothing to do with it.

Thus there are in the fabrics of the two most influential philosophies of modern times some profound differences that leave the mind unsatisfied and account in a broad historical sense for the present-day opposition in philosophy between scientism and existentialism. Hegel sewed a patch across the two-toned opposition. He removed the contradiction by denying the principle of contradiction. He absorbed the existentialisms of his predecessors into their essentialism. The essential is made to include the existential as one of its passing phases of development. The abstract universal is real, and the individual is indeterminate within it. In the radical

[10] Cf. *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*, Bonn, 1929 (*passim*).
[11] *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, 1902-1915, v. 3, p. 371.
[12] *Ibid.*, v. 5, p. 393.

dynamism of Hegel, all is mediate and the existing individual, acting in a vital, " booming, buzzing confusion," has no meaning or value. Meaning is acquired only when the individual is dissolved away by the dialectical process. In the vast contours of Hegelianism, where opposition is supposed to be overcome by a series of *Aufhebungen*, the essentialism of Hegel's predecessors really triumphs.[13]

But contradiction is not explained by explaining it away. A problem is not solved by denying its existence.[14] Efforts in this direction become only a game, leaving the mind unquenched. The individual is explained in Hegelianism by being subsumed and de-individualized. The being of the universe, the locus of pleasure and pain, the heartaches and the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to, is in reality so vague and de-ontologized, the ordinary man is told, that it becomes synonymous with the *ens rationis* of logic. But, the ordinary man replies, as he does to the formalism of modern science, that pleasure and pain, the ability to drive a car and to answer questions in semester quizzes, are not just logical forms. They are ontal facts. It is just such a reply which existentialism gives.

Existentialism can thus be understood by reference to the Hegelianism which provoked its first expression in Kierkegaard.[15] It recovers pre-Hegelian existentialism, pressing it to its extremes. As Hegel wrapped existence within essence, as modern science, kindred in spirit to Hegelianism, seeks to exhaust the concrete by reduction to logico-mathematical forms, so in existentialism, essence, thought, and meaning are deemed

[13] This is also the case with Communism which, however existential it may present itself, is essentialist and theoretical at root.

[14] This is what the existentialists do: " The modern existentialists do not really wish to solve the problem of existence; they wish to curb our right to raise the problem." Blondel, M., " The Inconsistency of Jean Paul Sartre's Logic, THE THOMIST, X (1947), p. 397.

[15] For a study of their relation, cf. Wahl, J., *Etudes Kierkegaardiennes*, Paris, 1938; also " Kierkegaarde's Critique of Hegel " by J. Collins in *Thought*, XVIII (1943), pp. 74-100. Cf. also Brunner, P., *Ursprung und Grundzuge der Existenzphilosophie* in Scholastik, 1938, 2.

illusory and existence alone is authentic. What this existentialism is, the following pages by analyzing themes from Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Sartre,[16] will attempt to show and then, in broad fashion, to criticize. Intending only to illustrate the central notion of existentialism, this study purports to illustrate the typical ideas of each of the men treated, without the completion, background-tracing, and fuller reference to their critics which reasonable space here delimits. Though the critical portion of this essay is comparatively short, it is in reality the chief aim. As Lavelle has said, our aim in studying other philosophers should not be to think what they thought but to know what to think ourselves.[17]

II. Kierkegaard

Existentialism is a simple doctrine, simple almost to the point of nihilism. Once its perspective has been grasped, its finer lines seem like repetitions. In his familiar, personal mode of expression, Sartre, the psychologist is often clearer than Kierkegaard, dominantly a theologian, Heidegger, the metaphysician, and Jaspers, the moralist. Reflection, according to Sartre, cannot achieve the noble aim of self-knowledge preached by Socrates. In the reflective process, the subject bends back on his own experience but, by the very nature of bending back, the moment of thought is posterior to the moment of experience, and hence the reality of experience eludes us. In another way, this same principle may be expressed by a familiar modern contrast between thought and experience proposed by Locke and dogmatized by Kant. Thought must remain outside ex-

[16] The reason for grouping these four men is their obvious community of doctrine and their current popularity. The term "existentialism" is applied to them without qualification. In other respects, it must be qualified. Thus no attempt will be made to include the theological existentialism of Chestov and Berdyaev, the spiritual existentialism of Lavelle, Le Senne, Marcel, the doctrines of Troisfontaines, the personalism of Maurice Nédoncelle, and literary expressions like those of Camus and de Beauvoir; one may even add Dostoievsky. Kierkegaard is included because, though a theologian, his works swing largely through philosophy. The so-called existentialism of St. Thomas is also not in question here.

[17] *Le Moi et Son Destin*, Paris, 1936, p. 8.

perience in order to grasp experience, existentialism says. Because thought is not the experience which it represents, it can never tell what that experience is. The intellectual knowledge of things, Kant has persuaded modern man, cannot tell us what reality is, except as conceptualized, hence de-ontologized, de-existentialized, derealized.

Kierkegaard reacted against the extreme intellectualism of Hegel who viewed all being as simply the Idea in development. This plenary reality, Hegelianism goes on, discloses itself in history and is genuinely approached by fitting its various parts into a system. Bradley and Joachim in England and, more recently, Blanshard in this country, have well stated the coherence doctrine of truth that stems from Hegel. An idea is regarded as true not, as in traditional philosophy, when it conforms to the real,[18] but when it can be integrated into an "arrangement of ideas, self-consistent and complete."[19] The highest fling of knowledge, the deepest reach toward value is made, according to this view, as the mind tends to the more and more universal, the more and more abstract, the more and more logically architectonic, capable of achieving a wider and wider vista of organization and system. But every individual is unique. It does not fit nicely into a system. Only universal and abstract principles can be systematized.[20]

Kierkegaard insisted, and insist we must, that the individual alone exists. Roger Bacon said that one individual, because it exists, is worth more than all the universals in the world. Mere system does not explain this individual, the concrete, the existential. Systemism is a purely essentialist metaphysic. A policeman arrests a man not humanity in the bulk. To give a universal rule to an individual is, to quote Lichtenberg, like giving a cookbook instead of food to a hungry man.

Kierkegaard discerned that a system can never be truly

[18] Cf. Ryan, J. K., "The Problem of Truth" in *Essays in Thomism* (ed. R. Brennan), New York, 1942.

[19] Bradley, F., *Appearance and Reality*, London, 1893, p. 360.

[20] For a critique of systemism, cf. Bennett, O., *The Nature of Demonstrative Proof According to the Principles of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas*, Washington, 1943.

known and evaluated until it is completely formed. In Hegelianism, only the past can really be known, since the present is still becoming. "*Wesen*," as Kierkegaard and Sartre repeat from Hegel, "*ist was gewesen ist.*" Essence is what has been. Thus, the ultimate meaning of history, always in dialectical ferment, transcends the individual thinker here and now. The future, when it plummets into the past may loosen new and revolutionary secrets of the real. As in scientific method which has so many similarities to Hegelianism, tomorrow's discoveries may make today's ideas seem archaic. Bradley insisted that "thought is compelled to take the road of indefinite expansion." [21] Dewey, influenced by both idealism and the scientific method, speaks of philosophy as providing a pattern "to lead us ever onward and outward." [22]

If the conclusion of the system is lacking, the whole structure is open to question. For the characteristic of a system is that it must be complete. If a coat lacks a cuff button, it may still be worn, but with systematic science, where all principles are universal and hence are equal to each other, the story is different. The missing conclusion, if it contradicts the architectonic of the developing system of ideas, has retroactive power to destroy the whole structure. Madame de Stael once wrote that the German language did not permit a sentence to be interrupted; the verb, the most important word, comes at the very end, and interrupted sentences are meaningless. Hegelianism, Scientism, Marxism are in the midst of a sentence that is always being said. They never get to the last word.

Formally, Kierkegaard propounds two theses on system: a) that a logical system is possible, and b) that an existential system is impossible.[23] The first proposition can be gleaned from a glance at logic itself. It prescinds from the existential, with its living dialectic. It begins with the arbitrary and abstract. As in scientism, the thinker is not an historical reality

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 165.

[22] *Experience and Education*, New York, 1938, p. 112. Italics mine.

[23] *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (tr. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1944, hereinafter cited as *CUP*, pp. 99 ff.

on the march with history. He stands on the sidelines, watching history move by. It is as though a leader gave the command, "Whole battalion, about face!" but did not about face, himself.[24] In systemism man becomes, in the language of Descartes, a spectator looking at reality and not a part of it,[25]—a passive, inert, purely logical entity himself or, as Kierkegaard dubs him, "a ghost." Raymond Lully long before modern systemism, had envisioned a thinking machine that would do for logic, if the right premises were fed into it, what the modern comptometer does for numbers. But an existential system is impossible, according to Kierkegaard. Systematic thought, like reflection as Sartre described it, is wholly inadequate to the real. To penetrate reality, thought must abrogate itself. It is thus no longer thought in terms of universals but immediate experience, the communion of self with self. It is untractable by systemism. The present instant is something ineffable, an atom of eternity, and existence can only be met in the experience of it.[26]

When Kierkegaard attacked the historical approach to reality, he was still crusading against Hegel but under a different banner. Influenced by Hegel, who stimulated a universal interest in history, theologians of the time, like Martenson, were attempting to apply the historical method to theology itself. They tried to make faith a matter of reason, showing that historical evidence is absolute like the history which Hegel envisioned. They attempted to argue from their present historical moment to the Gospel narratives as though faith were available to philosophical speculation which Hegel had pictured. The rationalism of the nineteenth century, with its historical direction that culminated in Strauss and Harnack and later has come to regard as mysticism or myth whatever is not statistically available, was already under way.

Once more Kierkegaard rose up with full steam against Hegelianism. Historical reality, he kept repeating, is not com-

[24] *Repetition* (tr. W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1941, p. 137.
[25] *CUP*, p. 141.
[26] *Ibid.*, p. 107.

mensurate with eternity and eternal happiness. There is no proportion between cause and effect. Aristotelianism could not understand man's ultimate end as the beatific vision because it could not see the proportion between man's finite acts and the reward of seeing God. It was Aquinas who completed Aristotle by showing that grace is a participation in infinity, rendering man capable of beatitude. Kierkegaard, another Aristotle rising up against a nineteenth-century system of Platonic universals, stated that historical research could only approximate the past and " an approximation is essentially incommensurable with an infinite personal interest in eternal happiness." [27] Historical research does not bear on either the infinite or the personal, and as James, a later reaction to Hegel argued, it is disinterested.

Reason, Kierkegaard insisted, can only approximate faith. The schoolboy who rated sixty-nine in his examinations instead of the required seventy still failed. The pedestrain, who almost got across the tracks in front of the streamliner, was still struck and killed. Thus it is with history as opposed to faith and eternal happiness. No matter how much scholarship may be invested in pure history, there is no continuity between faith and reason. Reason does not taper off into faith, like a polygon increasing the number of its sides indefinitely to become a circle " For nothing is more readily evident than that the greatest attainable certainty with respect to anything historical is merely an approximation." [28]

Who or what is this existing individual, so disproportionate to the Hegelian abstract universal? As Kierkegaard, though pretending to oppose romanticism, puts it:

> Existence constitutes the highest interest of the existing individual, and his interest in his existence constitutes his reality. What reality is cannot be expressed in the language of abstraction. Reality is an *inter-esse* between the moments of that hypothetical unity of thought and being which abstract thought presupposes. Abstract thought considers both possibility and reality, but its concept of reality is a false reflection, since the medium within which

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 26. [28] *Ibid.*, p. 25.

the concept is thought is not reality, but possibility. Abstract thought can get hold of reality only by nullifying it, and this nullification of reality consists in transforming it into possibility.[29]

A possible being is not one that exists here and now but one that can be. The emphasis is not on *be* but on *can*. If thought de-existentializes the real, transforming it into possibility, then Kierkegaard can invoke the old maxim: *ab posse ad esse non valet illatio*. The existing individual, possibilizing his being by thought, can never know himself. To know his own individuality, to think it universally, as pure intellection must do, he must abstract from this existing individuality. Thus a contradiction is involved. This is really the critical doctrine of existentialism. Once this light is seen, the whole of existentialism becomes its monochromatic reflection.

Hegel and modern systemism extol only what Kierkegaard calls "objective" knowledge. As Heidegger will argue, we must first examine the questions which we put to being to determine by the nature of the question what kind of answer is possible. Kierkegaard, though not as extreme at least by intention, argues a similar case. Disdaining as he did the "objective," Hegelian approach which could not, because of its universality, include the most important entity in the world, the uniquely existing individual, Kierkegaard stands for an approach to existence by existence itself, an immediate approach to the immediate.

Every individual is an original being islolated from the guiding voice of universal principles unaided by thought and speculation which are on a vastly different level from individuality, compelled to lead his life by an abrupt movement which he and he alone can deploy. If thought is our guide, Kierkegaard asks, if principles must be first recognized before action can occur, an infinite regression must result. Let us take the case of reflection. We reflect, it is said, on ourselves. But to know that we are reflecting, we must in turn reflect on the first reflection, and so on. Since reflection cannot stop itself—for it would be using itself in the very process—how does the series of reflec-

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 279.

tions end? It ends, Kierkegaard declares, by a resolve of the reflector, by an act of will, by a decision that Sartre will later term completely gratuitous and radically contingent. It is thus the subject who stops the reflection, not being or the self-evidence of being. It is this absolute, abrupt, spontaneous act on the part of the individual which conditions his whole life, his whole philosophy, his whole moral view.

Being is discovered to the human mind in the actualization of the mind's own thinking of reality. Louis Lavelle, in a different setting, speaks of act accomplishing itself.[30] Being is grasped, philosophy is born, in that process, Kierkegaard would hold, by which the thinker's subjectivity comes to consciousness of itself. It is, as it were, a thought of a thought, where thought and object, self and self, are indistinguishably united. Schelling and Fichte are here suggested. Marcel has defined his existentialism as a " second reflection," a reflection on reflection itself.[31] What Bergson called the natural metaphysic of the human spirit centers on things thought about, not thought thinking. Yet in the process of thinking about things, thought may be considered as a being or event under way. The dynamism in that process is what Kierkegaard wants to underscore.

A final approach to this view may be made through the terminology of consciousness. A distinction may be made between two kinds of consciousness: concomitant, when associated with the event taking place in the psychic structures of the individual as being itself con-known with the object at the very moment when the object itself is known, and reflex, when it is consciousness of a psychic event as an object or thing. Existentialists hold that experience, if it is known at all, must be disclosed in concomitant consciousness. Such an experience is pre-ontological, pre-reflexive. In the words of Guthrie, meta-

[30] Lavelle, in contrast to the existentialists here studied, views this act not as an annihilation but as a participation in a being, viewed, in somewhat Cartesian fashion, as providing the finite being power to pose itself. For a study of his thought that comes to direct issue with existentialism, cf. *De l'Etre* (2nd and rev. ed.), Paris, 1947.

[31] E. g., *Etre et Avoir*, Paris, 1935, p. 28.

physics and logic are blended.[32] Since subject and object cannot be separated, the meaning of the experience slips away, unknown.

What produced this event, associated with pre-ontological concomitant consciousness, which indeed in the absence of distinction between subject and object, is pre-ontological consciousness? The decision of the subject itself. Hegel held to an infinite mediation between one reality and another, one reflection and another, reflection and reality. But the original decision of the Kierkegaardian subject is unmediated and hence isolated and absolute. Here in the decisive resolve of the individual, in his own subjectivity, is the mystery and meaning of reality. It is this aloneness which leads Kierkegaard to his concept of anxiety.

In such a light, it is logical that Kierkegaard should make the highest task of the existing individual that of becoming subjective, of realizing and repeating what he is from within, realizing and repeating through this non-cognitive, pre-ontological confronting of self with self, this act accomplishing itself in process. Every human being, he writes, has a specific gravity to tend toward what he is not.[33] Kierkegaard would have man strive to become what he is, to realize in the utter dynamic sense of that word his own subjectivity. Thus he says:

> I should suppose that education was the curriculum one had to run through in order to catch up with oneself, and he who will not pass through this curriculum is helped very little by the fact that he was born in the most enlightened age.[34]

Man must will decisively to be himself. At the fulcrum of concomitant consciousness, the emotions, will, and intellect are delicately united, and here is realized that infinite personal interest in eternal happiness which was incompatible with the historical, approximative, systematic approach: " Christianity is spirit, spirit is inwardness, inwardness is subjectivity, sub-

[32] *Introduction au Problème de l'Histoire de la Philosophie. La Metaphysique de l'individualité a priori de la Pensée,* Paris, 1937, p. 31.

[33] *CUP,* p. 499.

[34] *Fear and Trembling* (tr. W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1944, p. 65.

jectivity is essentially passion, and at its maximum an infinite personal interest in one's eternal happiness." [35]

For an abstracting Hegelian type of thinker, truth is objectified and existence abrogated. But for the genuine hero, truth is the probing of one's own inwardness. The purely objective and universal scientist is indifferent to the existing individual who can only recover and recognize himself from within. Kierkegaard's view of truth may again be etched out in terms of process. Thought may be described, even in traditional philosophy, as an appropriation of the real. It is an apprehension, an assimilation, of the object with this object remaining objective while yet being known. For Kierkegaard, the secret to the real lies in the appropriation as a subjective process. Truth is the personal mode of appropriation, a realization within the individual; the less he depends on an object to mediate the realization, the more perfect does his personal truth become. This subjective dynamism is of interest to the individual; he is passionately interested in it, as opposed to the de-ontologized and dehumanized Hegelian, whom Kierkegaard describes as a ghost. All men, Kierkegaard says, need not think of the same object; they need not have a common faith or an organized religion. The only important reality is this mode as a mode, this process as a process.

Readers will recognize Kierkegaard's thought as suggesting that general tradition of Protestant theology which stems from Luther and thrives on the Kantian morality of formalism, categoric imperatives, and the autonomy of the human will. The tremendous role of inwardness, passion, subjectivity, process, secrecy, individuality, and the absolute character of man before God, unmediated by objective agreements, objective practices, and objective ethical precept, suggests both vocabulary and form for the so-called Evangelical Theology of northern Europe, for Barth, Brunner, Tillich, and for Niebuhr and Keane.[36] Kant's notions are almost literally translated in the

[35] *CUP*, p. 33.

[36] No attempt can be made to deal here with these interpretations nor with the interpretation of Kierkegaard by such Catholic thinkers as E. Przywara T. Haecker, and R. Troisfontaines.

statement that "there is an absolute duty toward God; for in this relationship of duty the individual as an individual stands related absolutely to the absolute." [37] Works, it is apparent from Kierkegaard's standpoint, do not matter. Faith is justification. Sin could be overcome by faith as Luther himself had suggested.[38] But Luther had ninety-five theses, Kierkegaard said. He in turn had only one: subjectivity, spirit, passion, interest, faith—in a word, existence.

Recurrently, Kierkegaard alludes to existence as a type of striving, a thought that Lessing had previously emphasized. Kierkegaard agrees with Lessing that truth lies in the search for an object, not in the object searched. If God held truth in one hand and the eternal pursuit of it in the other, He would, Lessing stated, choose the second hand.[39] But if we are constantly occupied in immanent striving, how are we to reach a knowledge of a transcendent God, Whom traditional thought declares to be known even by reason? Lessing and Kierkegaard declare, typically enough, that there is no bridge between the historical, finite knowledge and God's existence and nature. This gap can only be bridged by a "leap." [40] Faith is a completely irrational thing, and yet it is, paradoxically enough, the highest duty of a Christian. Because it is an infinite act of resignation, it is blind and completely decisive. There is an unmediated and completely a-intellectual belief, much like that of Kant's proof for God's existence. *Natura non facit saltus*, Leibniz said. But faith, according to Kierkegaard, must do so. There is no mediator between God and man, nothing like a Church, historical revelation, or tradition. Every individual must make this leap for himself. Faith has neither rational content nor motives of credibility. It is not an act of the intellect commanded by the will. It is completely in the will, in the decisiveness, inwardness, the infinite interest of the subject. There is a complete, abrupt, irrational discontinuity between

[37] *Fear and Trembling*, p. 65.

[38] *Sickness unto Death* (tr. W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1944, hereinafter cited as SD, p. 132.

[39] *CUP*, p. 97.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 92.

religion and everything else. That is why Kierkegaard finds it contradictory to speak of a "Christian world."[41] Man was to reach God by an act of inwardness, husbanding all of his forces into an intensive unity of a pure, an infinite decision.[42]

The task of being a Christian is always the task of becoming a Christian, becoming subjective. There is no public censorship in this highest act, man is his own censor, greater than the censor of the Republic of Rome. In pure becoming, we really become nothing since the dynamism is only terminated by the sin of man. Becoming something, holding out for ourselves, is sin. Christianity is thus always a paradox. It is an existential act and an existential transcendence. *Credo quia absurdum.* It is an either-or relation in which man is nothing versus being. It must sacrifice the temporal completely or it is false. It is the quest of historical knowledge and the attention to historical events which are sin.

The notion of the leap is an occasion to bring forward the problem of anxiety or dread. This is not fear in the ordinary sense. Fear is always fear of a definite object, recognized and menacing. Anxiety is the fear of ourselves. It is the fear of nothing.

What is it that produces the first psychological state in each individual, that puts him into the parade of history with a personal part to play? What is it that awakens him to a consciousness of himself and of the world about him? In empirical physics, where the law of inertia reigns, the thinker is always envisioned as being acted on rather than acting. Knowledge is here not the act of a subject, seizing the real, becoming it. Quite the contrary, man is inert, determined by outside influences like Morris' buzzer.[43] In this view, man becomes a purely passive being, like the Hegelian ghost. But experience indicates the inadequacy of such a view. There comes a point in the knowledge relation where man reacts, where he is awakened. Since the object cannot act on him inertially *ad infinitum*, he

[41] *Attack upon Christendom* (tr. W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1944, p. 31.
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 81.
[43] *Signs, Language, and Behavior*, New York, 1946, *passim.*

really awakens himself. He is conscious, so to speak, before experiencing knowledge. He is something in his own right before things act on him. But how do we explain this process by which self awakens self to consciousness? Here is where the notion of anxiety or anguish makes its appearance.

Anxiety is defined by Kierkegaard as "inexplicable nothing" [44] and again as "the alarmng possibility of being able." [45] Before actual consciousness of any object, there is possible consciousness of it. Since this awakening could not take place inertially through the action of the objective world on our consciousness, there must be an absolute, qualitative "leap" by which we bring ourselves, as it were, into conscious existence. Why must this be a "leap?" Simply because there is no continuity between possibility and existence, any more than between reason and faith. It is this isolation of the individual, this state where, unguided and unmoved by anything that is outside of him, he must bring himself to consciousness and existence, that discloses anxiety. Kierkegaard even speaks of this sentiment as being anterior to possibility.[46] It is a state of recognizing, as it were, that our possibilities depend for their actualization on us and us alone. It is this pristine state, escaped by no individual and faced by him in total solitude, that forces us to shoulder the responsibility for our own existence. But it is not a pristine experience only. It hounds man through his whole life. Every decision must eventually be made in that utter isolationism of existence which only a leap can transcend: "One may liken dread to dizziness. He whose eye chances to look down into the yawning abyss becomes dizzy. But the reason for it is just as much his eye as it is the precipice. For suppose he had not looked down." [47]

Sartre, inheriting the notion of anxiety from the Kierkegaardian tradition, illuminates this example. Fear would be occasioned by the possibility that someone would push us down into the precipice. Dread is felt by the fact that we might hurl

[44] *The Concept of Dread* (tr. W. Lowrie), Princeton, 1944, hereinafter cited as *CD*, p. 58.
[45] *Ibid.*, p. 40. [46] *Ibid.*, p. 30. [47] *Ibid.*, p. 55.

ourselves down into the abyss. It is ourselves who are the restraining force. Unaided, the restraint must involve the qualitative "leap." Since the leap is irrational, gratuitous, it might just as well have prompted a contrary decision: to plunge ourselves down.[48] Sartre likewise has the following example: A soldier, loading shells into his cannon, might have fear of being under fire the following day. Dread would be associated with the fact that the responsibility for what he does under fire, the decision where to retreat or where to dig a foxhole, rests with him alone.[49]

Anxiety is thus alarming: "there is the egotistic infinity of possibility which does not tempt like a definite choice but alarms and fascinates with its sweet anxiety."[50] Anxiety is thus the fear of nothing, the fear of ourselves. Possibility cannot force us into action from the outside because it is infinite nor, from the inside, because it is possible only. Anxiety is the sealing sentiment of our subjectivity and inwardness. There is no fleeing from it, and no seeking of it. To flee or to seek would be decisions fermented by anxiety itself. Anxiety is essentially ambiguous, isolating man and proposing an infinity of possibility. It gives a range of choice in which there is no reason for going in one direction rather than another.

As a theologian, Kierkegaard was greatly concerned with the problem of sin which Lutheran tradition solves in a peculiar way. What is it that made Adam sin? It was not the concupiscence of a fallen nature, birthmarked by sinfulness; Adam had no such dispositions. Adam's sin was original in the etymological sense of that word. This sin, Kierkegaard attempts to explain by the concept of anxiety. Sin came into the world not by simply multiplying sinfulness but by a qualitative leap. It was possible for Adam to sin, but this sin became an actuality through the intermediary of anxiety. What else could mediate between possibility and actuality in the Kierkegaardian dialectic? Sin occurs in general because every man

[48] *L'Etre et le Néant*, Paris, 1943, pp. 69 ff.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 69 ff.
[50] *CD*, p. 55.

tempts himself. He is alone with himself. Never by a quantitative increment of sinfulness do we have sin. Every sin involves a leap. Anxiety, the possibility of possibility, the alarm produced by nothingness which surrounds and isolates the individual, brought and brings sin into the world. It is responsible for every sin since Paradise. "The possibility of freedom announces itself in dread." [51] Sin, a leap, cannot be explained; it is always original.

God is discovered, Kierkegaard says, by turning toward our guilt. Essentially depraved, every individual must first experience guilt psychologically, and so "if the finite spirit would see God it must begin by being guilty." [52] To posit guilt is to eliminate dread and attain repentance. The conscious interruption in the dynamic striving to be what we are and to intensify our subjectivity entails sin in the broad sense. The recovery of that dynamism, the decisiveness of the leap which is faith, is the salvific experience.

But does Kierkegaard ever come to a knowledge of God? It was apparent to him that the subjective selfhood which he so championed was never realizable. Man can never become completely himself simply because he is never completely inward. He is always dependent on objects. He is always interrupting his march toward God by looking at the sidelines. False to his destiny, he is always frustrated. He commits sin: "So regarded man is not yet a self." [53] Defining subjectivity, Christianity, faith as the relationship of self to self, Kierkegaard writes: "For despair is not a result of the disrelationship but of the relation which relates itself to itself. And the relation to himself a man can never get rid of, any more than he can get rid of himself, which is moreover one and the same thing, since the self is the relationship to one's self." [54]

This relationship may be simply stated to mean that man is not knowingly related to himself except as far as he knows other things. There is thus no pure mode of appropriation but always a *tertium quid* which is the object known and appro-

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 96.
[53] *SD*, p. 17.
[54] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

priated. Man is not a pure relation. All of his relations require both subject and object. Despair is thus the sickness unto death. The more we flee it, the more conscious of it do we become. Moreover, the price for attaining God is our own annihilation which Truc, a French critic of Sartre, has compared to that of Hindu philosophy.[55] We cannot remain ourselves and know God.

Thus the final significance of Kierkegaard, despite his intentions and the pleas of a number of critics, is despair. The high ambitions which he vaunted for subjectivity and for Christianity have emerged from his final philosophical synthesis as irrealizable. Man, gloomy, guilty, and disintegrated, must tramp the earth in vain: "Hence the self in its despairing effort to will to be itself labors into the direct opposite, it becomes really no self. In the whole dialectic within which its acts there is nothing firm, what the self is does not for an instant stand firm, that is eternally firm." [56]

III. Heidegger

A student of Husserl, Martin Heidegger applies the method of his master to the problem of existence. For Husserl, to put it briefly, the world, prescinding from its existential status, is described as it appears to pure consciousness.[57] In Heidegger, this transcendental describer becomes being-thrown-into-the-world. At the end of Heidegger's twist to phenomenology, Kierkegaard is met, but it is a Kierkegaard who is likewise twisted, wrung dry of all theological implication. Of Heidegger it could surely be said, as Marcel said of Jaspers, that his thought is a religion laicized.[58]

In a manner that Sartre is at even greater pains to show, Heidegger admits no distinction between appearance and reality. Appearances, phenomena, are themselves being,[59] and

[55] Truc, G., *De J. P. Sartre à. L. Lavelle*, Paris, 1946, pp. 25 ff.

[56] *SD*, 110.

[57] For the best study of Husserl cf. Berger G., *Le Cogito dans la Philosophie de Husserl*, Paris, 1941.

[58] *Du Refus à l'Invocation*, Paris, 1940, p. 325.

[59] *Sein und Zeit*, Halle a. d. Salle, 1935, hereinafter cited as *SZ*, pp. 29 ff.

so sign and signified turn out to be the same thing. Describing what appears, phenomenology thus lacks a medium to give meaning to what is ultimate since there is no ultra-ultimate to render it.

Sein und Zeit, Heidegger's major work,[60] would charge headlong into the question of the meaning of being, which he proclaims to be his avowed and unrelenting purpose. But in the very beginning, the subject discovers himself inhabiting the house which he set out to build. In asking the question, he finds that he has already answered it. The thing with which the question deals, the source from which the answer is sought, the questioner himself not to mention his question—all are beings.[61] It would seem then that the question of being involves a vicious circle.

The existence of the circle, Heidegger admits, but he denies that it is vicious. In phenomenology, no attempt is made to deduce being, he argues, and so the formal fallacies of logic are superseded. What actually takes place, according to Heidegger, is more of an exposition by pointing,[62] working at a pre-scientific and pre-ontological level. Ontology deals with truth as attained through judgment, but what of the foundations of judgment which are pre-judicative, pre-predicative? [63] What is the reason for the principle of sufficient reason? [64] Existentialism insists that these ultimates be explored and that, since the questioner conditions the answers to his questions, his own nature be examined first. Leibniz declared: *Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu, nisi intellectus ipse.* But what is this *intellectus?* Kant, Heidegger says, was plod-

[60] This work is acknowledged by the author as the first half of his ontology, the prolegomenon to a positive philosophy of being which has been reported alternately as partially completed and abandoned. That the latter alternative is probable will be seen from the critical remarks below which show no room for positive expression on the ruins left by the earlier book.

[61] *SZ*, p. 5 ff.

[62] . . . aufweisende Grundfreilegung., *Ibid.*, p. 8.

[63] *Vom Wesen des Grundes* in *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Phänemonelogische Forschung* (Festschrift E. Husserl), Halle a. d. Salle, 1929, hereinafter cited as *VWG*, p. 76.

[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 76-79.

ding over the right road by examining knowledge first, moving from criteriology to metaphysics.[65] But what is the Kantian *a priori* prior to entering action? What is *a priori* to the *a priori?* These are the types of questions which existentialism poses. In such an adventure, Heidegger and later Sartre say, no circular demonstration is entailed since the very nature of reflection consists of the unity between subject and object. Phenomenology, as Heidegger sees it, reduces to describing the nature of the human reality, the *Dasein.*[66] Measurement can be made only when we have previously calibrated an instrument.

Existentialism is blocked in its quest for the pre-conscious status of the *Dasein* because, when this status is considered, the *Dasein* must already be conscious. Already under way in asking questions about its origin, it can never be stationary to take a fix. In the ontological setting which Heidegger prefers to the psychological, the *Dasein* is never pure being but being-in-the-world. This simply means that the world is always " there " with the *Dasein*, never thought away. Preoccupied, if one may use de Waelhens' rendering of *Besorgen*,[67] man's knowledge always presupposes an object as Brentano insisted. We cannot see ourselves as others see us. Likewise, in the notion of the world, as we possess it, there is always the fact of our presence in it, our in-dwelling.[68] Otherwise the thinker could not think of it. This might be phrased by showing that a frame of reference must be located somewhere to locate

[65] *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, passim.*

[66] *SZ*, p. 436. *Dasein*, " being there," has the wider meaning of *existence* as opposed to *essence* in German. But Heidegger, it will be seen, describes man in terms of existence, and hence man and *Dasein* become equivalent. To preserve the originality of Heidegger's thought we shall follow the convention of his critics by keeping the word *Dasein* in its German form, since its etymological sense, being there, does not have a one-word equivalent in English. Also at this point, it should be noted that Heidegger is not radically phenomenological. He is positing being at the beginning and *describing* it as his second logical movement.

[67] *La Philosophie de Martin Heidegger*, Louvain, 1946, p. 37. This is by far the best exposition of Heidegger's thought to appear in any language. Gabriel Marcel remarked that philosophers of the future will be reading it, rather than Heidegger, to see what Heidegger said.

[68] *SZ.*, p. 46.

another object. But the in-dwelling is not to be taken in the strict spatial sense. It has more the meaning of *colo, habito,* and *diligo.*[69] Nor can it be held that the world is a determination of the *Dasein* since the two cannot be distinguished.[70]

Heidegger emphasizes, redolent of Husserl, that he has undercut the problem of idealism versus realism. To distinguish the two orders would presuppose a standard in terms of which the inner and outer world could be lined up. But such a measure there cannot be since it would likewise suffer from the absence of a yardstick to define it. To pose the question of idealism and realism presumes an abstraction from the in-the-world character of the *Dasein,* an abstraction that is fated to failure.[71] Instead of asking about the existence of the external world, the philosopher should search out why such a question is asked.[72] The inquiry about being thus spirals inward, suggesting the Scotism which early captured Heidegger's interest, to an analysis of the *Da.*

Heidegger sharpens his dialectic to argue that the *Da,* opaque and irreducible, can only be for its own sake. Sartre expresses the idea by declaring that man is radically contingent. If what is ultimate in man is irrelational, it is gratuitous, spontaneous—spontaneous in the etymological sense of *sua sponte,* coming from the self.[73] Only what is related has responsibility, and every *Dasein* is related only to itself, responsible to itself and itself alone. " *Dasein* is existence, to which as being-in-the-world existence is for itself." [74] Yet to exist for its own sake does not entitle the *Dasein* to egoism; it simply determines that the decision to be egotistic or altruistic comes from the *Dasein,* alone in its thereness and hence moved only by itself. Honing down intelligible content until analysis leaves only the *Da,* Heidegger states that man's very substance is his existence.[75]

The *Dasein,* as already under way within a world and never outside of it surveying the implications of itself, is called *Sich-schon-vorweg-schon-sein in-einer-Welt.*[76] This notion of beforeness—*tempus est . . . secundum prius et posterius*—explains

[69] *Ibid.,* p. 54. [71] *Ibid.,* p. 205. [73] *VWG,* p. 102. [75] *Ibid.,* p. 212.
[70] *Ibid.,* p. 64. [72] *Ibid.,* p. 206. [74] *SZ,* p. 143. [76] *Ibid.,* p. 192.

why Heidegger, as it will be shown more clearly, seeks the whole meaning of the *Dasein* in terms of temporality. *Sich-vorweg*, thrown-into-the-world (*Geworfenheit*), man is abandoned. Abandonment, de-jection, is the *Dasein* in its character as *Da*,[77] hopelessly isolated from guidance. Who can help man, Sartre says, unless he spontaneously accepts, spontaneously seeks such counsel? In Nietzsche's language, man is here beyond good and evil. " I can no longer distinguish right from wrong." [78]

The disclosure of man's isolated character is the meaning of anxiety.[79] Abandoned before a destiny that he did not create and cannot control, man is always a being with . . . , a being in. . . . He is not first on the diving board and then in the stream. From the start, he is plunged into the world. He cannot localize, as in fear, an object that threatens. Unique, he must discover everything else in the ultimate analysis as absolutely strange (*das Unheimliche*).[80] He trembles not in the face of definite objects of the world but in the face of the world as such, the world as globally worldly and not as a pointalism of objects. In this infra-visible spectrum, his abandonment can be defined anew since, confronting the world as world, there is nothing not included in the anxiety-causing object from which he could seek help. Likewise, since there is nothing outside of this world for which he could be anxious—it would only be discoverable on the premise that the problem of this world is first faced and solved—man is anxious only for himself.[81] This is another way of saying that the *Dasein* is for its own sake,[82] the spontaneous combustion of nothingness. In a more generic sense, the *Dasein* is essentially care.[83]

But why does man fail to realize what existentialism declares him to be? Before coming to consciousness of himself, man leads a purely work-a-day life (*die Alltäglichkeit*).[84] He is in the world but not conscious of his being there in all of its

[77] *Ibid.*, p. 135.
[78] *No Exit and the Flies*, p. 119.
[79] *SZ*, p. 192.
[80] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[81] *Ibid.*, p. 187.
[82] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 193.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 146.

subtle substructures. In this earthy form, there are two possibilities that invite him constantly,[85] proper existence existentially recognizing its own isolation and improper existence in which man chooses to remain in a kind of *Alltäglichkeit*. A person in this commonplace mode should be represented by the impersonal pronoun "it" (*das Man*). *Das Man* is bound up in the world of affairs, plunging himself out of himself, searching and always alienating his true being, overthrowing himself.[86] He is neutral, an average more than an individual. He is not an act but a phenomenon, indifferent, passive, the slave of illusion, an object among objects.

The *Dasein* takes hold of itself by an act of transcendence. The logical question is: what is transcended? For Heidegger, it is *das Seiendes*, a term that may be taken to include all modalities of being that are not the proper existence of the *Dasein*.[87] In this transcendance, the *Dasein* is constituted as a self.[88]

But what is the other term of transcendance, apart from the transcending *Dasein*? It is the negation of all other-ness, as abandonment and anxiety starkly display. Like the chaos of sensations described by Plato, the point of departure for the structuring of the *Dasein*, the source of intelligibility, is the unintelligible (*Grundverborgenheit*). Transcending this chaotic existence (*das Seiendes*), the *Dasein* sees itself in the world.[89] What it really sees is its character as *Da*,[90] a relation of self to self,[91] spontaneous and contingent. Only through transcendence is the *Dasein* with its presence in the world, the first and indeed the last word in Heidegger's dialectic, awakened to its own evidence.[92] Whereas a more orthodox view would describe the knowable in terms of intimacy and identity, Heidegger defines knowability as transcendence, and so the mind of man remains in absolute darkness.[93]

But what is absolute darkness? What transcends pure exis-

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 43. [86] *Ibid.*, p. 178. [87] *Ibid.*, p. 230.
[88] *Was ist Metaphysik*, Bonn, 1929, hereinafter cited as *WM*, p. 20.
[89] *VWG*, pp. 97-98.
[90] *Ibid.*, p. 82.
[91] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[92] *Ibid.*, p. 98.
[93] *Ibid.*, pp. 82-83.

tence? It is nothing, and here anguish once again frames the picture of man. Anxiety is not directed to a thing. It is the fear of nothing, the experience of nothing.[94] In this experience, everything glides away from us, even a determinate ego.[95] With ourselves absolutely alone, everything else must be absolutely other, and the absolute other is nothing.[96] Everything else is annihilated so that existence might exist, being might be.[97] "In the structure of abandonment . . . resides essentially a nothingness. . . ." [98]

To say that man is abandoned is to say that he is but a project of himself (*Entwurf*),[99] emerging spontaneously, i. e., from himself.[100] To project is to be *vor-weg*. In the effort to understand itself, the *Dasein* builds itself from its own possibility. If the *Dasein* must emerge from nothingness, beginning in that experience of the naught that is dread, then it is obviously first possible and afterwards actual. The naught makes us aware of our possibility. To understand it is to understand ourselves. Hence, understanding is defined as a pro-jection. Already Kant had stated that we understand what we make.[101] "The *Dasein*," Heidegger writes, "determines itself as being, from its very possibilities. This is the formal sense of the existential grasping of the Dasein." [102] Man's primary meaning as a being that makes itself and exists for its own sake is the future.[103]

As the title of Heidegger's major work suggests, the sense of being is to be found in time, more precisely in the temporalization of the *Dasein* by itself. De Waelhens [104] has rightly reproached Heidegger for stacking the cards in his own favor by a preconceived notion that the *Dasein* is to be understood in terms of time only and then, to fit this prejudgment, defining the *Dasein* in terms of temporal modalities like abandonment and pro-ject. Heidegger's whole dialectic on the *Dasein*, the *sich-schon-vorweg*, has been an ingenious playing on the no-

[94] *WM*, p. 17.
[95] *Ibid.*, p. 18.
[96] *Ibid.*, p. 19.
[97] *Ibid.*, p. 26.
[98] *SZ*, p. 285.
[99] *Ibid.*, p. 148.
[100] *WG*, p. 102.
[101] *Kant, op. cit.*, v. 3, p. 12.
[102] *SZ*, p. 43.
[103] *Ibid.*, p. 327.
[104] *Op. cit.*, p. 244.

tions of *before* and *after* which would obviously be indistinguishable and inexpressible in the monotone of existentialist premises, were it not for an arbitrary note which Heidegger sounds from the backstage. Pro-ject, the thrust toward the future by which the *Dasein* comes to itself (*Zu-kunft*), is temporalization. Time always involves the whither (*das Wozu*).[105] C. I. Lewis, in a parallel circuit of scientism with the existentialists, has recently stated that the primary sense of knowledge is in the future.[106] Heidegger reduces this *Wozu* to another index that the *Dasein* is for its own sake. The future is a principle of organization, giving sense, purpose in the dynamic sense, to what is past. Discovery is thus a moment of the past, the awareness of abandonment; understanding is an affair of the future.[107] The *Dasein* has a past only because it is *sich vorweg*, ahead of itself. Between these two moments of abandonment and pro-ject, is the meaningless passing of the present, disclosing man as *Da*, irreducible and irrelational. Man is thus outside of himself, *sich-schon-vorweg*, abandoned, pro-jecting, present as radically there, hence not really in himself. Heidegger construes this exteriority as absolute "ek-stasis,"[108] in the ancient meaning of the word. There is a standing out from being, a nothingness. It is but "the possibility of a free being for its proper possibility."[109]

Time is more fundamental than space. The union of points in space is made possible through time.[110] But since space cannot be understood without reference to beings that are spatialized, a more specific analysis of Heidegger's world is needed.

Of supreme moment in such a description is the difference between being at hand as a tool (*das Zuhandenes*) and simply being present (*das Vorhandenes*). The second is discovered in terms of the first by a Dewey type of instrumentalism. There is in fact, a third kind of being which Heidegger calls the

[105] *SZ*, p. 43.
[106] *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, La Salle, Ill., 1946.
[107] *SZ*, p. 240.
[108] *Ibid.*, p. 329 ff.
[109] *Ibid.*, p. 144.
[110] *Ibid.*, p. 417.

worldliness of the world, the world as world,[111] disclosed as pure exteriority. This is the condition for discovering everything else.

The *Vorhandenes* is what does not present itself; it is a kind of *An sich* in being.[112] The *Zuhandenes*, on the contrary, is the world at man's service, conquered and controlled. The *Vorhandenes*, not taking its measure from the *Dasein*, has more the character of a hard and unyielding datum; when the *Zuhandenes* appears with "givenness," obtrusiveness, persistence, it takes on the character of the *Vorhandenen*. The more given the world, the less *Zuhanden* it is. To say that a hammer is heavy is to advert to the *Zuhandene*, the impression made (*in statu viae*) on our muscles. To generalize, announcing that corporeal being is heavy involves a leap, the lacuna—let us say—which induction must hurdle in moving from a limited range of experience to the whole. What accomplishes the leap is care (*Sorge*), standing at the border where transfer from the personal reference of the tool to the general fact of nature is accomplished, care as that ubiquitous attitude of man toward the world which mediates man's constant plunging into the unknown.

Zuhandenheit is intelligible only with respect to *Vorhandenheit*, the term (*terminus ad quem*) of the tool. That the world is not reducible to *Zuhandenheit* is apparent from the fact that in the attitude of care the *Zuhandenes* vanishes, and only the *Vorhandenes*, bulking large and opaque, the world as world, remains.[113] What happens in the reduction of the *Vorhandenes* to *Zuhandenen* as a possible solution to the mystery of being? It is true that the *Vorhandenes* in time changes into the *Zuhandenes*—science and civilization reflect man's conquest over nature. But darkness again prevails, for the *Zuhandenes* is in turn at the service of the meaningless, irreducible, existing *Dasein*.[114] "The pure 'that it is' discloses itself, the whence and the whither remain in the darkness."[115]

[111] *Ibid.*, p. 88.
[112] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[113] *Ibid.*, p. 75.
[114] *Ibid.*, p. 73.
[115] *Ibid.*, p. 134.

But what is it that calls the *Dasein* to come into existence? The answer is the *Dasein* itself. It is the voice which calls to its own self. It is already in existence, anguishing in its abandonment. Yet it is not in existence. It is the conscience of man, pro-jecting a pattern to be realized.[116] The voice calls being to its own possibility.[117]

From all this, it is apparent that the *Dasein* is autonomous. Radical freedom is its birthmark. Will is thus not ordained to reason. It is absolute. Spontaneous, the *Dasein* is utterly unaided and unmoved from without in its lonely transcendence. In fact, transcendence *is* freedom.[118] "In the choice of a choice does the *Dasein* make possible in the primary sense its own possibility."[119] Freedom thus is labelled "the ground of ground."[120]

The *Dasein* relates itself only to itself.[121] The scan of will which traditional philosophy declares to be as wide as universal good turns out here to be radically finite and particularized. Free only to choose itself, the *Dasein*—understanding the world as radically other—is free at the same time to choose the world. "The pro-jecting-abandoning imposition of choice by the world is freedom."[122] The simultaneity of imposition and radical freedom, the *necessity* of *freely* choosing, at once constrains and liberates man.[123]

Such a strait-jacketed freedom, typical of Heidegger's dialectic which unites contraries and even contradictories, is explainable by the principle of simultaneous origins (*Gleichursprunglichkeit*). The past, present, and the future are united by the *Da*; abandonment, project, evidence are at one; discovery, understanding, and discourse are indistinguishable.[124] All being is projected with . . . the *Dasein* (*Mitentwurfen*).[125] The irreducible thus does not exclude the manifold.

Another interesting problem in Heidegger is his theory of our knowledge of others (the *Mitsein*). For the *alltägliche*

[116] *Ibid.*, p. 277.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 273.
[118] *VWG*, p. 109.
[119] *SZ*, p. 268.
[120] *VWG.*, p. 109.
[121] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[122] *Ibid.*, p. 102.
[123] *Ibid.*, p. 101.
[124] *SZ*, p. 161.
[125] *Ibid.*, p. 315.

man, *Mitsein* is but a tool, an object among objects. But the *Dasein* finds others to be something much more, cooperators at its own level. *Mitsein* is given. The *Dasein* finds the notion of *Mitsein* included in its being, for only in such a light can fault and failure be explained.[126] One can only fail for a *Mitsein*, when complexity—*mit*—is introduced. In himself, man is not *mit* or complex. The *Dasein* simply is.

Others when understood at all are understood not in terms of relations but in terms of care, this time care for . . . (*Fürsorge*). Discerning readers will note here that Heidegger, even though not discussing the *Dasein* in all purity, is introducing a modification of being which he has previously put into the opaque realm of the unique and irrelational. He has introduced a complexity that is important in assessing his work. In fact, he speaks of knowing others as a kind of projection of ourselves into their being, recognizing that: "Other is a double of the self."[127] This is a crucial admission that will be later led to a rather crucial conclusion.

A final idea that cannot be overlooked in dealing with Heidegger is his notion of death. He has defined meaning in terms of pro-ject. The "whither" (*Wozu*), in the efficient order, relations conceived in the sense of "wherefor" form our only hope of knowledge. Death, the final destiny of man, must in this view become the final arbiter of life (its *terminus ad quem*). But death turns out to be unrepeatable. Everyone goes through it only once for himself since the deaths of others are events which he observes rather than acts out himself from within. Hence, the unicity, irrelationality, meaninglessness of death is the final seal of the meaninglessness of life. If philosophy is a meditation on death, as Socrates says, then philosophy likewise is nonsense. Man's proper attitude should be to keep himself free for death. It is after all, the most personal and genuine type of freedom, structured into our being as a possibility and permitting liberty its absolute autonomy; freedom is thus limited by nothing. For a man, keeping himself free for his final end, death is not the accident or disaster that,

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 120. [127] *Ibid.*, p. 124.

psychologically and metaphysically, it usually becomes. Only by recognizing nothingness as our final end are we free, just as nothingness was found to be at our origin. Time is absolutely finite.

The following theses apply to death: 1) there is a not-yet character to every *Dasein* which makes it always incomplete; 2) what comes to an end has the character of no-longer; 3) coming to an end involves the unrepeatable.[128] Since only in terms of the complete, the present, the repeatable do we have meaning, death makes the life that precedes it a meaningless answer to a meaningless question.

IV. Jaspers

Karl Jaspers is in many ways the most searching and provocative of the contemporary Kierkegaardian type of existentialist. His spirit is certainly the most synthetic, uniting into a single expression ideas scattered through Kierkegaard, Hegel, Kant, Nietzsche, Schelling, Max Weber, and Plotinus. Whereas Heidegger is interested in the problem of being, Jaspers focuses more on human existence, its place and meaning. Heidegger, by intention, leans more toward the metaphysical, Jaspers toward the moral.

By the divisions of his huge three-volume work, *Philosophie*,[129] Jaspers suggests a blueprint for presenting his thought: first, the problem of man's orientation in the world (*Weltorientierung*); secondly, the clarification of existence (*Existenzerhellung*); and thirdly, the study of transcendence.

That the philosophy of *Weltorientierung* is carved largely out of Kierkegaard's attack on Hegel, Jaspers would be willing to acknowledge. Philosophy is not a detached review of a passing parade. It is a daring. It is an awakening of one's self (*Selbstvergewisserung*). Not the study of an object, it can

[128] *Ibid.*, p. 242.

[129] Berlin, 1932. Except where otherwise indicated, citations below are taken from this work. For a very competent study of Jaspers, cf. de Tonquédec, J., *L'Existence d'apres Karl Jaspers*, Paris, 1945; cf. also Pareyson, L., *La filosofia dell'esistenza e Carlo Jaspers*, Naples, 1940 and Collins, J., "An Approach to Karl Jaspers," in *Thought*, 20 (1941), pp. 657-691.

be best defined as the realization of an inner act.[130] It grounds the authentic existence of the individual,[131] clarifying while producing, realizing while being transcended. The place of man in the cosmos, to use Scheler's phrase, reveals him as fenced off from the ultimate around him and the intimate within him, reduced like Nietszche's *Jasager* to pure striving rather than purposeful existence in a value-laden world.

Cosmic orientation shocks man toward limits that must be transcended if meaning and value are to be reached. The meditations on existence show that these limits are irremovable and that only the unconditional can surmount them. In the third stage, where the transcendent is discussed in terms of the ciphers in which it is embodied, the problem of deciphering the existential code, ambiguous and antinomic, is confronted.[131]

Jaspers' attack on systemism is of shattering proportions. The system, as Kierkegaard said, must be complete to be meaningful. It is utopian rather than historically keyed,[132] abstract and arbitrary in its attitude to existence. On the other hand, existentialism is much harder. " The existence philosophy cannot attain to a perfect figure in art nor to a decisive completion for the being of a thinker." [133] Imperfect, the various historical world pictures are not compelling because the first principles are relative to the system-maker; they are postulates. Only existence is compelling and imposing.[134] Systems are constantly disagreeing; there are different theories in science, different parties in politics, different guesses in the face of the unknown.[135] The placid, static character of systems is at variance with the dynamic core of existence and life. We live in a world of ontology, not of logic, a world where the individual is unmistakably more striking than the universal. Systems all end in symbols, in external substitutes for reality. They involve the infinite regression, the relative, the indeterminate.[136] Even Descartes, in the end, found rational evidence inade-

[130] *Existenzphilosophie*, Berlin, 1938, pp. 66-67.
[131] *Die Geistige Situation der Zeit*, Leipzig, 1931, hereinafter cited as *GSZ*, p. 127.
[132] v. 1, p. 79.
[133] *GSZ*, p. 145.
[134] v. 1, pp. 89 ff.
[135] v. 1, pp. 109 ff.
[136] v. 1, p. 198.

quate.[137] He seemed forced to an existential fact, thought in action, the sum of an existing thing. But the overall tone of Cartesianism resonates with the modern emphasis on logic; pure method without content is as meaningless as the Kantian *reine Vernunft*. Method without metaphysic is a random thing.[138]

Cosmic orientation, by its breakdown, brings man to his right senses, to the possibility of his existence through transcending the world. " The world picture is incomplete, it end with directions, ideas, intentions; it is not yet the whole but is becoming the whole." [139] But in this very failure there is revealed the reality of the existing subject whose continued questions have brought the failure to pass and who, in obstacle, becomes conscious of himself.[140]

The *Weltanschauung* is found to be unverifiable because it cannot verify its own self. This is the beginning of wisdom.[141] What remains from such a failure is no longer a world in which orientation can take place but a self who can orient, an immanence that can transcend. The wires that would unite reason with this existential world are clipped away. For there is no dipolar relation of subject and object. There is, rather, the confronting of self with self and the realization, through an act of faith,[142] not of reason, that this positing of the self can only be achieved through the transcendent and obviously Plotinian One. The search after the meaning of life and nature thus goes first into the world to orient itself, discovers the call toward possible existence, and moving like Nietzsche from the negative to the positive,[143] opens the way to transcendence. The world is thus a totality, existence is an origin, and the One is the transcendent.[144]

To give meaning to life, appeal is often made to religion,

[137] *Descartes und die Philosophie*, hereinafter cited as *DP*, p. 30.

[138] v. 1, p. 135.

[139] *Psychologie der Weltanschauungen*, Berlin, 1925, hereinafter cited as *PW*, p. 149.

[140] v. 1, 145.

[141] v. 1, p. 246.

[142] v. 1, p. 240.

[143] *Nietzsche*, Berlin, 1936, hereinafter cited as *N*, p. 101.

[144] v. 2, pp. 27-28.

science, and art. But all these are inadequate, Jaspers says. Prayer and cult bear upon another world, not the one, he declares, where life is led and challenges engaged. Revelation, he goes on, is an objective deposit, given once and for all and not adaptable to subjective, existential acceptance. Revelation is pictured as objective, whereas man moves from within. Revelation speaks in terms of objects and universals, Jaspers finds. Likewise, organization, a *corpus mysticum*, is said to be at variance with the existingly valuable individual.[145]

Science Jaspers thoroughly discredits. It extols the merely mechanical, moves from particular to general, lacks a taste for the obvious unity in our world, soars away toward the conceptual, is unable to examine itself, is abstract by contrast with life's concreteness.[146] With every step forward in science there comes not completion but new problems and unsuspected tasks.[147] Science is formal, ideal, logical, whereas existence is striving. Thought lies outside of being. It is not being but about being. At every moment when I make myself an object, I am indeed at the same time more than this object, namely an essence that can objectify itself.[148] I can never be unconditional and, simultaneously, know this fact. Knowledge would itself be a condition.[149] Philosophy is not algebraic knowledge but passion. It acts without end, wills without knowing.[150]

Art offers the highest hope. It is existential. Instead of transporting man to a different world, Jaspers holds, it deepens and reveals the world that is.[151]

In the second stage of Jaspers' thought, it is argued that philosophy reaches existence by rendering the subject conscious of himself.[152] Ontology, the categories, *Weltorientierungen*

[145] v. 1, pp. 294 ff.
[146] v. 1, p. 216.
[147] *GSZ*, p. 47.
[148] *Vernunft und Existenz*, Groningen, 1935, hereinafter cited as *VE*, p. 47.
[149] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[150] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[151] v. 1, p. 340.
[152] It is in this sense that *Existenzerhellung* is to be taken. Cf. de Tonquédec's note, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

prepare the way.[153] They give the philosopher a choice, a descent to that skepticism which Nietzsche termed a disease or the clarifying of his existence by reducing certainty to the present of self-certainty, by making all knowledge—Socrates-like—self knowledge. When such an identity occurs between knower and known, knowledge becomes a deed rather than a formal thing, a matter of *inneren Handeln*.[154] There is really not a choice between one world outlook and another but between to be oneself and not to be.[155] This choice brings us to the decisive consciousness of ourselves. "For where man is totally himself in a matter, there is for him an either/or, and then no compromise. He wills to drive things to the limit in order to come to a decision." [156]

Philosophy is thus a daily self-experience. It is lifting ourselves by the proverbial bootstrap to transcendence.[157] The emphasis is not on thinking as content but thinking as an act, a note that is redolent of Fichte. This decision, this *innere Handeln* is not universally known but historically experienced through a concrete participation in the historical process.[158] Such a concretion has been depicted variously by others as libido, anxiety, preoccupation, will to power, fear of death, tendency to death.[159]

What I really am, Jaspers says in parallel with Heidegger, is possible experience that is determined through my own concrete act of liberty. Man must be alone at his origin in order to acquire power and originality.[160] He must produce himself, as it were, if he is to be free and independent.[161] Man is neither a vacuum nor a part God.

The so-called vicious circle in the analysis of this second stage of the wise man's career is avoided as in the case of Heidegger. To know and to know that I know are identified. What is logically nonsensical is existentially real. Existence is not an object but an origin from which objects, thought, action, come. Thought is thus posterior to existence, privative rather than

[153] v. 2, p. 23 ff.
[154] *VE*, p. 20.
[155] v. 2, p. 418.
[156] *GSZ*, p. 44.
[157] v. 2, p. 326.
[158] v. 2, pp. 11-12.
[159] v. 2, p. 12.
[160] *VE*, p. 84.
[161] *N*, p. 132.

enriching. Existence in turn gets its steam from transcendence;[162] it is simply engaged by the individual. Without existence, life becomes an empty formula, vacuous, abstract, a *tabula rasa*.[163] However, this awakening to existence cannot come through pure thought. Rather there is a trembling in a situation where a decision must be made *ex nihilo*, without the help of counsel or even of forethought. There is no mediator between man and himself. He is truly immediate. Involved thus is a Kierkegaardian leap, a movement of self by self in a relation that is absolute.[164] Yet existence is not to be taken as subjectivity. It is found much more in that relation between subjectivity and objectivity, the dynamic totality of subject and object.[165]

Existence can be clarified by the limits which hem it in.[166] The notion of *Grenzsituation* (limit-situation), plays a leading role in Jaspers' thought. Situations are discovered in our first questions about reality, since such questions arise not out of a vacuum but out of a pre-existing set of circumstances. In thinking of a situation, as Kierkegaard said, I must prescind from it. What is thought, schematized, universalized is not this immediate, black-bodied, ontal frontier. Hence the surges to transcend these limits are checked (*Scheitern*).[167] What then is the significance of these situations? As facts, they are realities for an interested *Dasein*, circumscribing its freedom.[168] Motion, with its resistances, gives ample evidence of constraining as well as motive forces. Situations are imposed on us, but we can create new ones. All we can never do is escape them completely.

Grenzsituationen in the proper sense of the term are those which force us into struggle and suffering. They are fast, hard, unyielding. Unprotected, we cannot help but take a stand toward them.[169] Death is an example of such a situation. It is as a barrier beyond which we cannot see, cannot act, cannot

[162] v. 2, p. 13.
[163] *VE*, p. 38.
[164] v. 2, p. 41.
[165] v. 2, p. 337.
[166] *VE*, p. 30.
[167] v. 3, p. 220.
[168] v. 2, p. 203.
[169] *PW*, p. 229. Cf. Marcel's penetrating study of the *Grenzsituation* in *Du Refus à l'Invocation*.

will. Unrepeatable and unique, it cannot be clarified from other grounds.[170] Another *Grenzsituation*, absolute and recalcitrant, is suffering. Man is not an absolute. To get away from suffering, he must represent it as an object, a number, a formula. But suffering is not relieved by logic. Man, not being absolute, cannot think his suffering out of existence.[171] Suffering is the price of limitation. Guilt is a third important *Grenzsituation*. Man is responsible for his finitude. He is produced from his own liberty. Through this decision taken, guilt is born into a reality [172] as unremitting as our shadow. It is a wound [173] that cannot be healed. Nietzsche and Kierkegaard are at one in affirming that man cannot return into a reflectionless immediacy.[174] Even not acting, even returning to this immediacy could not be achieved without destroying the very agent himself.

In the face of these *Grenzsituationen*, the existing individual is called on for bravery. Such bravery is the only attitude that is without disillusionment. It is the attitude of the *Jasager*, recognizing that his life depends on incompletion. Nothing that is complete, achieved, can live. But man cannot help but strive toward completion and death by striving itself.[175] No other attitude is realistic. Paradoxical, this portion of Jaspers is in phase with the Kantian antinomies.

The *Grenzsituationen* reveal the reality of existence as a polarity between order and disorder in history, subject and object in knowledge, individual and society, person and person.[176] There is no worldless ego or egoless world. Neither of these opposite poles can describe human existence. The solution of life's antinomies will be offered in the third phase of Jaspers' thought.

Existence is a consciousness of existence, not a knowledge of it. *Existenzerhellung* is not to be discussed in the light of the Cartesian clear and distinct idea. On the contrary, existence is not thinkable, experimentable, transferable. It is as noth-

[170] v. 2, p. 203.
[171] v. 2, p. 215.
[172] v. 2, p. 196.
[173] v. 2, p. 247.
[174] *VE*, p. 11.
[175] v. 2, p. 228.
[176] v. 2, p. 402.

ing.[177] It is marked much more by frustration than by success. "I am in the world only as my situation which, in the ruins of the knowledge of the world as a knowledge of being itself, awakens me to myself as possible existence."[178] Jaspers, it may be repeated, condemns the philosophy of objects. His is an experience from within.

In searching out the backgorunds of this experience, Kant naturally forges to the foreground. Being is its own oughtness. There is a kind of moral autonomy, good will for its own sake. *Sollen* is something unconditional.[179] The autonomous act, *Handeln*, by its unconditional character, is an expression of self-consciousness, self-possession. In this deed of the individual, in that inner act by which he becomes himself,[180] lies the final sense of philosophy. This *innere Handeln* is its own evidence, its own production, its own motion.[181] Self-becoming is also self-giving, the giving of self to self.

An expression of this unconditional character is the phenomenon of anxiety. All anxiety comes from anxiety over death. The *Dasein* stands before the possibility of its own nothingness. At any moment, death may come, death that not only means to be no longer *Da* but no longer to be at all.[182] Without this anxiety, without death, there would be no freedom. The nothing-ness of the future detaches freedom from conditions that would limit it. Even knowledge and certitude must be posterior to freedom. Pre-existing, they would limit it.[183]

Entailed in the dialectic of will as found in Jaspers, the view of will not as a *liberum arbitrium* but in terms of indivisibility and immediacy, is the very same problem that beset the theologian Kierkegaard, the problem of belief. Belief is called the outward expression of love.[184] It is a groundless belief, the ground of all else in the life of man. It is not posited as an object but is much more to be depicted in terms of consciousness. It is a trust, an imperishable hope. Belief, communica-

[177] v. 2, p. 257.
[178] v. 2, p. 65.
[179] v. 2, p. 230.
[180] v. 2, p. 335.
[181] *DP*, 25.
[182] v. 2, p. 265.
[183] v. 2, p. 266.
[184] v. 2, pp. 278 ff.

tion, love, and the inner deed that makes one be—all of these are not placidly possessed. They are a matter of constant struggle where momentary success is followed by failure. The *Dasein* contends undyingly in an effort to clarify itself, express itself, reveal itself, and in that very struggle indeed lies its final meaning, its sole attainable goal.

Existence may be amply set forth in terms of freedom. As de Tonquédec puts it, liberty [185] is the axis about which Jaspers' whole philosophy revolves. Only in freedom do we have the absolute where every man is an exception.[186] Indeed, in seeking to comprehend myself through freedom, I grasp my transcendance by its recession.[187] Freedom is pure movement, cut away from all content and conditions.[188] It is immediacy, decision, activity. " I must will," Jaspers says, " for willing must be my last aim, if in the end I wish to be. In the fashion however in which I freely will can transcendence be revealed to me." [189] Freedom discloses itself not through insight but through action. Only a free man can understand freedom. Even law is free since I can follow it or not.

Transcendence is the source of existence, and freedom is its language.[190] Existence cannot overcome its situations. But in these situations, it gleans by a kind of *via negativa* a dim suspicion of the beyond. Transcendence must be present wherever it is sought, for it is itself the power to seek and the seeking. In the cosmic orientation, being is treated as an object; in existence, it is felt from within; transcendence, a Pyrrhic trophy, is achieved only by defeat, failure, frustration.[191]

Transcendence is real only in the present which passes before it can be grasped.[192] It stands in that no man's land between being and nothingness. Transcendence shows possibility as the identity of reality and necessity since it is attained by an utterly indivisible act. Furthermore, transcending myself, I think of freedom and nature as identified through the instant. Once more existentialism proves itself to be a philosophy of Kierke-

[185] *Op. cit.*, p. 25 ff.
[186] *N*, p. 80.
[187] v. 2, p. 199.
[188] *DP*, p. 26.
[189] v. 2, p. 197.
[190] *Existenzphilosophie*, p. 71.
[191] v. 3, p. 3.
[192] *PW*, p. 114.

gaardian paradoxes, if indeed it does not attempt to unite contradictory realities. The transcendent being is not only being but also something else; the other is darkness, ground, matter, nothingness.[192]

Jaspers' final position in theodicy would be, by intention, agnostic. The transcendent is not grasped, not revealed and proved. God remains hidden. Transcendence is visible only in its footprints and is here always ambigious.[193] Whether this transcendent principle is God we do not know. Man attains to possible "*vestigia dei* not God Himself in his hiddenness."[194]

The ambiguities alleged by Jaspers have been elaborated into a major section of his philosophy. Existence, in relation to transcendence, can take an attitude of defiance or obeisance, rebelling against the enigma of its own existence or yielding to the incomprehensible through quietism. A second antinomy is that of degeneration and resurrection on the part of the individual. A third is between day's law and order and the darkness, the passion of night.[195]

Existence cannot deny these antinomies. They are evident realities that it must face existentially despite all the niceties of logic and system.[196] Existence in fact lies precisely in the polarity between the branches of the dilemmas, between, it would seem, the two Bergsonian sources of morality—school and natural growth, morality and originality, form and inspiration, convention and self-assertion.[197] Such a tension, while not self-satisfying in the sense of providing an object to grasp, is the way in which the metaphysic of act can be realized.[198] A full integration is impossible in time since there is no concrete either-or on the one hand,[199] and no possibility of an essentialist Hegelian *Aufhebung* on the other. So the *Dasein* swings between opposites which, even when they are negative like defiance, degeneration, and suffering, presuppose the transcendent without which all would be indifferent.[200] Thus pinned by the tight dilemmas of existence, the "concrete situation requires action, it becomes deepened through the experience

[192] v. 3, p. 67. [193] v. 3, p. 69. [197] *Ibid.*, p. 240. [199] v. 3, p. 81.
[194] *VE*, p. 110. [196] *PW*, p. 236. [198] v. 3, p. 71. [200] *PW*, p. 240.

of the antinomic in the development of man." [201] What is genuinely required is a will to unity, a daring, a process without rules and without possessiveness, a refusal to vanish into either horn of the dilemma and the discovery of the transcendent by oscillating between both. Thus it can be said that in momentary flashes, while the lights of the world are turning on and off between the positive and negative terms of a polar relationship, God is manifest. But this transcendence, it should be repeated, is not grasped by thought. It is not repeatable like an experiment. It is a reference point to which I am either moving or receding with never the final assurance of a concept.[202] The polarity of the antinomies is but another way of translating anxiety.

Transcendence is disclosed to man when he reads its ciphers. Incapable of capture in the narrow-mindedness of a concept, transcendence requires openness, a straining toward the possible, a recognition that the ultimate cannot be measured by possessiveness but is more to be signaled by despair, destruction, the passions of darkness, renunciations, and the like.[203] All beings are ciphers of transcendence. This is not a formal relation in which one being is found behind the other. In reality, Jaspers would hold, it is a logical impossibility to think something as one without thinking of other-ness, a proof that concepts fall far short of the absolute. When I think of the one, I cannot but think of the other, and there can be no thought of the other without reference to the one. Transcendence is detected in the passage from the one to the other.

A cipher is a metaphysical object. This is not the transcendent but rather its language. It may be best described not as an object but as a manner.[204] In reality, there are three such languages, each of which is a cipher-bearer in its own right. First, there is the immediate experience of transcendence. What is immediate is not expressible, metaphysically provable; there would have to be something better known from which it could be deduced. Secondly, there is the universal language of communication. In images and thoughts aimed at reaching others,

[201] v. 3, p. 83. [202] *PW*, p. 241. [203] *VE*, p. 94. [204] v. 3, p. 129.

I experience transcendence—a fact *in statu viae*. Finally, there is the speculative language. This bears on the possible rather than the realized. It involves memory and prediction.[205] Bergson marshalled such activities in support of his theory of the vital elan. All three cipher languages bring transcendence into the world without making it an object, without making existence a subject distinct from it.[206] To read the ciphers cannot be planned, methodical, principled. There is nothing more immediate than immediacy. Cipher-reading is unwilled spontaneous. It is a gratuity.

But to speak of the enciphered language and its deciphering by man may be misleading. It is not a language where symbol and symbolized can be segregated. There are no signs, metaphors, comparisons, models, distinct from the signata. Because of this strange alphabet in which it is translated, transcendence is always a-conceptual. The ciphers are thus ambiguous since there is no standard by which to judge them. Yet they are the sole expressions of meaning, and the philosopher, on the trail of this meaning, cannot help but remain on a pendulum that arcs between opposites. Understanding everything, we understand nothing. Once more, Jaspers has descended below the level of the intellect. The ciphers are grasped more by freedom than by thought. I persuade myself that I am what I am because I so will it. Yet I receive everything that I choose.[207] Thought is at the service of freedom rather than its guide.

There is nothing that cannot be a cipher. Everything has an indeterminacy and yet, somehow, an expressiveness. What is said is always said questionably, ambiguously. Like Plato's shadow-world, what we grasp on earth is almost an occasion. Transcendence, to labor the obvious, transcends it. Concepts thus hold man aloof from reality. They are intervening experiences, fixed symbols that attempt to reduce a dynamic universe.[208] Reality is not to be found by seeking what is

[205] v. 3, p. 129.
[206] v. 3, p. 137.
[207] v. 3, p. 155.
[208] v. 3, p. 175.

distant but in the here and now, in loyalty to one's self, one's work, in a readiness toward the present.[209]

Man's fate in the universe of Jaspers may already be suspected. It is failure, defeat, *Scheitern*. Jaspers' affinity to Nietzsche, already apparent on preceding issues, is now fully forged. Striving against insuperable odds, man cannot help but be completely checked. In Jaspers' thought, as in Nietzsche's, the hero is the man who fails genuinely. Such a failure is not one where the individual disappears, absorbed into the bosom of a logical system. Genuine failure is a plunge into darkness.[210] The antinomies are not two ways between which I choose. They are occasions for a leap.

Thus what is ultimate is failure.[211] This comes about in the *Weltorientierung*, as it was already noted. Man fails in the clarification of his existence, for " where I am properly myself, I am not only myself." [212] Man cannot be himself alone.

Courage is required for a man more than truth. Failure is not the excuse to cease failing. It challenges man to confront it. It can be said that in itself nothing fails but that I simply let failure take place in me through the *manner* in which I recognize the failure and face it.[213] Once more greatness is found to consist not in the possession of an object but in a mode of bearing.

Only in the inevitable check do we discover ourselves, the world, reality. " He who really sees what is appears compelled to gaze into the stark darkness of nothingness." [214] For what is transcendent is closed off to a creature who is essentially limited and, at his highest, indivisibly himself through freedom.

V. Sartre

Jean Paul Sartre is closely related to Heidegger. Applying the analytic of Cartesian rationalism to the problem of existence, Sartre starts from the direction of psychology to work out an original existentialism that springs from the clash be-

[209] v. 3, p. 175.
[210] v. 3, p. 110.
[211] v. 3, p. 220.
[212] v. 3, p. 220.
[213] v. 3, p. 200.
[214] v. 3, p. 223.

tween being and nothingness more than from the apparent antinomies of time. He has driven Heidegger to his logical conclusions, super-imposing on the dialectic of his German master, his own personal intuition of being as "haunted" rather contrasted by nothingness. The Sartre prototype of man is not only anguished; he is nauseated.[215]

Being cannot be disclosed by its appearances, according to Sartre, for the appearances themselves are beings. *Etre est un paraître.* An aspect of an object is itself an object. There can be no metaphysics of experience since metaphysics itself is an experience, thus begging the question. How then is a plenum to be averted? How can questions be asked? The answer is to be found, according to Sartre, in the non-being.

Suppose that I have a rendez-vous with Pierre in a cafe but that Pierre does not appear as scheduled. I search for him, looking at every table, every chair, every person. In such a perception, there is, against the foreground of what I see, the background of an absence. The cafe is organized on a backdrop of nothingness, annihilation (*une néantisation*). Pierre's absence is also a form against this negatively organized perspective, a second nullity in the experience. It is these negativities, to transliterate Sartre, which serve as the basis for the judgment, "Pierre is not here." Thus, Sartre says, it is not the judgment of negation which inserts the non-being into things. It is the non-being which serves as the basis for the judgment of negation.[216] "The condition necessary that it be possible to say *no* is that the non-being be a perpetual presence, in us and outside of us; nothingness *haunts* being."[217] If my carburetor stops functioning, I think immediately that there is something wrong—a negation—in the carburetor. There is thus a pre-judicative grasp of the non-being.

By a phenomenological examination of distance, destruction, cyclones, pillagings, other-ness, repulsion, regret, distraction, it

[215] This is the significance of the title of Sartre's novel, *La Nausée*, Paris, 1938. For a good critique of Sartre, cf. Marcel's essay in his *Homo Viator*, Paris, 1944.

[216] *L'Etre et le Néant*, hereinafter cited as *EN*, pp. 44 ff.

[217] *EN*, pp. 46-47. Despite Sartre's intention, later developments will show that the expressions "non-being" and "annihilation" must be taken literally.

can likewise be shown, Sartre says, that at the very heart of reality, as the necessary condition for its appearance and being, the naught is experienced.[218] In like fashion, man emerges out of nothingness. Posing being, he must transcend it, and the only thing outside of being that can so transcend is what is not being. Since man experiences himself as not being pure and simple existence, since he is not the being of the world which he discovers around him, the *no* is spun through the very web of what he is.[219]

In a more technical and somewhat Hegelian terminology, Sartre calls the human reality being-for-itself, *le pour-soi*. This is contrasted with being-in-itself, *l'en-soi*. The *pour-soi* is the *en-soi*, negated, the *en-soi* into which an alien element has been introduced, that of consciousness. The *en-soi* is a plenum, filled with itself. In speaking of this *en-soi*, the following propositions can be enunciated: a) being is; b) being is in-itself; and c) being is what it is.[220] The *en-soi* is an undifferentiated, pre-reflexive state. It is in seeking to ground itself that the *en-soi* gives place to the *pour-soi*.[221] But the *pour-soi* is distinguished by its nothing-ness since it lies outside of that which is. Consciousness, reflection, self-possession are thus defects in being rather than its perfections. Consciousness implies a certain distance from the object; [222] far from self-presence, it is marked more by absence. Mathieu, the chief character in Sartre's trilogy, " always felt as though he were somewhere else, that he was not yet wholly born." [223] That is why, for Sartre, there can be no God. In order that a self exist, the original unity, ineffable and simply existing, must be ruptured, ruptured indeed by nothingness. The *pour-soi* can exist only in so far

[218] *Ibid.*, pp. 57 ff.

[219] *Ibid.*, p. 54.

[220] *Ibid.*, pp. 30 ff.

[221] It is through man, however, that nothingness comes into the world, as Sartre has said in the citation of n. 219. But man originates form the *en-soi*, as Troisfontaines says, and hence this *en-soi* must likewise bear the nothing in its being. The *en-soi* thus acts like the *pour-soi*, a gross contradiction in Sartre's logic. Troisfontaines, R., *Le Choix de J. P. Sartre*, Paris, 1945, p. 39.

[222] *EN*, pp. 106-107.

[223] *The Age of Reason*, New York, 1947, p. 64.

as it does not coincide with itself. Did it so coincide, it would be the *en-soi*, unconscious and involuntary.[224] Man is an annihilation. The *pour-soi* is a being that is not what it is and is what it is not.[225] It is an incongruity with oneself, a contradiction, an absurdity in the heart of things.

The *en-soi* is opaque, unintelligible. It is what it is, and since intelligibility would be added to it, the addition could only be nothing. It is neither an appearance nor a reality in the conventional post-Kantian meaning of these terms. It is simply massive.[226] Its density is infinite.[227] It has no laws, no secrets, no meaning, no reason for existence. The *pour-soi* is a " hole in being," a fall, a perpetual degradation.[228] Only a being which is lacking in being can be intelligible; only a being which is lacking in being can be intelligent.

Consciousness is a " decompression " of the density.[229] Reminiscent of Heidegger, Sartre defines a conscious being as one " for which there is in its being a question of its being in so far as this being implies a being other than itself." [230] It is in taking consciousness of ourselves that we elongate ourselves from what we are. In Sartre's view, this consciousness is twofold, pre-reflexive and reflexive. Scholastics make such a distinction in speaking of concomitant and reflex consciousness but accord a valid status to reflection. The pre-reflexive *cogito* is the identity of self with self immediated by knowledge. It is the condition for reflection, for the Cartesian *cogito*. Sartre would prefer to write not consciousness of self but consciousness-self, or, as he also expresses it in the wake of Husserl, consciousness (of) self. The " of " implies duality. In the pristine pre-reflexive state it is not there. He argues to this identity from psychology. The consciousness of pleasure is indistinguishable from the pleasure itself, he says. Similarly, when I have an eye-ache, the only evidence for saying this is the eye-ache itself.[231] There is no standard outside of achiness and outside of the eye that makes the eye-ache conscious, meaningful, identifiable. It is this pre-reflexive consciousness

[224] *EN*, p. 121. [226] *Ibid.*, p. 33. [228] *Ibid.*, p. 121. [230] *Ibid.*, p. 29.
[225] *Ibid.*, p. 108. [227] *Ibid.*, p. 116. [229] *Ibid.*, p. 116. [231] *Ibid.*, p. 298.

that holds the secret to whatever there is to the human reality. It defines the being of consciousness. It reveals a modality of being. If we would ever understand ourselves, it is to this fact that we must come. But we cannot come to this fact with understanding. Understanding implies the wedge of nothingness and cannot render that perfect coincidence of self with self, since it cannot enter into this unity without disrupting it. Thus Sartre can say, I am forgotten; I see only the empty and the naught.[232]

On this same point, Sartre renders his meaning otherwise by employing an Hegelian terminology. Pre-reflexive consciousness is, he says, nonthetic, non-positional. Only what is posed, past, a thesis, can we understand. *Wesen ist was gewesen ist*, Hegel declared. Reflection is thetic, positional. It grasps what no longer is and hence feeds on what is not. Alain was right, Sartre finds, " to know is to have consciousness of knowing "; " to know is to know that one knows." But a foreign body has been introduced. What originally is known is withdrawn behind the curtain of the second knowing, reflection, reflex consciousness. Thus a Sartre character muses that " it must seem strange to him to feel behind him an unknown act which he has already almost ceased to understand and which will turn his life upside down. All I do, I do *for nothing*." [233] Being is not reached across a vacuum. True knowledge is impossible. Reflexive consciousness falsifies. Reflexive consciousness must be consciousness of what lies outside of being, a consciousness of nothing.[234] It is this consciousness which constitutes the ipseity, a degree of negation more advanced than the negation involved in pre-reflexive consciousness.[235]

Sartre is thus led to his curious thesis that existence precedes essence. Man *exists* first and ineffably. It is only afterwards, by knowledge and action that he defines his essence, indeed that he acquires an essence. The object-world, known when it is known at all as tools which man uses for ends, is rendered intelligible through these goals, just as Heidegger related

[232] *La Nausée*, p. 213.
[233] *The Age of Reason*, p. 395.
[234] *EN*, p. 558.
[235] *EN*, p. 148.

Zuhandenheit and *Vorhandenheit*. Where the object of an action, the end of an agent, are in play, essence has priority. But man knows himself in terms of subjectivity. He begins with the *sum* of Descartes' first principle, moving to an essence by the *cogito*.[236] Thus, Sartre writes:

> This simply means that man *is* first and that only afterwards he is this or that. In short, man must create his own essence; it is by throwing himself into the world, by suffering and fighting in it that little by little he defines himself. And the definition always remains open; one cannot say what *this* man is before he has died, or what mankind is before it has disappeared.[327]

Knowledge always implies a presence, the presence of nothing. Presence always implies an absence. What is present to me is not myself but what is other.[238] Reversing the traditional maxim, Sartre writes that we are not what we know.[239] Knowledge implies rather the nothingness, and complete knowledge can only be had by complete annihilation. The parenthesizing of the world proposed by Husserl is impossible, for the world, to be known, must be related to a real consciousness. True fictions are incapable of existence. " Knowledge is nothing but the presence of being to the *pour-soi*, and the *pour-soi* is the nothingness which realizes this presence." [240] Knowledge is always " ek-static " in the original sense of the word. It lies outside of being. The *pour-soi* is likewise " ek-static." It exists out of, by virtue of, the nothingness. Sartre speaks of " the inappreciable distance that reveals things to me and sets me apart from them forever. I am nothing. I possess nothing." [241]

Reflection can be described in terms of a check. The *pour-soi*, it was said, attempts to ground itself. But in attempting to dominate itself, it becomes more and more self-consciousness. The *pour-soi* wishes, while remaining the pour-soi, conscious

[236] *L'Existentialisme est un Humanisme*, Paris, 1946, hereinafter cited as *EH*, pp. 17 ff.

[237] " What is Existentialism? " in *Foreground* I (1946), p. 119.

[238] *EN*, p. 222.

[239] *Ibid.*, 224.

[240] *Ibid.*, p. 268.

[241] *The Reprieve*, New York, 1947, p. 363.

and self-possessed, to return to the *en-soi*, dense and massive. The result is to try to make an intelligible object present to an intelligent being, a relation that is not the return to the *en-soi* but the presence of the *pour-soi* to the *pour-soi*. Deeper reflection only deepens the internal negation by which the human reality is constituted. "The being which wishes to ground itself in being is nothing else but the very foundation of its own nothingness. The ensemble thus remains the *en-soi* annihilated." [242] Reflection, knowledge implies the separation of the subject from the object rather than their identification. Knowledge not only implies that coincidence between subject and object which would be unconscious and impossible in practice. In addition, there must be the assumption of a viewpoint by the knower, thus closing him off from seeing the object wholly and as it is.[243]

It can readily be seen that, as in the case of the other existentialists, the critical problem does not arise in Sartre's dialectic. This is the sense of his book, *L'Imagination*. How can we distinguish sensations from images without a prior judgment transcending both subjectivity and objectivity, assigning to each its proper place? [244] Holding it meaningless to speak of things before they act on consciousness, he rejects realism. Idealism is likewise rejected because pure subjectivity cannot pose an object which transcends itself. The coincidence of knower and known demanded in existentialism does not allow the consideration of subject; without object or object without subject. Man is a monotone. The projected symphony of his life never gets beyond the initial tuning note of the violin. Indeed, the string snaps, reducing man to a negation.

In the hopeless insularity of a being that is simply there, simply for its thereness, haunted and hounded by the non-being wherever it turns, which leads Sartre to his doctrine that man is the victim of bad faith. Consciousness is not what it is; it is what it is not; far from becoming other things, as true knowledge implies, consciousness can never even become itself. It

[242] *EN*, p. 200.
[243] *EN*, p. 208.
[244] *L'Imagination*, pp. 98, 101, 128, 148 ff., 162.

seeks what Sartre, following Heidegger calls facticity and seeks also transcendence: facticity because it would like to be itself, a fact alone; transcendence because it would like to know itself, know its facticity. But the juncture of these two poles is forever unattainable. Facticity cannot be and be known without altering its being. Transcendence cannot know facticity, it transcends it.[245] " A unique, unmatchable lightning-flash would light up the bridge and the Seine." [246]

Sincerity itself is a case of bad faith. A sincere person would be what he is, but he wants to be so with consciousness and deliberation. Any virtue of this order implies, after all, the will. But conscious, the sincere person loses his sincerity. With knowledge superadded to what he is, he cannot coincide with himself.[247] " Thus, the essential structure of sincerity does not differ from that of bad faith, since the sincere person sets himself up as that which he is in order *not to be it*." [248] *We know* that we believe. Hence believing is not believing. Pure belief is impossible.[249] We wish to reconstitute ourselves in our original indifferentiation, but doing this consciously, we only differentiate ourselves the more. It is a play of mirrors. Man is conscious of his natural failure to attain his ends.[250]

Our attitude toward others likewise distills the utter failure that is man. Love is a contradiction, because it would set up two absolutes, as a mutual love, and then ask these absolutes to be relational, relative. Hatred of others likewise fails because it can never destroy its object. It *has* existed. Sadism and masochism run headlong into an impasse because they would make objects and instruments out of liberties, subjects, the *pour-soi*. The *pour-soi* cannot be attained as *pour-soi* through considering it as a facticity. Desire is impossible of fulfillment also because we cannot possess another consciousness. " In fact we could be able to take a consistent attitude toward others only if they were simultaneously revealed as subject and object, as transcendence-transcending and transcendence-transcended, what is in principle impossible." [251]

[245] *EN*, p. 95.
[246] *The Reprieve*, p. 364.
[247] *EN*, p. 103.
[248] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[249] *Ibid.*, p. 110.
[250] *Ibid.*, pp. 106-107.
[251] *Ibid.*, p. 479.

The discerning reader will want to know how the existence and nature of others can be posited in Sartre, and it is this that is one of the more salient points on which he differs from Heidegger. His theory has practical moment in view of the fact that he has attempted to make a humanism out of his existentialism,[252] to turn his thought into a philosophy for democracy because it renders men equal, undifferentiated in existence, and secrets unto themselves,[253] and has engaged in contraversy with Marxism,[254] after once allegedly belonging to the Communist party.[255]

In regard to knowledge of others, Sartre finds that the realistic position is inclined to solipsism. Realism, it is said, holds that experience is a mediator between ourselves and others. We note certain attributes in organized form, positing an organizing center behind them. We think of a centricity radically different from our own, an ego which is not the ego. A subject is thought in the manner of an object. But what entitles us to place that center of organization behind the appearances? [256]

Sartre rejects Husserl's solution of this problem by reducing it to Kantianism. Pure consciousness cannot know an ego which is radically other, for in the very knowing it would detach itself from pure consciousness, projecting it outward toward others. Hegel, Sartre finds, likewise offers a specious answer to the question. Others are known before we know ourselves, according to Hegelianism. It is others, their opposition to us, that make the *cogito* possible. But this solution likewise runs aground. It is idealistic, too universal. The problem must be posed in time and must depart from my own being, the being that must do the recognizing. Heidegger speaks of *Mit-sein*. Others involve not an opposition but a team. Why this is so, Heidegger does not say, making his answer gratuitous, according to Sartre. To speak of " being-with " as a structure of the

[252] *EH* (passim).
[253] *Reflexions sur la Question Juive*, Paris, 1946, pp. 75 ff., 116 ff.
[254] *EH*, p. 10, pp. 104 ff. " What is Existentialism?" *art. cit.*, pp. 119 ff.
[255] Truc, *op. cit.*, p. 44.
[256] *EN*, pp. 276 ff.

Dasein is to smack of Kant and to pass over the concrete, psychological dimensions of the problem.[257]

In place of all these solutions, Sartre proposes that we recognize others from the sentiment of *being seen*. It is the *look* of others that awakens us to their reality. "In a word, that to which my apprehension of another as *being probably* a man refers is my permanent possibility of being-seen-by-him, that is to the permanent possibility for a subject who sees me to be substituted for an object seen by me. 'The being-seen-by-another' is the *truth* of '*seeing another.*'" [258] Another is not seized as a mode of knowledge but as a mode of being.[259] In Sartre's example, let us suppose that a man peeping into a keyhole is caught in the act by someone else. He cannot define himself alone as looking into the keyhole because he escapes himself as the victim of bad faith. He is not what he is; he is what he is not. But in the sentiment of being detected there is identified the existence of others who detect. A typical sentiment in this context is shame. Shame is the most revelatory emotion with respect to social values. It is shame that makes the keyhole-peeper not simply to know but to live the situation of being seen. "I feel you there in every pore. Your silence clamors in my ears." [260] Shame establishes my objectivity for others. It is the mediator between one self and another and also the revelation to myself of my own real being which appears.[261] The keyhole peeper recognizes his character of facticity, *en-soiness*, posture. By his shame, fear, rage, pride he assures himself of his own reality and the reality of the other who sees him.[262]

The look of another makes man spatializing-spatialized and temporalizing-temporalized. He sees himself as an object, while reaching as it were to the subjectivity of others. In the phenomenon of *being-seen*, the other is not an object. To objectify him is a kind of defense-action which frees man from the status of being simply for someone else and makes the other

[257] *Ibid.*, p. 288.
[258] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[259] *Ibid.*, p. 319.
[260] *No Exit and the Flies*, p. 29.
[261] *Ibid.*, pp. 319 ff.
[262] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

a quasi-object, another *pour-soi* existing. The presence of others is thus not simply a projection by an idealist, a deduction from dead objectivity that there is a consciousness other than mine. "It *is*, and I cannot derive it from myself." [263]

The discovery of otherness is the third in a series of ecstasies. The first is the break in being in which the *en-soi* becomes the *pour-soi*. The second is reflex consciousness which is consciousness of the first consciousness, a futile effort to recover and reconquer reality in its massive depths. The third ecstasy is in being for others, a fissure in time and space. A recognition of an ego which is *not* myself, is an internal negation which further annihilates the *pour-soi*. Our first thought is to resorb this being who has discovered our secret to recover our absoluteness in a Feuerbachian "*Homo homini Deus*." But bad faith intervenes, it was seen; love and hate and all of their secondary manifestations only fail man when he seeks their aid.

Time is a modality of the *pour-soi*. As in Heidegger, the human reality is before itself in the world, helpless and abandoned. Temporality is a mode of this being who is thus outside of himself, at a distance from himself, a creature that exists through its nothingness.[264] The annihilations involved in temporalization can be rendered more precise: First, the being of the *pour-soi* is discovered as being behind it; it existence precedes its essence; its being is discovered as abandoned. Secondly, it recognizes itself as a defect in being, a lack that is the source of its own lack, and in the concept of lack there is a reference that makes necessary the future. Finally, the *pour-soi* is a perpetual escape from itself, a perpetual flight, the present that is always vanishing.[265] What had no duration would be merely a datum. What endures has an internal negation that is its very nature.

Heidegger emphasized the future. He remonstrates that man is his own projection. Sartre believes that this emphasis is a mistake and that the secret to time lies in the present. It is in the present that the annihilation of self takes place; it is here where the *pour-soi* is constituted and hence where the

[263] *Ibid.*, p. 321. [264] *Ibid.*, p. 180. [265] *Ibid.*, pp. 183.

answer to the problem of time must be, if not found, at least sought.[266] The *pour-soi* is what it is not, is not what it is, finds itself in perpetual motion between the moments of time.[267] But what, to return to Kierkegaard, is the meaning of " between-ness? "

The present is unintelligible. Ineffable, it has nothing outside of it in terms of which it can be rendered. " There shall be no next time." [268] The present is, and that is all. The past is always with us. It is the essence that our actions have looted for us. It acquires its sense from the way in which it is oriented.[269] The future is not yet experienced. It can only be represented by thought, generality, and abstraction rather than as *my* future.[270] Alone it makes no sense.

The place of liberty in Sartre's thought could already be definitely settled. We not only have freedom; we *are* it.[271] It precedes the essence and makes it possible. " Outside the world, outside the past, outside myself: freedom is exile, and I am condemned to be free." [272] Man makes himself to be what he is by his liberty. Cut off from counsel and command, he cannot but be autonomous.[273] He does not exist first and have freedom afterwards. " First " and " after " are terms created by freedom itself.[274] His first act is spontaneous, gratuitous; " . . . it is the absolute, as a result perfect gratuity." [275] What liberty really is is the naught at the core of being which forces man to make himself what he is. To be is to choose to be. Because of the spontaneous character of the free act which urges man's thought into action and thus determines the answer that thought will reach, liberty becomes the source of all values.[276] Values like liberty are thus radically contingent, unjustifiable. Man is a " nobody from nowhere in particu-

[266] *Ibid.*, p. 188.
[267] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[268] *No Exit and the Flies*, p. 110.
[269] *EH*, p. 23.
[270] *EN*, p. 169.
[271] *EH*, pp. 37, 82. Cf. Marcel, G., " M. Sartre's Conception of Liberty," in *Thought*, XXII (1947), pp. 15-18.
[272] *The Reprieve*, p. 363.
[273] *EH*, pp. 39 ff.
[274] *EN*, p. 566.
[275] *La Nausée*, p. 167.
[276] *EN*, p. 76.

lar." [277] Existence must arise brusquely, *ex nihilo*, or it is nothing at all.[278]

The supreme value that man actually seeks is to be an *en-soi* while remaining a *pour-soi*. To have everything and yet, while being conscious in addition to this universal possession, to have nothing.[279] Value is beyond being; it is con-substantial to the *pour-soi* and is thus as gratuitous as man himself.[280] It is a source of no amazement to find Sartre concluding that man is unjustifiable. There is nothing from which he is founded and derived. He is superfluous because he is outside of being. In truth, he is a "malady of being."

Yet man is also responsible, responsible for himself and for the world. For he not only makes himself. With his own emergence from nothing, the world and other men likewise come into existence.[281] Never for a moment can this responsibility cease. It is involved in every thought, deed, word since the world is the condition for their existence. Not to act is also to act. It is as though man were forced inescapably into action from his abandonment, and yet he is free. Even suicide is a mode of being in the world.[282]

Death is the end of man. For Heidegger, where death is a possibility structured into the *Dasein* itself, authentic existence decides to die and projects itself deathward. For the *Dasein* is nothing but pro-jection. Death, because it terminates, provides meaning to the life of a person. When a continued story is still going on, we do not know its ultimate turn. But Sartre finds that Heidegger uses death to individuate the *Dasein* and then uses the *Dasein* to individuate death. Both are unrepeatable, requiring the self to perform since no one can live for us or die for us.

But death is not one of our anticipations, Sartre holds. It is the result of any one of the infinite and hence unknowable factors operating around us. Chance decides the character of our death, the terminus of life; in so deciding, it decides the mean-

[277] *The Reprieve*, p. 444.
[278] *La Nausée*, p. 168.
[279] *Ibid.*, 528.
[280] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[281] *Ibid.*, p. 639.
[282] *Ibid.*, p. 641.

ing of our life as well, the last installment of the story. Death is not *my* possibility but *a* possibility. It has nothing to do with pro-ject but rather emphasizes, as the sense-bestowing final score of life, that I am powerless to give my life a meaning since I do not invest it with its end. "That's what existence means: draining one's own self dry without a sense of thirst." [283] Death should neither be sought nor taken lightly. In either attitude, it will come when it will. It is random like existence, liberty, and value [284] which it terminates.

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(*To be concluded*)

[283] *The Age of Reason*, pp. 60-61.
[284] *EN*, pp. 616 ff.

THE BASES OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL'S AUTHORITY

THE judgment of the twenty-two defendants at Nuremberg by an international tribunal definitely marks a milestone in the history of international law. The importance of the trial arises from the fact that it established several juridical precedents which have occasioned as many controversies among jurists and moralists concerning their legality and morality. The conviction of the majority of the defendants on the evidence of captured recordings, films, and documents leaves no doubt that the Germans were guilty of atrocious war crimes. Doubts have arisen, however, as to whether or not an international tribunal had the right to try and to sentence the statesmen, generals, and economic leaders of the German nation. Grave questions have been raised regarding the origin of the tribunal's right. Where did the International Military Tribunal get its authority? Under what law were the defendants punished? Was the law created by the tribunal's charter or did it exist prior to its institution? If the charter was merely declaratory of existing law, what is the nature and binding force of that law?

The importance of the problem is gleaned from the many repetitions which have been made in defense of the trial and the many attacks leveled against it by members of the legal profession. Defenders of the tribunal's charter maintain that the solemn agreements and pacts made since World War I reestablished principles of international law which had been forsaken by the jurists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. This fact was indicated by the Allies, they maintain, in the numerous declarations that were issued periodically throughout the war in which they manifested their intention of punishing those persons who were responsible for the com-

mission of war crimes. Opponents of the charter claim that it represents an abandonment of existing international law and the rejection of a universally recognized principle of modern criminal law, namely, that there can be no punishment without a law that already existed when the act was committed. The defense attorneys' motion to dismiss the indictment, made on the opening day of the trial stressed this point. The defense contended that count two of the indictment, the crime of planning and initiating wars of aggression, had " no legal basis in international law but is a procedure based on a new penal law; a penal law created only after the act."[1]

Many American jurists have expressed themselves as being of the same opinion. On the other hand, there are some whose opposition is based on the fact that an international criminal law has never existed. The following statement was made by Frederic R. Coudert, president of the American Society of International Law, two months before the promulgation of the International Military Tribunal's Charter:

> Endless discussion of a learned, subtle and rather Byzantine character has been carried on by those interested in international law as to what law or laws could be applied to such crimes. On this subject there has been little general agreement, as there is no recognized general international criminal law. International law deals with the relations between nations and has little direct relationship to individuals. Nations have, however, through usage and convention, recognized some general rules applicable to warfare as it is supposed to be waged among civilized people. The United States has such a code. . . . There are also the rules agreed upon in The Hague Convention, but these, if applicable, do not meet many of the worst atrocities.[2]

Thus even among the members of the legal profession there is found a diversity of opinion regarding the legality of prosecuting individuals before an international tribunal for the commission of war crimes. Briefly, these opinions concerning the

[1] " Text of the Defense Motion to Dismiss the Indictment against the German War Criminals," *New York Times*, November 22, 1945, p. 3.

[2] Frederic R. Coudert, " Letters to the Editor," *New York Times*, June 3, 1945, Sec. IV, p. 8.

tribunal's authority can be summarized as follows: (a) the charter reestablished principles of international law; (b) the charter abandoned fundamental principles of international law; (c) the charter established its own penal law since international criminal law did not exist.

The solution to this problem cannot be given with a simple affirmative or negative response. Certain distinctions must be made. Before attempting to evaluate the legality of the Nuremberg Trial, however, three prerequisites are necessary. First, an examination of the statements of those associated with the International Military Tribunal must be made in order to ascertain what, in their estimation, are the bases of the tribunal's authority. Second, contemporary theory and practice of state sovereignty must be presented in order to determine whether or not the above-mentioned bases are consonant with the principles of modern political philosophy. This will also entail a brief presentation of the historical background of the doctrine of sovereignty. Finally, the principles of solution must be established so that the International Military Tribunal may be accurately evaluated. The subject matter of the present study is concerned only with the first point, namely, a statement of the tribunal's bases by those who assisted in the formulation of the charter.

The Charter of the International Military Tribunal. Many of the subsequent statements regarding the tribunal's authority refer to the charter of the International Military Tribunal as the source of jurisdiction. This charter was annexed to the agreement which was signed by the representatives of the four allied nations on August 8, 1945 and which formally established the International Military Tribunal. The extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction as laid down in Article 6 of the charter is as follows: " The Tribunal established by the agreement referred to in article 1 hereof for the trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis countries shall have the power to try and punish persons who, acting in the interests of the European Axis countries, whether as individuals or as members

of organizations, committed any of the following crimes." [3] The charter then enumerates a threefold classification of crimes as being within the jurisdiction of the tribunal: (a) the crime of waging a war of aggression that is " in violation of international treaties, agreements, or assurances "; (b) crimes that are " violations of the laws or customs of war "; (c) crimes against humanity, such as religious, racial, or political persecutions.[4] Thus the International Military Tribunal was empowered to try the major war criminals in virtue of its Charter which, in turn, emanated from the agreement drawn-up by the four major Allied powers " acting in the interests of all the United Nations." [5]

Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel. The numerous statements of Justice Jackson reveal several significant pronouncements regarding his conception of the bases of the International Military Tribunal. Shortly before his appointment to the office of Chief of Counsel, Justice Jackson delivered an address before the American Society of International Law in which he stated:

> I have no purpose to enter into any controversy as to what shall be done with war criminals, either high or humble. If it is considered good policy for the future peace of the world, if it is believed that the example will outweigh the tendency to create among their own countrymen a myth of martyrdom, then let them be executed. But in that case let the decision to execute them be made as a military or political decision. We must not use the forms of juridical proceedings to carry out or rationalize previously settled political or military policy.[6]

Thus, Jackson was of the opinion that the Allies, as victors, possessed the right to execute the Nuremberg defendants without juridical proceedings provided, however, that it be made as a military or political decision. He reiterated this opinion in

[3] " Charter of the International Military Tribunal," *Trial of War Criminals* (U. S. Government Printing Office, Wash., D. C.), p. 16.

[4] *Ibid.*

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[6] " The Rule of Law Among Nations," *American Bar Association Journal*, XXXI, 292, June, 1945.

the first report to President Truman in which he declared that " we could execute or otherwise punish them without a hearing." [7] But such a decision, made without a trial, he warned, " would violate pledges repeatedly given, and would not set easily on the American conscience or be remembered by our children with pride." [8] He concluded that the only alternative " is to determine the innocence or guilt of the accused after a hearing as dispassionate as the times and the horrors we deal with will permit, and upon a record that will leave our reasons and motives clear." [9]

What law would justify an international trial of war criminals? The answer, according to Justice Jackson, was international law. Speaking on the origin of international law before the French Bar Association, he stated:

> There is something fundamental about the basic relations between legal right and wrong which changing governments—save for the ruthless experimentation of the Third Reich—do not try to change and cannot change any more than they can change time or tide. I believe that in international affairs as in domestic affairs, we can from time to time discover these basic relationships which must be respected if we are to have an international order of peace and justice.[10]

He expressed the belief that the gradual incorporation of the " basic relationships " into an international common law " will provide means of settling grievances and will reach and punish crimes against peace." [11] Moreover, in his opinion, the International Military Tribunal contributed toward this goal by the establishment of precedents in the field of international law.

In Jackson's conception of international law, more than abstract and immutable principles are included. Treaties and agreements between nations together with universally accepted customs also contribute to its development. Pacts among the

[7] " Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President," *The Nurnberg Case*, p. 8.
[8] *Ibid.*
[9] *Ibid.*
[10] " The Trial of War Criminals," *American Bar Association Journal*, XXXII, 320, June 1946.
[11] *Ibid.*, p. 321.

various governments of the world bring about revisions and innovations in international law. Thus, by adapting its fundamental principles to present circumstances, the law of nations grows. Justice Jackson stated that: " Unless we are prepared to abandon every principle of growth for International Law, we cannot deny that our own day has its right to institute customs and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened International Law." [12] Jackson and those associated with him in the framing of the charter proceeded on the assumption that certain treaties and agreements, to which Germany was a signatory, did actually change the status of international law. It was maintained that these pacts (at least implicitly) empowered the society of nations to punish those of its members that menace international peace. Jackson declared that any attack " on the foundations of international relations cannot be regarded as anything less than a crime against the international community, which may properly vindicate the integrity of its fundamental compacts by punishing aggressors." [13]

If, as Justice Jackson maintained, crimes against the international community were subject to punishment by international law, what was his norm of criminality? This question was discussed at length in his first report to President Truman. He stated that, in general, " those things which fundamentally outraged the conscience of the American people " were criminal acts.[14] In explanation of this general rule, he declared that these " acts which offended the conscience of our people were criminal by standards generally accepted in all civilized countries." [15] Moreover, these atrocities were " offenses against that International Law described in the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 as including the ' laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.' " [16] He also pointed out that the Ameri-

[12] " Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President," *The Nurnberg Case*, p. 14.
[13] " Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President," *The Nurnberg Case*, p. 16.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[16] *Ibid.*

can conscience considered as criminal and punishable, the manner in which the Nazis "flagrantly violated the obligations which states, including their own, have undertaken by convention or tradition as a part of the rules of land warfare, and of the law of the sea." [17] Justice Jackson concluded: "I believe that those instincts of our people were right and that they should guide us as the fundamental tests of criminality. We propose to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and have been so written in every civilized code." [18]

Therefore, according to Justice Jackson, the proximate basis of the International Military Tribunal's authority was its charter which he described as "an organic act which represents the wisdom, the sense of justice, and the will of twenty-one governments." [19] The basis upon which the provisions of the charter rest was international law. In response to the objection of Dr. Robert Ley, made at the time of the indictment, Jackson declared: "Our case rests squarely on the provisions of the charter based on international law." [20] The specific aspects of international law which were violated were outlined by the Chief of Counsel in his report to the President. This threefold analysis manifests his conception of the ultimate basis of the tribunal's authority. First, wars of aggression were classified as crimes against the peace of the world on the grounds that they were in "violation of International Law or treaties." [21] Second, atrocious acts committed in prosecution of the war were deemed punishable because they represented "violations of International Law, including the laws, rules, and customs of land and naval warfare." [22] Third, the persecution of minority groups on racial or religious grounds deserved punishment by the family of nations since these offenses violated "the principles of

[17] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[18] *Ibid.*
[19] "Opening Statement," *The Nurnberg Case*, p. 80.
[20] Cf. AP dispatch, *New York Times*, October 21, 1945, p. 13.
[21] "Report of Robert H. Jackson to the President," *The Nurnberg Case*, p. 13.
[22] *Ibid.*

criminal law as they are generally observed in civilized states." [23] Moreover, Jackson pointed out, these " principles have been assimilated as a part of International Law at least since 1907 " when the Fourth Hague Convention decreed that belligerents shall be protected by " the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience." [24]

Finally, Jackson maintained that culpability for these violations of international law must be placed on responsible persons. Punishment of the nation, as such, was not held to be a sufficient sanction. The basis for this opinion is found in the following statement: " We do not accept the paradox that legal responsibility should be the least where power is the greatest. We stand on the principle of responsibile government declared some three centuries ago to King James by Lord Chief Justice Coke, who proclaimed that even a King is still ' under God and the Law.' " [25]

Lord Wright, Chairman of the United Nations War Crimes Commission. Lord Wright enuntiated opinions similar to those of Justice Jackson regarding the legal basis of punishment for war criminals. In an article, written before the establishment of the International Military Tribunal, he speculated on the manner by which the Nazis might be punished. He stated that war criminals might be tried by specially created military courts. Such a court, he declared, " is well recognized in international law. The court is held under the authority of the Commander in Chief and acts on the principles of international law." [26] It is to be noted that the tribunal, established by the allied agreement, was termed a " Military Tribunal " and acted by the authority of the Commanders in Chief of the four Allied nations.

[23] *Ibid.*
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 8.
[26] " That the Guilty Shall Not Escape," *New York Times Magazine*, May 13, 1945, Sec. VI, p. 34.

Various international conventions were also cited by Lord Wright as constituting the legal basis for an international court. He specifically mentioned, as did Justice Jackson, the provisions of the Hague Convention. He said:

> Early in this century great efforts were being made to humanize as far as possible the inevitable horrors of war. Various international conventions met and deliberated and published rules and regulations which were acceded to by almost every nation, including Germany. In particular, there was The Hague Convention of warfare on land which set out a code of rules and declared that the inhabitants and belligerents were to remain under the protection and governance of the principles of the law of nations derived from the usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity and from the dictates of the public conscience.[27]

Moreover, he asserted that the declaration of the Hague Convention was intended to bestow rights on individuals and to impose responsibility on those who violate these rights. Breaches of the rights of belligerents and of the rules for the conduct of war, in his opinion, "constitute war crimes and expose the guilty criminal to punishment if the offenses can be proved and the offenders identified."[28] Punitive action, he maintained, is not a question of revenge but rather of justice. In another article written after the establishment of the International Military Tribunal, Wright declared:

> Let it be established now that there is a rule of law among nations even in the launching and conduct of war and that there is legal machinery available, wherever it is necessary, to vindicate that rule. Let us sweep away the pseudolegal or legalistic rules that have no basis in the common conscience of mankind, which is convinced that there is a common law of nations and a legal machinery to enforce it so that it has teeth.[29]

Therefore, according to Lord Wright, international law is the basis of the Allies' right to establish a military tribunal. Inter-

[27] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[28] *Ibid.*

[29] "For Crimes Against Humanity," *New York Times Magazine*, October 28, 1945, Sec. VI, p. 8.

national law, in turn, is founded principally upon the various international conventions and is ultimately derived from the usages of civilized peoples, the laws of humanity and the dictates of the public conscience.

Murray C. Bernays, Associate of Justice Jackson. Murray C. Bernays, a military adviser to Justice Jackson, assisted in the formulation of the basis of the war crime trials. He has presented his views on this subject in an article which appeared in *Survey Graphic.*[30] In his discussion of war crimes and crimes against humanity, he laid down a fundamental principle that " assault and murder are felonies in war as in peace." The provisions of the Hague Convention, he asserted, guarantee certain rights to prisoners of war and to the citizens of occupied countries. For example, a commander has the duty of trying for murder any soldier guilty of murdering a prisoner of war. Bernays declared: " That is traditional law among nations of undisputed force. It is law, though *not* so specified in the Hague Conventions." He then stated that this fundamental principle, " by common and universal acceptance," also applies to those who hold positions of command: " They can be tried for these felonies not only if they commit the crimes themselves but also if they order or willfully countenance them." Moreover, by a still further application of the principle, in his opinion, even the head of a government may be tried for these crimes. As a proof of this belief he cites both the United States Field Manual on the Rules of Land Warfare, and the German Military Code. The Manual provides: " Individuals and organizations who violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be punished therefor. . . . The person giving such orders may also be punished." " The German Military Code recognizes the same rule: ' If the execution of a military order violates the criminal law, then the superior officer giving the order will bear responsibility therefor.' " [31] Thus, concluded

[30] " Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trials," *Survey Graphic,* XXXV, 5-9, January, 1946. This article in slightly different form appeared in *Reader's Digest,* February, 1946, pp. 56-64.

[31] *Ibid.*

Bernays, all the atrocities enumerated in counts three and four of the indictment " were felonious under accepted international law. Under that law, the guilty are liable to trial and punishment, without regard to their station."

The prosecution at Nuremberg charged that the crimes enumerated in count four of the indictment were " violations of international conventions, of internal penal laws, of the general principles of criminal law as derived from the criminal law of all civilized nations." [32] Regarding the violations of internal penal laws, Bernays declared: " This furnishes another well-settled ground of prosecution, because, under the instrument of unconditional surrender which Germany signed, the occupying powers exercise all juridical authority in the occupied land." [33] He pointed out that the military tribunals of the victorious Allies had " full jurisdiction to try " Germans who, *at any time*, had committed offenses against other Germans or who violated the German laws.[34] It is to be noted that during the Nuremberg Trial the prosecution emphasized the criminality of racial and religious persecutions—many of them against German nationals. In fact, of the eighteen defendants who were indicted on the fourth count, sixteen were found guilty by the court.

According to Bernays, the basis for punishing crimes against peace is the law of nations as established by international agreements. The aggressive wars initiated by the Nazis were treacherous acts " committed in the face of treaties of friendship, arbitration, and nonaggression, and in violation of recent, repeated, and solemn assurances that they would not occur." Moreover, in the opinion of Bernays, the " fact of treachery, standing by itself, is enough to condemn these wars as unlawful under the law of nations " because a war so begun is not, " under the law of nations," war at all; it is simply brigandage. Citing, as did Jackson, the various international treaties and

[32] " International Military Tribunal Indictment Number I," *Trial of War Criminals*, p. 60.

[33] Bernays, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 8.

agreements, Bernays insisted that aggressive warfare was outlawed. He declared that the Kellogg-Briand Pact "made aggressive war unlawful." Thus, he concluded, "What has happened at Nuremberg is revolutionary. But let us be clear as to the kind of revolution it is. It is not a revolution in the law. It is a revolution in law enforcement." [35]

Sheldon Glueck, Associate of Justice Jackson. In the United States, the most articulate exponent of the problems arising from the trial and punishment of war criminals is Dr. Sheldon Glueck.[36] His opinions regarding the basis of the International Military Tribunal are important to this study because he was associated with Justice Jackson during the preparations for the Nuremberg Trial and because he held membership on the Commission on Trial and Punishment of War Criminals of the London International Assembly, League of Nations Union.

In several instances throughout his writings, Glueck voices the opinion as did Justice Jackson, that the United Nations could have executed the Nuremberg defendants without resorting to any juridical procedure. He repudiated the idea that a victorious nation is obliged to observe all the technicalities which accompany the peacetime administration of justice. In discussing the problem of a peace treaty, he declared that "it should be emphasized that a victorious belligerent state *can* impose any terms it deems proper on the vanquished. It is simply a matter of power." [37] Again, he stated: "The fact that the victorious United Nations could, if they chose, impose any conditions on the Axis States—including the surrender for execution *without trial* of a long list of leading militarists,

[35] "The Legal Basis of the Nuremberg Trials," *Reader's Digest*, XLVIII, 64, February, 1946.

[36] Sheldon Glueck, Professor of Criminal Law and Criminology at Harvard University, was an adviser to Justice Jackson during the London negotiations in the summer of 1945. The foreword of his work *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War* was written by Justice Jackson, who declared: "When I was appointed as Representative and Chief of Counsel for the United States, he (Glueck) became an Advisor during those negotiations," p. vii.

[37] Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment*, p. 12.

politicians and industrialists believed to be involved in the murders, lootings and other crimes—is of basic importance.[38]

According to Glueck, the imposition of a peace treaty on the vanquished is limited only by " a decent respect for the judgment of history and fear of later reprisal." [39] These views were again expressed in his treatment of the various types of juridical procedure that could be used in the prosecution of war criminals. He believed that the heads of state together with their " chief henchmen " could be executed without a trial—by " proclaiming them to be criminals and outlaws, they would be put in the position of fugitives from justice, and subject to summary execution when captured or surrendered." [40] With the characteristic caution of a member of the legal profession, he continued:

> As was stressed at the outset, there is very little limitation on what a victorious nation can do with a vanquished state at the close of a war. . . . But the common law of nations probably requires a fair trial of offenders against war law as a prerequisite to punishment for alleged offenses; and the Geneva Convention so prescribes in the case of prisoners of war. But in the final analysis, a decent respect for the opinion of mankind and the judgment of history is, in effect, a victorious belligerent's main limitation on its treatment of the surrendered at the close of a war; and this is self-imposed.[41]

Another aspect of this " will of the victor " doctrine was voiced by Glueck in his consideration of the principle of liability for heads of state. He asserted that the prosecution, before a court of justice, of the " Nazi-Fascist leaders is justifiable as a morally legitimate exercise of a *political* policy on the part of the civilized nations of the world, a policy of expediency enforceable by the will of the victorious United Nations." [42] Even if such a legal basis was not recognized by some international lawyers, the procedure, declared Glueck, " is simply a question of expediency, a prerogative to be exercised by the victorious bel-

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 13.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[40] *Ibid.*, p. 77.
[41] *Ibid.*
[42] *Ibid.*, p. 126.

ligerent or not, as he may judge fit; ' a high exercise of executive and conquering force submitting itself to the judgment of history.' " [43]

Similar doctrines were expressed in his second work on the subject, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War,* which appeared a year after the cessation of hostilities. He prefaced his discussion of aggressive warfare by insisting that the Nuremberg defendants could have been executed without trial. In his opinion, the law " of an armistice or a treaty is, in the final analysis, the will of the victor . . . compulsion is to be expected and is an historic fact in the case of international agreements imposed by a victorious belligerent State upon the vanquished." [44] On the basis of these *quasi* " principles," Glueck deduced the following conclusion: " The United Nations could, then, have disposed of the Nazi ringleaders summarily by ' executive ' or ' political ' action, without any trial at all and without any consideration whatsoever of whether the acts with which the accused were charged had or had not previously been prohibited by some specific provision of international penal law." [45]

An example of this non-juridical or political action was provided, Glueck believed, in the exile of Napoleon to Elba and his subsequent imprisonment on St. Helena.[46] But, he declared, since the United Nations decided to proceed in a civilized manner, the defendants were given the benefit of a trial. The charter of the International Military Tribunal, according to Glueck, was another manifestation of the " will of the victor " doctrine. He asserted: " There is no question but that, as an act of the will of the conqueror, the United Nations had the authority to frame and adopt such a Charter." [47]

Before proceeding further with the presentation of Glueck's views on the particular bases of the Tribunal, it should be noted that in his second book he reversed his previous opinion

[43] *Ibid.*

[44] Sheldon Glueck, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War,* p. 8.

[45] *Ibid.,* pp. 8-9. [46] *Ibid.,* p. 9. [47] *Ibid.,* p. 25.

concerning the criminality of aggressive warfare. Glueck originally believed that the criminal liability of the Nazi leaders could be sufficiently established by the provisions of the Hague and Geneva Conventions so that " it seemed to be an unnecessary and dangerous complication to resort to prosecution for the ' crime ' of aggressive war." [48] He said:

During the preparation of my previous book on the subject of war crimes, I was not at all certain that the acts of launching and conducting an aggressive war could be regarded as " international crimes." I finally decided against such a view. . . . However, further reflection upon the problem has led me to the conclusion that for the purpose of conceiving aggressive war to be an international crime, the Pact of Paris may, together with other treaties and resolutions, be regarded as evidence of a sufficiently developed *custom* to be acceptable as international law.[49]

Therefore, Glueck's conception of the bases of the tribunal's right to prosecute crimes against peace will be culled from the more recent work. First, however, the question of war crimes and crimes against humanity will be considered. It should also be noted that although Glueck did recognize a distinction between acts that are technically called war crimes and crimes against humanity in the charter, he included all these offenses under the general heading of " War Crimes." In explanation, he declared: " The gruesome murders and greedy lootings are in this work designated ' war crimes ' only for convenience, since they were committed in preparation for or during the progress of a war upon helpless civilians in the clutches of ruthless military and political officials." [50]

Based on the Nazi conception of total war, Glueck's rather lengthy definition of war criminals is as follows:

. . . we may legitimately define war criminals as persons—regardless of military or political rank—who, in connection with the military, political, economic or industrial preparation for or waging of war, have, in their official capacity, committed acts contrary to (a) the

[48] *Ibid.*, p. 5.
[49] *Ibid.*, pp. 4-5.
[50] Sheldon Glueck, *War Criminals: Their Prosecution and Punishment*, p. 45.

laws and customs of legitimate warfare or (b) the principles of criminal law generally observed in civilized States; or who have incited, ordered, procured, counseled, or conspired in the commission of such acts; or, having knowledge that such acts were about to be committed, and possessing the duty and power to prevent them, have failed to do so.[51]

Two determinants of criminality are contained in this definition, namely, " the laws and customs of legitimate warfare " and " the principles of criminal law generally observed in civilized states." Since Glueck, at the time of writing, was of the opinion that the waging of aggressive war was not a crime, the violation of solemn treaty obligations was not included among the principles of liability in his definition. He explained that the " chief malefactors . . . can readily be prosecuted for violations of the laws and customs of legitimate warfare and of criminal law which they have committed during the course of the conflict." [52]

What are the fundamental bases of these two principles of liability? The sources of law involved in the first principle (i. e., violations of the laws and customs of war) are the written and unwritten rules of war. Glueck listed four conventions as the chief sources of written law: the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and two conventions signed at Geneva in 1929. In the opinion of international lawyers, Glueck pointed out, the provisions of these conventions oblige only the States and not the individual subjects. But the exception to this traditional theory is also noted. " However, when a State has ' implemented ' its international obligations by *domestic* law (i. e., statutes or, as in the case of the American *Rules of Land Warfare*, rules having the force of law), it has ' converted ' international law into municipal law; and, thereafter, violations of such domestic law by its own or enemy soldiers are punishable as offenses against its own sovereignty." [53] Unwritten (customary or common) international law is also a valid directive norm the violation of which constitutes a war crime. Quoting the War Department's *Rules of Land Warfare*, Glueck

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 37. [52] *Ibid.*, p. 38. [53] *Ibid.*

asserted that written agreements are merely " declaratory of a vast body of *unwritten* " international law. He pointed out that those who framed the Hague Conventions recognized the existence of a common international law based on the principles of humanity and justice. The elements of the unwritten law of warfare were summarized by Glueck in the following manner: " Part of this unwritten law of warfare consists of the basic principles of *military necessity*, . . . *humanity*, . . . and *chivalry*." [54]

Domestic penal (civil) law is the source of Glueck's second determinant of criminality. He held that acts which are contrary to " the principles of criminal law generally observed in civilized States " are punishable war crimes. He cited numerous atrocities committed against racial and religious minorities as examples of crimes " which have nothing to do with legitimate warfare." [55] These acts were not only violations of the rules of warfare but were also contrary to civil penal codes. Glueck, quoting the opinion of the German Supreme Court in the Leipzig Trials, declared that lawfulness " requires the acts of the soldier to be legitimate not only under domestic criminal law, but also under the law of nations, which all states and their agents are bound to obey." [56]

Therefore, concerning the crimes described by the charter as war crimes and crimes against humanity, Glueck concluded:

> . . . apart from being violations of the prohibitions of any particular State's military or criminal law (triable in domestic courts)—the majority of the outrages committed by the Germans and Japanese and their satellites are also contrary to the provisions of three bodies of law legitimately cognizable by an *international* tribunal: (a) conventional or " written " international (war) law, (b) common or " unwritten " international (war) law, (c) the prohibitions common to the great majority of civilized penal codes.[57]

Glueck's second book, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War*, is an exposition of his new-born thesis that crimes against peace may be considered international crimes. The contents

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 42.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 45.
[56] *Ibid.*, p. 44.
[57] *Ibid.*, p. 46.

of the book are concerned with the solution of two questions, namely, whether the initiation of aggressive warfare is an international crime and whether the rule of liability is applicable to the individual nationals of an errant State.

Dr. Glueck, in maintaining that aggressive warfare is an international crime, established his opinion on a different basis than that of Justice Jackson. Glueck's thesis, as has already been mentioned, is that " the Pact of Paris may, together with other treaties and resolutions, be regarded as evidence of a sufficiently developed custom to be acceptable as international law." [58] He quotes from Sir Frederick Pollock and from the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice to support his opinion that prevalent custom may be considered as a legitimate source of international law. According to Pollock, international agreements subscribed to by a majority of the civilized nations, may " become part of the universally received law of nations within a moderate time." [59] Writing in 1902, Pollock also believed that some of the provisions of the Hague Convention of 1899 " may sooner or later . . . be adopted as part of the public law of civilized nations by general recognition *without any formal ratification*." Article 38 of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice decreed that: " International custom," may be considered " as evidence of a general practice accepted by law." [60] Having cited these authorities, Glueck declared:

> If, therefore, a reasonable amount of proof can be adduced of a customary recognition among nations in the modern era that aggressive war is a crime, it need not at all be claimed that the violations of the Briand-Kellogg Pact or of any of the other treaties . . . in themselves constitute international crimes, in order to hold Germany, Japan, and other Axis nations liable for crimes against the Community of States as protected by international law.[61]

[58] Sheldon Glueck, *The Nuremberg Trial and Aggressive War*, p. 5.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 35.

[60] *Ibid.*, p. 26; cf. also John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition and the Law of Nations*, p. 509.

[61] Glueck, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

According to Glueck, proof of this "customary recognition among nations" is abundant in the numerous international agreements which have been entered into during the past fifty years. He then enumerates these solemn international pronouncements and cites pertinent quotations from many of them. These pronouncements, he asserts, "greatly re-enforce whatever inference . . . is derivable from the Briand-Kellogg Pact," and, *in toto*, they manifest a customary belief in the criminality of aggressive warfare among the civilized peoples of the world.[62] Therefore, Dr. Glueck concluded:

> The prosecution at Nuremberg under count two of the historic indictment, "Crimes Against Peace," . . . is, then, strictly speaking, not based upon proof of the breach of any specific provision of any particular one or more of the above-mentioned international treaties or conventions. It is rather based upon violation of customary international law—a system of law that is as obviously subject to growth as has been the law of any other developing legal order, by the crystallization of generally prevailing opinion and practice into law under the impact of common consent and the demands of general world security. Acquiescence of all members of the Family of Nations is not necessary for this purpose. All that is needed is reasonable proof of the existence of a widespread custom; and the numerous multilateral anti-war treaties, agreements and resolutions, as well as the statements and writings of experts in connection with such international pronouncements, comprise such proof.[63]

Having established that the initiation of aggressive wars is an international crime, Glueck discusses the other important question, viz., whether the rule of liability extends to individuals. He noted that the principle of personal liability was proclaimed in the numerous statements issued by the Allies during the progress of the war and was enunciated in both the agreement and the charter of the International Military Tribunal. Nevertheless, Glueck points out, certain objections to this principle have been raised by conservative international lawyers and publicists. They have claimed that "international law is a body of norms applicable only to the actions of sov-

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 34.

[63] *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.

ereign states and, in the second place, it provides no sanctions of a nature applicable to individuals, no punishment for natural persons." [64] Dr. Glueck does not concur with these opinions.

Citing several cases from the records of international law in support of his views, including the opinion of the German Supreme Court in the Leipzig Trials, Glueck declares that the law of nations is obligatory upon individuals. Thus he stated:

> The authorities cited and others amply support the conclusion that the relevant principles of the law of nations may and do obligate individuals; and that there is nothing in international law itself that necessarily prohibits the direct application of its relevant prohibitions to natural persons, if a state chooses to do so.[65]

Traditionally, violations of the law of nations are punishable by the particular nation concerned. However, in the opinion of Glueck, by reason of the international scope of the Nazi atrocities the nations involved may cooperate in the prosecution. He said:

> Consequently, when the great majority of civilized States, after due warning to the Axis leaders, united in prosecuting individuals for violating the tenets of international law they were doing no more than could have been done had each of them proceeded individually. Indeed, they are doing a service to the Family of Nations and its international law, in combining their individual jurisdictions into a single agency speaking on behalf of world law and order.[66]

In answer to the second objection, that international law provides no sanctions, Glueck declares that it, too, is open to question. Quoting Grotius and other authorities, Glueck's opinion is based upon, or rather deduced from, the traditional punishments which are meted out for violations of the laws and customs of war. The same principle, he declared, " would apply to breaches of any other prohibition of international law capable of being violated by individuals, including a breach of the peace of the world by the initiation and conduct of an illegal and criminal war." [67]

[64] *Ibid.*, p. 60.
[65] *Ibid.*, p. 65.
[66] *Ibid.*, p. 66.
[67] *Ibid.*, p. 69.

The preceding conclusions of Dr. Glueck concerning the bases of the International Military Tribunal's authority can be briefly summarized. First, he firmly believed that the United Nations had plenary power with respect to the vanquished German nation. The " will of the victor " doctrine was applied in explanation of the United Nations' jurisdiction regarding the terms of the peace treaty, the drafting of the charter and the mode of juridical procedure to be followed in the prosecution of war criminals. Second, war crimes are punishable by an international tribunal because they are violations of " the laws and customs of war " and " the principles of criminal law generally observed in civilized States." Fundamentally, the bases of these two principles are: (a) written international law (the provisions of the various conventions concerning the rules of warfare); (b) unwritten international law (customs founded on the principles of justice and humanity); (c) civil penal law of civilized nations. Third, the initiation of aggressive warfare violates customary international law and therefore is punishable as an international crime. Fourth, on the basis of customary international law the rule of liability extends to the responsible persons of the errant nation.

It should be noted, in conclusion, that the persons quoted in this study by no means constitute an exhaustive catalogue of those who have expressed themselves in defense of the Nuremberg Trials. However, these individuals are representative insofar as they were all intimately associated in the formulation of the International Military Tribunal's charter. The addition of other sources would merely result in the multiplication of repetitious statements. The bases of the tribunal, as expressed by Justice Jackson and the other authorities, represent a comprehensive enumeration of the fundamental bases as conceived by those who were associated with the creation of the International Military Tribunal. These fundamental bases will be analyzed and evaluated in a later study.

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NOTES ON THE CONNECTION OF THE VIRTUES

FEW points in moral doctrine have been given more importance by theologians writing on the virtues in general than the connection of the virtues and few points have caused greater disagreement in the interpretation, acceptance, and defense of St. Thomas' teaching. The Angelic Doctor has definitively expressed his doctrine in the *Summa Theologica* (I-II, q. 65) where he studies, (1) the mutual connection of the moral virtues, (2) their connection with the theological virtues, and (3) the connection of the theological virtues with one another. The first of these considerations is philosophical and depends upon the right notion of the terms of quality, " habit " and " disposition," terms which were not completely understood by St. Thomas until he came to write his Summa.[1] The second consideration has not been properly accepted and so has been misinterpreted to suit pessimistic views; we shall attempt to give a correct interpretation, optimistic though it may be. The third consideration is not always aptly shown, but as everyone accepts it we shall comment on it only briefly.

I. Moral Virtues

In considering here the mutual connection of the moral virtues, we limit ourselves for the moment to the natural virtues. Such connection as the supernatural or infused virtues have is had through charity; consequently, such a consideration belongs in the third part of this study.

Virtue is a habit, an operative habit, and an operative good habit. As habit, virtue differs specifically from an inclination or

[1] On the Thomistic distinction of habit and disposition Fr. Ramirez, O. P., has written a most important paper, *Doctrina S. Thomae Aquinatis de distinctione inter habitum et dispositionem*, in *Studia Anselmiana*, VII-VIII, *Miscellanea Philosophica Patri Gredt Oblata* (1938), pp. 121-142.

disposition, whether innate or acquired by acts.[2] A habit is a quality not easily changeable of itself; disposition is a quality easily changeable of itself. Therefore, a disposition can not attain the perfection of a habit, and so it is called an imperfect virtue. But, while a habit is a quality not easily movable, and disposition is a quality easily movable of its nature, we can think of habits that are easily movable and of dispositions which are not easily movable on the part of the subject. Thus, the habit of science obtained from a single demonstration is firm in its object and weak in its subject. On the other hand, the habit of opinion, which is based on merely probable reasons and lacks immobility of itself, can be so tenaciously held as to be almost impossible for the subject to change. In the first case, the habit is in the state of disposition; in the second, disposition is in the state of habit.[3] Consequently, a virtue which would be a habit by essence, but in the state of disposition by reason of its subject must also be called an imperfect virtue. A perfect virtue, therefore, means a virtue which, besides having the essence of habit, also has the condition of habit; that is, it is a quality which is movable only with difficulty both by its nature and on the part of its subject.[4]

Natural moral virtues, if acquired by acts, presuppose a great number of these acts. Because these acts deal with particulars and thus with the variable according to manifold circumstances, they are not essentially in a person unless they are in him in the state of habit. Thus, whenever such virtues are

[2] In the writings which preceded the *Summa*, St. Thomas did not teach that habit and disposition are essentially different. Consequently he admitted that a disposition could become a habit.

[3] In the same way we say that under the Old Law, a law of fear, people were in the state of servitude, while in the New Law, a law of love, we live in the state of freedom. But this did not prevent some of the just of the Old Testament from having the spirit of the New Law, just as it does not prevent some of the Catholics today from having the spirit of the Old Law, as St. Thomas remarks. (*I-II*, 107, 1.)

[4] The terminology, in the different authors, is far from being fixed. Some would call a perfect virtue that which is very intense; others would call perfect only infused virtues, or the virtues, acquired or infused, which are accompanied by charity.

present, they are present as perfect moral virtues.[5] Consequently, we consider inadequate both the opinion of Cajetan, who admits an acquired moral virtue which is imperfect, that is, in the state of disposition; [6] we disagree also with John of St. Thomas, who holds that firmness on the part of the subject belongs to the very essence of the moral virtues.[7] The moral virtue considered here is begotten, as has been said, by many acts. But, there are virtuous acts which frequently occur in all men, as, for example, the acts of the cardinal virtues, so-called because human life hinges upon them.[8] There are others, on the other hand, which do not occur frequently, at least in all men, but only in some in a given condition of life. Thus, for example, the virtue of magnificence has no chance to be exercised by those without an abundance of earthly goods.

Imperfect moral virtues are not mutually connected. Some men have an inclination or disposition, innate or acquired, to the act of one virtue, for example, justice, and have no disposition or inclination to the act of another virtue, such as temperance. Moreover, when it is a question of innate inclination, he who is disposed to fortitude is rather indisposed toward

[5] Cf. Bernini, *Le virtù morali acquisite nello stato del peccato mortale sec. S. Tommaso*, in *Divus Thomas* Pl., 43 [1940], p. 428 sq.

[6] The great Commentator of the St. Thomas was the first to distinguish two dispositions and two habits: a) a disposition in the state of disposition, which lacks firmness both of itself and in its subject, e. g., a momentary state of health or disease; b) a disposition in the state of habit, which, being easily changeable of itself, is firmly rooted in its subject, e. g., that condition of physical well being which challenges all kinds of temperature, or that poor physical condition which resists all cures; c) a habit in the state of disposition, which is not easily movable of itself but easily movable in its subject, e. g., charity in a recent convert; d) a habit in the state of habit, which, besides being not easily movable of its nature, is also deeply rooted in its subject, e. g., the charity of a holy man. But Cajetan holds that an acquired moral virtue might exist in the state of disposition while having the essence of the habit. (Cf. Cajetan, *Comm. in I-II*, 65, 1)

[7] *Cursus Theol.*, ed. Vives, t. VI, q. 62, disp. 17, a. 2.

[8] "Cardinalis a cardine dicitur, in quo ostium vertitur, secundum illud Prov. 26, 14: *Sicut ostium vertitur in cardine suo, ita piger in lectulo suo*; unde virtutes cardinales dicuntur in quibus fundatur vita humana." (*QQ. DD. de virt. card.*, a. 1); "Virtus aliqua dicitur cardinalis, quasi principalis, quia super eam aliae virtutes firmantur sicut ostium in cardine." (*QQ. DD. de virt. in comm.*, a. 12, 24 m)

meekness. Furthermore, one who chooses a work of justice on account of the special goodness of justice might lack strength and thus be led to omit or renounce the act of justice because of the danger that threatens from the pronouncement of a just sentence. In the same way a woman might consent to fornication, not because she is attracted to the sexual pleasure, but because of the financial gain she acquires by the act.[9]

Perfect cardinal virtues are so mutually connected that he who has one also has the others. This second proposition is easily demonstrated if we take the four cardinal virtues as four general conditions of virtue,[10] since in that case prudence stands for discretion, justice for rectitude, fortitude for firmness, and temperance for moderation. It is evident, as St. Gregory points out, that, "There is no true prudence unless it be just, temperate, and brave; no perfect temperance that is not brave, just, and prudent; no sound fortitude that is not prudent, temperate, and just; no real justice, without prudence, fortitude, and temperance." [11]

[9] A particular motive, namely, of justice or chastity, is altogether insufficient for the constant and perpetual acting according to justice and chastity. Thus an imperfect virtue, though it inclines toward good, does not do so as to establish and strengthen the soul against every impulse. Since by its formal object it is easily movable, this imperfect virtue is essentially a disposition, not a habit.

[10] "These four virtues are understood differently by various writers. For some take them as signifying certain general conditions of the human mind, to be found in all the virtues: so that, to wit, prudence is merely a certain rectitude of discretion in any actions or matters whatever; justice, a certain rectitude of the mind, whereby man does what he ought in any matters; temperance, a disposition of the mind, moderating any passions or operations, so as to keep them within bounds; and fortitude, a disposition whereby the soul is strengthened for that which is in accord with reason, against any assaults of the passions, or the toil involved by any operations. To distinguish these four virtues in this way does not imply that justice, temperance and fortitude are distinct virtuous habits: because it is fitting that every moral virtue, from the fact that it is a *habit*, should be accompanied by a certain firmness so as not to be moved by its contrary: and this, we have said, belongs to fortitude. Moreover, inasmuch as it is a *virtue*, it is directed to good which involves the notion of right and due; and this, we have said, belongs to justice. Again, owing to the fact that it is a *moral virtue* partaking of reason, it observes the mode of reason in all things, and does not exceed its bounds, which has been stated to belong to temperance." (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 61, a. 4.)

[11] *Cf. Summa Theol., loc. cit.*, ad 1um.

Even if the four cardinal virtues are taken as distinct virtues according to their determinate matter, the proposition is equally susceptible of proof because no fortitude, temperance, or justice is perfect without total prudence. Total prudence, on its part, presupposes a perfect fortitude, a perfect temperance, and a perfect justice. Since prudence is the " right reason of things to be done," and since things to be done are all singulars, for its practical syllogism [12] prudence needs not only a major premise of universal proposition (" evil must be avoided ") but also a minor premise or particular proposition (" this act is evil.") If the major is given by the habit of synderesis, the practical truth and evidence of the minor is given only by the appetite which, of itself undetermined or indifferent, is rectified or determined by the moral virtues.[13] For example, no one sees promptly and with ease that fornication is simply bad for him unless he is well disposed toward the matter of temperance, the matter of justice, and the matter of fortitude. Thus he would not be moved to commit fornication either by the love of sexual pleasure, or by the love of money, or by the fear of death. Otherwise, we would have to call that woman chaste who would not consent to fornication for the love of sexual pleasure but would consent to it for the love of financial gain or

[12] " Reason directs human acts in accordance with a twofold knowledge, universal and particular: because in conferring about what is to be done, it employs a syllogism, the conclusion of which is an act of judgment, or of choice, or an operation. Now actions are about singulars: wherefore the conclusion of a practical syllogism is a singular proposition. But a singular proposition does not follow from an universal proposition, except through the medium of a particular proposition: thus a man is restrained from an act of patricide, by the knowledge that it is wrong to kill one's father, and that this man is his father. Hence ignorance about either of these two propositions, viz. of the universal principle which is a rule of reason, or of the particular circumstance, could cause an act of patricide." (*I-II*, q. 76, a. 1)

[13] " Perfection and rectitude of reason in speculative matters depends on the principles from which reason argues: just as we have said above that science depends and presupposes understanding, which is the habit of principles. Now in human acts the end is what the principles are in the speculative matters, as stated in *Ethic.* vii. Consequently, it is requisite for prudence, which is the reason about things to be done, that man be well disposed with regard to the ends: and this depends on the rectitude of his appetite. Wherefore, for prudence there is need of a moral virtue, which rectifies the appetite." (*I-II*, q. 57, a. 4)

through fear of ill treatment. So, too, we would have to admit, against Aristotle,[14] that a man who steals in order to commit adultery is not more an adulterer than a thief, but rather an adulterer and no thief at all. Total prudence, therefore—and this is the only true prudence—presupposes, in this case, not only the virtue of temperance, but also fortitude and justice. The ends of these virtues are the principles of prudence. As prudence is one, it is mortally wounded if a mistake is made about any of its principles.[15]

The perfect moral virtues are all mutually connected so that he who has one also has the others, at least in intention, or in proximate potency. The reason adduced for the connection of the cardinal virtues is valid for all those virtues whose acts might occur in an ordinary life, because unless prudence presupposes all those virtues, that is, the appetite rectified with regard to any matter concomitant to an act, it would be unable to regulate this act according to the canons of reason.[16] Thus

[14] 5 *Ethic.*, c. 2, n. 4; St. Thomas, lect. 3.

[15] See our *De vitiis et peccatis*, n. 150 sqq. "Unitas prudentiae est centrum in doctrina S. Thomae de connexione virtutum. Iam in Commentario ad Ethicam duce Aristotele expressis verbis ad eam revocat: *Propter prudentiae unitatem omnes virtutes morales sunt conexae* (in 6 *Ethic.*, lect. 11). Negata totalitate prudentiae, tota doctrina de connexione virtutum rueret, sicut apparet apud omnes praedecessores S. Thomae, qui regulationem universalem tantummodo prudentiae perfectae concesserunt, admittentes respectu materiarum particularium prudentias imperfectas, quas ut veras virtutes habebant . . . Artes diversae respiciunt singulares fines, e contra prudentia ordinat actus propter unum finem, seu ex una ratione formali, scilicet propter ipsum esse secundum rationem, in quo consistit perfectio humana, et quod est finis virtutum moralium. Licet in virtutibus moralibus sit diversa ratio boni, est tamen una ratio veri, secundum quam omnes diriguntur: *Obiectum rationis est verum. Est autem eadem ratio veri in omnibus moralibus, quae sunt contingentia agibilia, unde est una sola virtus in eis dirigens, scilicet prudentia. Obiectum autem appetitivae virtutis est bonum appetibile, cuius est diversa ratio secundum diversam habitudinem ad rationem dirigentem.* (*I-II*, q. 60, a. 1, ad 1m) Licet ergo sint diversae rationes practicae materialiter consideratae, inquantum alia rectitudo est in temperantia, et alia in iustitia, etc., tamen in omnibus est una formalis ratio veri. Prudentia enim, cum sit ratio virtuose proponens, unicuique virtuti ita format medium, quod respiciat non tantummodo materiam illius virtutis in se, sed etiam in comparatione cum omnibus aliis, secus oriretur difficultas ex materia neglecta, in qua forsitan homo nondum est firmatus in bono." (Utz, *De conexione virtutum moralium inter se*, 1937, pag. 110 sq.)

[16] Although, due to the fact that different materials are often presented, it is

they are all actually present. As Fr. Utz says, " Because St. Thomas places the formal reason for the connection of the acquired virtues in prudence, he holds that all those virtues are present in us that are required to constitute and rectify prudence. Besides prudence, therefore, one needs to have as many virtues as are necessary to his total and perfect moral rectification." [17]

With regard to other virtues whose material is lacking in the lives of certain people, such virtues as magnificence in a beggar or virginity in a married person, actual connection is unnecessary since prudence is preserved in such people without these virtues. Since the beggar and the married person lack the matter of these virtues, the integrity of their reason is not endangered by the absence of such virtues. Nevertheless, such virtues can be present in intention (*in proposito*) in that their matter might occur in the intentional order. Thus, for example, a woman might reflect on the danger of death or the loss of money with which she might be threatened by refusing to consent to fornication. In such circumstances, not real but only apprehended, she might elicit internal acts by which she would prefer virginity to life or to riches. In the same way, a beggar might elicit the intention of building a church, if he should obtain the necessary money, and a woman might will the preservation of her virginity if it were fitting for her. By internal acts, these people would have the virtues of magnificence or virginity, in intention.[18] If the materials of certain

very difficult for anyone to have exercised many acts of a moral virtue without having exercised at the same time acts of other moral virtues, and although, as a consequence, it can be said that no one practices temperance without practicing justice and fortitude—for example, the unjust or the timid would have yielded to intemperance and thus hindered the generation of temperance—St. Thomas does not call upon the exercise of all virtues, but only upon the unity of prudence in proving the connection of the virtues.

[17] *Loc. cit.*, pag. 118.

[18] St. Thomas (*II-II*, q. 152, a. 3) speaks of virginity as to its *formal element*, and this formal element he sees in the purpose of keeping virginity, should it be fitting for some even married person to do so. He speaks also of magnificence *in preparedness of the mind*. To avoid confusion, we prefer to say *in intention*, since where there is no matter of a virtue, it is impossible to perform its act, and

virtues are not present, even intentionally, the virtues can be possessed *in proximate potency* in that the other virtues are actually possessed. This is so because the generation of a virtue is so much easier as the dispositions of the subject are better Thus, one who is liberal in giving of the little he might possess would easily distribute larger amounts if he should acquire abundance; so, he would easily practice the virtue of magnificence. In the same way, a married woman who is chaste in marriage would easily be chaste in widowhood.

As a first corollary, it should be pointed out how virtues are begotten. By synderesis the reason dictates that the honest good is to be pursued and the will, by natural inclination, is somehow affected by this good. When a practical case arises regarding a concrete honest good the reason, after consideration and counsel, can judge that this good is to be pursued; the will can choose it and the reason, under the will's election, can command its execution. Judgment, election, command, and execution will be less prompt, easy, and pleasant, the more the agent is dominated by the contrary vice, but they are not on that account impossible. Vices do not destroy human freedom and do not eliminate synderesis or the natural inclination to a rational good.[19]

By the repetition of right practical judgment and command, man generates the virtue of prudence, and by frequent good

consequently to exercise that virtue and to begin its generation. Only where it comes to the mind, it is possible to form a real purpose or resolution about it.

[19] "It must be observed that there are two ways in which something is said to be natural to man; one is according to his specific nature, the other according to his individual nature . . . In both these ways virtue is natural to man inchoatively. This is so in respect to the specific nature, in so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the seeds of intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural appetite for good in accordance with reason" (*I-II*, q. 63, a. 1); "The good of nature, that is diminished by sin, is the natural inclination to virtue, which is befitting to man from the very fact that he is a rational being; for it is due to this that he performs actions in accord with reason, which is to act virtuously. Now sin cannot entirely take away from man that fact that he is a rational being, for then, he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good of nature to be destroyed entirely." (*I-II*, q. 85, a. 2)

election and execution he generates in himself the moral virtues. In the beginning, he has these virtues by way of disposition; that is, he has partial prudence and imperfect moral virtues which are not mutually connected. After long exercise in the acts of these virtues, there will come a time when one more act will suffice to generate the virtues by way of habit. As soon as this act is exercised, the man will have total prudence and perfect moral virtues.[20] This ultimate act, which means a new command, a new election, and a new execution, by its own force and the force of the previous acts, perfects not only the moral virtue by which it is elicited but also the virtue of prudence and the rest of the virtues connected with prudence. The subsequent right judgment, command, good election, and execution will come from the virtue, and hence they will be performed with promptness, ease, and pleasure. If, because of many evil acts or the generation of a contrary habit, a moral virtue falls away from its perfection or is corrupted as a habit then, simultaneously, total prudence and all the other perfect moral virtues are corrupted.[21]

As a second corollary it follows that, while imperfect virtue possesses neither the condition nor essence of habit but inclines toward the good of reason, perfect virtue inclines to perform the good and perform it well, as befits virtue. Virtue by its essence differs from simple disposition or inclination because

[20] "In agibilibus, quia operationes animae non sunt efficaces sicut in demonstrationibus, propter hoc quod agibilia sunt contingentia et probabilia, ideo unus actus non sufficit ad causandam virtutem, sed requiruntur plures; et licet illi plures non sint simul, tamen habitum virtutis causare possunt; quia primus actus facit aliquam dispositionem, et secundus actus inveniens materiam dispositam, adhuc eam magis disponit; et tertius, adhuc amplius; et sic ultimus actus, agens in virtute omnium praecedentium complet generationem virtutis, sicut accidit de multis guttis cavantibus lapidem." (*QQ. DD. de virt. in comm.*, a. 9, 11m)

[21] It is continually a question here, as stated in the beginning, of acquired virtues, and thus of acquired prudence. To these vice is directly opposed; and not only to perfect virtues, but even to the natural inclinations toward virtue (cf. our *De vitiis*, etc., nn. 5-14). The fact that vice lacks firmness from its object—repugnant to reason—does not deny it the power to corrupt virtue; even the omission of acts suffices to corrupt some habits. (*I-II*, q. 53, a. 4) The acquisition and loss of infused prudence and infused moral virtues will be discussed in the next section.

these, lacking regulative prudence, can be turned to an evil use. St. Thomas notes that " the greater the natural inclination is toward those things that pertain to virtue, the more dangerous it proves to be unless discernment of reason is employed. In this way, the faster a blind man runs the more seriously he gets hurt." [22] On the contrary, no one abuses virtue by using it as the principle of an evil act.[23]

Moreover, virtue in its condition of habit differs also from virtue existing in the condition of disposition since it connotes firmness in its subject. The subject, in addition to the constancy expected of virtue in any circumstance, performs virtuous acts with promptness, facility, and pleasure. If delay, difficulty, or disgust are experienced, they come from obstacles which are not directly contrary to the virtue and certainly are not from inclinations opposed to the virtue.[24]

II. Moral and Theological Virtues

Virtue is a habit that inclines toward good; good is twofold: real and apparent. Virtue, therefore, can stand for a true virtue which inclines toward real good, and for an apparent virtue which inclines only toward fictitious good.[25] True virtue has

[22] In 3 *Sent.*, dist. 36, a. 1.

[23] " One can make bad use of a virtue objectively, for instance, by having evil thoughts about a virtue, e. g., by hating it, or by being proud of it; but one cannot make bad use of virtue as principle of action, so that an act of virtue be evil." (*I-II*, q. 55, a. 4, ad 5m)

[24] " Ubi est maior habitus oportet quod sit maior actus secundum inclinationem habitus. Potest tamen esse in homine aliquid vel impediens vel disponens ad actum, quod per accidens se habet ad habitum; sicut habitus scientiae impeditur ne ad actum procedat propter ebrietatem " (*QQ. DD. de Virt. Card.*, a. 3, 12m); " Illa difficultas quam experitur in suis operationibus iustus in caritate exsistens oritus ex passionibus, quae non directe et formaliter opponuntur caritati: immo vero etiam si perfecta caritas sit infusa subito peccatori paenitenti ex magna contritione, non statim passiones appetitus sensitivi profligantur aut omnino sedantur; manet tamen homo cum potestate moderandi passiones insurgentes." (Bañez, in *II-II*, q. 23, a. 4; ed. 1586, col. 540)

[25] " As Augustine says (*Contra Iulian.*, iv) the prudence of the miser, whereby he devises various roads to gain, is no true virtue; nor the miser's justice, whereby he scorns the property of another through fear of severe punishment; nor the miser's temperance, whereby he curbs his desire for expensive pleasures; nor the

been distinguished as perfect and imperfect, inasmuch as it inclines to doing good well or to doing good but not well. On the part of its subject the former has the condition of habit, the latter the condition of disposition. Finally, perfect virtue might be perfect philosophically, if it inclines to performing good acts within the limits of the natural order; it might be perfect theologically if, under the extrinsic command (*imperium*) of charity, it attains the supernatural order with its good act.[26]

The theological virtues are three: faith, hope, and charity. As will be shown, faith and hope can remain without charity and charity is impossible in this life without faith and hope. But the only connection to be considered at present is that of moral virtue with charity and of charity with moral virtue.[27]

miser's fortitude, whereby as Horace says (Ep. i) *he braves the sea, crosses mountains, and goes through fire, in order to avoid poverty.*" (*II-II*, q. 23, a. 7)

[26] "Quilibet artifex iudicare debet secundum proprias sui generis causas, medicus quidem secundum humores, astrologus secundum astra, etc.; diversa est ratio sermonis apud theologos et alios. Theologus siquidem, cuius obiectum est Deus, et hominem bonum constituit solum in ordine ad finem ultimum simpliciter, qui est obiectum caritatis, distinguendo dicit quod perfectio virtutis est duplex, in genere et simpliciter; et quod sine caritate et fide etiam sunt virtutes perfectae in genere, sed non simpliciter. Philosophus autem, qui hominem bonum constituit in ordine ad ultimum finem naturalem, nec superiorem novit finem, virtutes humanas sine fide et caritate veras et perfectas virtutes simpliciter dicit. Nec propterea contradicunt: sed imperfecta notitia philosophiae de hominis bonitate in causa est. Quod enim philosophus vocat perfectum simpliciter, quia non est eius altiorem finem considerare, theologus vocat perfectum in genere et imperfectum simpliciter, quia eius est altiorem finem considerare. Et si haec bene notaveris, et sciveris applicare, cum reverentia suscipies dicta theologorum, et philosophos non spernes" (Cajetan, in *II-II*, q. 23, a. 7); "Cum virtus sit quae hominem facit bonum et opus eius bonum reddit, illa est virtus perfecta quae perfecte opus hominis bonum reddit, et ipsum bonum facit; illa autem est imperfecta, quae hominem et opus eius reddit bonum non simpliciter, sed quantum ad aliquid. Bonum autem simpliciter in actibus humanis invenitur per hoc quod pertingitur ad regulam humanorum actuum; quae quidem est una quasi homogenea et propria homini, scilicet ratio recta. . . . Ad rationem autem rectam attingit homo per prudentiam" (*QQ. DD. de virt. card.*, a. 2); In order to avoid the confusion which easily arises after having called a perfect virtue that which is a virtue *simpliciter* or has the perfection of a habit, it is better to distinguish this perfect virtue according to the aforesaid twofold consideration of the philosopher and the theologian, calling it, not *simpliciter* and *secundum quid*, but philosophically and theologically perfect.

[27] If there is a connection between the moral virtues and faith or hope, it will become evident from what will be said.

As moral virtues have been divided into natural or acquired and supernatural or infused, they must all be considered in this section.

Natural apparent virtues can be without charity and charity without them. In fact, since they incline toward that which is not good in reality, no matter how good it may appear to be, they have no need for charity which inclines toward real good, that is, toward a supernatural final end. Moreover, charity excludes such apparent virtues since they incline to something contrary to the final end or, at least, to something incompatible with it. If some of these are not excluded by charity, they are not demanded by it, as charity can not direct their act toward the end which is its peculiar object.

True natural imperfect virtues can be without charity and charity can be without them. These virtues, indeed, are at times given by nature as specific or individual properties, and nature does not give charity. Likewise, those inclinations or dispositions which are begotten by acts do not demand charity, as they do not demand it when converted into habits, as will be shown immediately. Nor does charity, on its part, need them. Charity is found in baptised children who have no natural virtues; it is also infused into adults at the time of justification regardless of their natural good inclinations, and therefore even into those who have acquired no natural virtues through the repetition of good acts. Besides, in its ordination to the supernatural end charity is sufficiently provided for by the infused moral virtues.

Charity can be without natural virtues, which, on their part, though not attaining the theological perfection of virtues without charity, can be, without charity, true and perfect virtues philosophically speaking. We have just seen that charity does not need natural virtues as mere inclinations or dispositions. *A fortiori*, it does not need them as they are in the state of perfection of habit, which is the complement of those dispositions.. It is also evident that only by charity are those virtues ordained towards the ultimate supernatural end.[28]

[28] Istae virtutes (morales acquisitae) non constituuntur in essse virtutis secun-

Concerning the second part of the last proposition a great controversy has been waged among theologians, even among Thomists. It is first necessary to demonstrate that natural virtues can remain after charity has been lost.[29] An act is not directly opposed to a habit, consequently an acquired habit is not corrupted by an act. A grievious sin of intemperance does not corrupt either acquired temperance or acquired prudence. St. Thomas is explicit: "Venial sin does not destroy virtue, while mortal sin destroys infused virtue, by turning man away from God. Yet one act, even of mortal sin, does not destroy the habit of acquired virtue, but if such acts be repeated so as to engender a contrary habit, the habit of acquired virtue is destroyed and the destruction of it entails the loss of prudence . . . and consequently all the moral virtues are destroyed as to the perfect and formal being of virtue, which they have in so far as they partake of prudence."[30] Even these virtues can be acquired by one who has no charity, who is in the state of mortal sin, because such a one can perform many naturally good acts by which he forms first a disposition, then a habit. The Angelic Doctor says: "It is possible by means of human works to acquire moral virtues, in as much as they produce good works that are directed to an end not surpassing the natural power of man. When they are acquired thus, they can be

dum essentiam, nec secundum statum, per caritatem, aut aliquid eius: sed dum imperantur ab ea, ab superiorem ordinem referuntur" (Cajetan, in *I-II* q. 65, a. 4, n. 6)

[29] For the negative position *cf.* Maritain, *De la Philosophie Chrétienne*, 1933, p. 105, and *Science et Sagesse*, 1935, p. 252 sq., and Garrigou-Lagrange, *L'instabilité dans l'état de péché mortel des vertus morales acquises* (Rev. Thomiste, 1937, p. 255 sqq). For the affirmative *cf.* Ramirez, *De philosophia morali christiana* (Divus Thomas Fr., 1936, p. 93 sqq.); Deman, *Questions disputées de science morale* (Rev. des Sciences Phil. et Theol., 1937, p. 278 sqq.).

[30] *I-II*, q. 73, a. 1, ad 2m. As Fr. Deman points out, nowhere does St. Thomas teach that a man deprived of charity necessarily multiplies these evil acts. "If indeed charity were an acquired habit dependent on the power of its subject, it would not necessarily be removed by one mortal sin, for act is directly contrary, not to habit but to act. The endurance of a habit in its subject does not require the endurance of its act, so that when a contrary act supervenes, the acquired habit is not at once done away." (*II-II*, q. 24, a. 12)

without charity." [31] Thus to the objection: "According to the Philosopher (in the 2 Bk. of Ethics) virtue is corrupted and generated by the same cause, but virtue can be corrupted by the free will. Thus by the free will (without grace) man is able to generate virtue," St. Thomas answers: "The Philosopher is speaking about political virtue, which is acquired by acts, but not of infused virtue." [32] Finally: "The good of a social virtue is commensurate with human nature and consequently the human will can tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace." [33] These virtues existed *de facto* in many pagans or gentiles. Explicitly St. Thomas says: "They were in many of the Gentiles." (*I-II*, q. 65, a. 2) So he has nothing to oppose to the objection: "Some heathens are related to have endured many hardships rather than betray their country or commit some other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore it seems possible to have patience without help of grace." [34]

Thus without charity there can be acquired moral virtues mutually connected, even if man, turned away from God as

[31] *I-II*, q. 65, a. 2.

[32] *QQ. DD. de veritate*, 24, 14, 6m.

[33] *II-II*, q. 136, a. 3, ad 2m. It cannot be opposed that man in the state of sin, deprived of grace and charity, is unable to avoid for a long time new mortal sins (*cf. I-II*, q. 109, a. 8) because to the objection: "Sin and virtue are contraries, so that they are incompatible. Now man cannot avoid sin except by the grace of God . . . Therefore neither can any virtues be caused in us by habituation, but only by the gift of God," St. Thomas himself answers: "Mortal sin is incompatible with divinely infused virtue, especially if this be considered in its perfect state. But actual sin, even mortal, is compatible with humanly acquired virtue, because the use of a habit in us is subject to our will, and one sinful act does not destroy a habit of acquired virtue, since it is not an act but a habit, that is directly contrary to a habit. Wherefore, though man cannot avoid mortal sin without grace, so as never to sin mortally, yet he is not hindered from acquiring a habit of virtue, whereby he may abstain from evil in the majority of cases." (*I-II*, q. 63, a. 2, ad 2m) And just because acquired virtues make us abstain from evil in the majority of cases (*ut in pluribus*), it loses nothing if now and then (*ut in paucioribus*) someone falls into evil. St. Thomas has said: "Virtus infusa facit quod nullo modo oboediatur concupiscentiis peccati; et hoc facit infallibiliter ipsa manete. Sed virtus acquisita deficit in hoc, licet in paucioribus, sicut et aliae inclinationes naturales deficiunt in minori parte." (*QQ. DD. de Virtut. in Comm.*, 11, 4m)

[34] *II-II*, q. 136, a. 3, arg. 2.

the author of grace, is not converted, in the present state of mankind, to God as the author of nature. It suffices that he keep total prudence, a virtue which is not corrupted by one act of imprudence, because prudence links all the perfect moral virtues, which are not corrupted by one contrary act. Therefore St. Thomas says: " The virtues are mutually connected in their proximate principle, namely in the principle of their genus, which is prudence (for the acquired moral virtues) or charity (for the infused moral virtues) ; but not in their remote principle, which is God." [35]

Infused moral virtues cannot be without charity, or charity without them. Being real virtues,[36] they cannot be without total prudence, because the mover and the movable must be in the same line and thus prudence directs and commands the moral virtues only on account of the moral virtues themselves, as has been explained. As total prudence cannot be without moral virtues, so infused prudence cannot exist without charity. The reason for this *a fortiori* is that in any essential order, no one can be duly ordained to the proximate ends unless he is also duly ordained to the ultimate end. The proximate ends belong to the moral virtues, the ultimate end, to charity. It follows that infused prudence dictates the acts of the moral virtues not only as means to their proximate ends but also as means to the supernatural last end. It presupposes, then, a

[35] *QQ. DD. de Virt. in Comm.*, 2, 3m. " Rectitudo naturalis circa ultimum finem naturalem stat dupliciter: uno modo perfecte, ita ut ametur Deus ut Auctor naturae super omnia secundum suam peculiarem rationem explicite; alio modo imperfecte et confuse in ratione boni honesti naturalis. Prima non manet in homine lapso, seclusa gratia et caritate, quia per peccatum indirecte recessit ab Auctore naturae; secunda manet quia naturaliter inclinatur in bonum honestum et ipsum potest sub hac ratione super omnia diligere; et haec sufficit ad virtutes acquisitas in ratione virtutis, prout cadit sub consideratione Philosophi moralis." (Ferre, *Tract. Theol.*, in *I-II*, tr. 7, q. 4, n. 685)

[36] They have their firmness from their very cause, namely, God, who infuses all of them by one single act; they also proceed from habitual grace, as the potencies of the soul proceed from its essence, and man who is in the state of grace can avoid, even for a long time, not only every mortal sin, but even all mortal sins. Lastly they are informed by charity, and the smallest charity suffices to overcome any temptation. But these infused virtues may have in their subject the condition of dispositions.

good disposition both toward the proximate ends, through the moral virtues, and toward the ultimate end, through charity. That charity cannot be without the infused moral virtues is shown from the fact that it is not the proximate principle of the acts of these virtues, though it is their first principle; it commands those acts, but does not execute them. It is, therefore, necessary to have those proximate principles in order to exercise the acts commanded by charity.

As a corollary it is commonly held that the infused moral virtues are connected, not only in prudence, like the acquired ones, but also in charity. Both prudence and charity are the forms of the infused moral virtues, charity, besides, being also the form of faith and hope. By every mortal sin charity and prudence are corrupted directly, as they are special virtues *in essendo*, by a mortal sin of hate or imprudence, indirectly, as they are universal virtues *in movendo*—that is, in commanding—by any mortal sin, such as stealing, lust, etc., and consequently all the infused moral virtues are corrupted. But infused moral virtues, although stable by reason of their cause, are not necessarily stable by reason of their subject. Because they are generated, not by a succession of acts, but by one single act, they can be accompanied by the contrary disposition of the subject. These contrary dispositions lose their condition of vices, no matter how rooted these may be in the subject, in as much as the subject, heretofore vicious, retracts his former vices, which, on this account, cease being voluntary—because justification does not take place in adults without an act of detesting past sins. The justified, also, is powerfully inclined by the infused virtues to the acts contrary to those vices.[37]

[37] "Ex doctrina D. Thomae colligitur in recenter iustificato manere habitus vitiosos, non in ratione habituum, sed in ratione dispositionum; non quia habitus in dispositiones quoad substantiam transierint: cum enim habitus specifice a dispositione differat, in veriori Thomistarum sententia, non potest ille transitus fieri; sed quia licet vitia remanentia sint habitus quoad substantiam, non tamen remanent in habituum ratione quoad modum, sed induunt modum dispositionum, et quod ratione inclinationis ad bonum, quam praestat gratia et virtutes et praedominii in subiecto, manent in via corruptionis, et consequenter facile a subiecto amovibiles." (Godoy, *Disp. Theol.* in *I-II*, disp. 15, n. 19)

III. Theological Virtues

As a habit for the practice of good, virtue stands for a constant inclination toward a good act in its particular matter. It may happen that a given virtue cannot perform its act without the help of some other. In such a case, no one possesses the one virtue without the other. Thus, since moral virtue, acquired or infused, must execute the *medium rationis*, which medium is determined only by prudence, moral virtue needs prudence and therefore cannot essentially exist without the coexistence of prudence—acquired or infused, this being in the subject by way either of habit or of disposition, as has been said. But if without the help of another a virtue can perform its good act, but cannot perform it well, that is with promptness, ease and pleasure—as befits habit—then it is a real virtue without the other and does not depend on it essentially; it is dependent only as to its state or condition of habit. Thus it is not a perfect virtue without the other.

It is commonly said that *faith and hope can be without charity, but without charity neither of them is a perfect virtue.* As for the first part of the statement we have some pronouncements of the Church. The Council of Trent defined: "If anyone should say that by losing charity on account of a mortal sin faith is also lost, or that the faith which remains is not real faith, although not living; or that he who has faith without charity is not a christian, let him be anathema." (*Denz.* 838) Clement XI condemned the proposition of Quesnel: "Everything is lacking in a sinner when hope is lacking; and there is no hope where there is no love of God." [38] The reason is that not every mortal sin is contrary to faith and hope as it is to charity; consequently, although corrupting charity, it does not necessarily corrupt faith and hope. In fact, faith and hope, even without charity, ordain their subject infallibly to a good act:

[38] *Denz.* 1407;—As Bañez (in *II-II*, q. 18, a. 3) points out: "Non est tam certum manere spem sive secundum habitum sive secundum actum eiusdem rationis, sicut de fidei habitu sive actu. Probo. Quia de fide definitur in concilio Tridentino (sess. 6, can. 28) quod manet vera fides in peccatore; non est autem de spe tam expressa definitio; ergo non tam certum; quamvis esset temerarium id negare."

faith ordains to the good of the intellect, which is truth, namely to the truth backed by God's authority—as God cannot deceive nor be deceived; hope ordains to the good which is eternal happiness, attainable secondarily by personal merits, but chiefly by the help of God, in whom, according to the council of Trent, " all must place and repose a most firm hope." (*Denz.* 806)

An objection can be raised on the part of the prudential judgment presupposed to faith and hope, since infused prudence, as has been said, is destroyed by any mortal sin. For faith always presuposes a prudential judgment of credibility, and hope a prudential judgment by which one estimates that there are sufficient motives to tend efficaciously toward the real attainment of glory. But in the first case, the prudential judgment, although having a prudent object, namely rational credibility—or credibility in conformity with reason—is not an act of prudence, since it belongs to the speculative intellect; consequently, on account of that judgment it does not follow that faith is connected with prudence. In the second case, the prudential judgment is elicited by faith, which is practical by extension; and thus hope requires faith, but not necessarily prudence.

There is a stronger objection against the preservation of faith. A heretic, by the fact of his refusal to admit a particular dogma of faith, loses the habit of faith, though he might retain other dogmas and persevere in their belief; [39] but anyone who commits any mortal sin seems to deny faith in a particular dogmatic proposition; consequently, faith is lost by any mortal sin. For instance, a man who commits fornication does not commit it except after judging fornication to be good, while according to faith fornication is not good, but evil.

The question has been studied by St. Thomas with regard to

[39] " It is manifest that he who adheres to the teaching of the Church, as to an infallible rule, assents to whatever the Church teaches; otherwise, if, of the things taught by the Church, he holds what he chooses to hold, and rejects what he chooses to reject, he no longer adheres to the teaching of the Church as to an infallible rule, but to his own will. Therefore it is clear that such a heretic with regard to one article has no faith in the other articles, but only a kind of opinion in accordance with his own will." (*II-II*, q. 5, a. 3)

a special sin, namely, despair.[40] And his solution, extended to other sins, amount to this. The will is not moved toward fornication except after a judgment of the intellect; this judgment must be practical, for it is ordained to acting, and must be particular, as all our actions which have to do with the singular, and must be actual, that is, actually applied to directing the will. Thus a speculative judgment does not move the will; my will is not moved toward something because this is good in itself, but because it is good for me. A practical but universal judgment does not move the will; my will is not moved toward all fornications, but toward this one. A practical and particular but habitual judgment does not move the will; I might habitually deem this particular fornication, at this time, in these circumstances, to be an evil for me, and still consider it good for me at the moment when temptation arises.

Now a practical, particular, and actual judgment can be wrong (as, for example, the judgment that this fornication is right now good for me and worth committing) without any harm to the right speculative judgment (fornication is of itself evil and worth avoiding) and without any harm to the practical and universal judgment (e. g., every fornication is evil for

[40] "Unbelief pertains to the intellect, but despair, to the appetite: and the intellect is about universals, while the appetite is moved in connection with particulars, since the appetitive movement is from the soul towards things, which, in themselves, are particular. Now it may happen that a man, while having a right opinion in the universal, is not rightly disposed as to his appetitive movement, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter, because, in order to pass from the universal opinion to the appetite for a particular thing, it is necessary to have a particular estimate (*De anima*, iii), just as it is impossible to infer a particular conclusion from an universal proposition, except through the holding of a particular proposition. Hence it is that a man, while having right faith, in the universal, fails in an appetitive movement, in regard to some particular, his particular estimate being corrupted by a habit or a passion, just as the fornicator, by choosing fornication as a good for himself at this particular moment, has a corrupt estimate in a particular matter, although he retains the true universal estimate according to faith, namely that fornication is a mortal sin. In the same way, a man, while retaining in the universal, the true estimate of faith, namely that there is in the Church the power of forgiving sins, may suffer a movement of despair, to wit, that for him being in such a state, there is no hope of pardon, his estimate being corrupted in a particular matter. In this way there can be despair, just as there can be other mortal sins, without unbelief." (*II-II*, q. 20, a. 2)

me and has to be avoided by me) and without harm to the practical, particular and habitual judgment (e. g., while habitually I deem that this fornication is an evil and has to be avoided by me). Consequently, I might commit this particular fornication, by judging it to be good for me now, without any harm being done to the universal judgment of faith: fornication is an evil or a sin.

We must admit that a man who is tempted by fornication might consider this under two different aspects, as a moral evil and as a physical, delectable, good. If under the temptation, he judges fornication or even this fornication not to be a sin, we can see in this judgment a proposition more or less contrary to that of faith: every fornication is a sin. But if under temptation man does not compare fornication with sin, his judgment is not: fornication, even this fornication, is not a sin, and consequently his judgment is not necessarily opposed to the judgment of faith. In fact one who consents to fornication is wholly under the impression of the pleasure of the act; while it is appealing to him and occupying all his attention, he compares it with pleasure, and, seeing that it is pleasant he yields to it. But the judgment: "Fornication is pleasant," is by no means opposed to this other: "Fornication is a sin." And this is why St. Thomas, following Aristotle, says that the syllogism of both the continent and the incontinent—who are habitually determined to avoid sin—has four terms: on the part of the reason: "Every fornication is to be avoided"; on the part of the passion: "Every delectable thing is to be pursued." While the continent would subsume under the major of the reason, the incontinent subsumes under the major of the passion.[41]

[41] "Tam continens quam incontinens dupliciter movetur: secundum rationem quidem, ad vitandum peccatum; secundum concupiscentiam vero, ad committendum. Unde uterque utitur syllogismo quattuor propositionum, sed ad contrarias conclusiones. Continens enim syllogizat: nullum peccatuum est faciendum, et hoc proponit secundum iudicium rationis; secundum vero motum concupiscentiae versatur in corde eius quod omne delectabile est prosequendum. Sed quid iudicium rationis in eo vincit, assumit et concludit sub primo: hoc est peccatum; ergo non est faciendum. Incontinens vero, in quo vincit motus concupiscentiae, assumit et concludit sub secundo: hoc est delectabile; ergo est prosequendum. Et talis proprie est qui peccat ex infirmitate. Et ideo patet quod licet sciat in universali, non

Though without charity both faith and hope are real virtues, they are not without charity perfect virtues. This is, as has been said, a common doctrine. But not all theologians give to it an identical interpretation. Some hold the condition of faith and hope without charity to be like that of any moral virtue without charity; they lack their ordination to the last end and their acts are not meritorious. Of course, since infused moral virtues are so intimately connected with charity as not to exist at all without charity, the parallel can only be understood in speaking of acquired moral virtues. But we have already proved that acquired moral virtues can exist as habits, and thus as philosophically perfect virtues, without charity. Consequently we cannot accept this explanation.[42]

Some others say that faith and hope without charity are like temperance and fortitude without prudence. St. Thomas himself has a few expressions that seem to favor this understanding.[43] But we have shown that no moral virtue reaches the very essence of a habit without total prudence, and thus, without prudence, they are not essentially habits; they are simple dispositions, which are essentially distinct from habits. St. Thomas explicitly holds that one and the same habit of lifeless faith is that of living faith.[44] Being specifically the same habit, it is necessary to say that even lifeless faith has the essence of a

tamen scit in particulari; quia non assumit secundum rationem, sed secundum concupiscentiam." (*QQ. DD. de Malo*, 3, 9, 7m)

[42] As Cajetan says (and we have already given a part of his text): "Aliter se habet caritas ad fidem et spem; et aliter ad morales acquisitas. Istae enim non constituuntur in esse virtutis secundum essentiam, nec secundum statum, per caritatem aut aliquid eius: sed dum imperantur ab ea, ad superiorem ordinem referuntur. Illae autem ex caritatis praesentia sortiuntur perfectionem status." (in *I-II*, q. 65, 4, n. 6)

[43] "If a man does what is just, what he does is good: but it will not be the work of a perfect virtue unless he does it well, i. e. by choosing rightly, which is the result of prudence; for which reason justice cannot be a perfect virtue without prudence. Accordingly faith and hope can exist indeed in a fashion without charity; but they have not the perfect character of virtue without charity. Faith may be without charity, but not as a perfect virtue, just as temperance and fortitude can be without prudence. The same applies to hope." (*I-II*, q. 65, a. 4)

[44] "Living and lifeless faith do not differ specifically, as though they belonged to different species. But they differ as perfect and imperfect within the same species." (*II-II*, q. 4, a. 5, ad 3m)

virtue. The only thing missing, then, would be the perfection of a virtue, the status of a habit; it is a habit by essence, but in the state of mere disposition. And this is why St. Thomas (in *QQ. DD. de Veritate*, 14, 7) says that living faith differs from lifeless faith as to the mode of acting, as sight differs according to a more clear and less clear vision, as chastity which acts with more or less promptitude; and thus, he adds, faith with charity and faith without charity are not specifically distinct habits, but differ according to perfection and imperfection.[45]

In fact faith implies an assent of the intellect coming from the motion or affection of the will. Since, in order to be perfect, an act coming from two principles needs both principles to be perfect, a perfect assent of faith calls for the perfection not only of the intellect—by the virtue of faith—but also of the will—by the virtue of charity. We trust our friends more quickly than our enemies; we more easily believe what we love than what we do not like. If by faith we believe God (*credimus Deo*) and believe in a God (*credimus Deum*) and believe in God (*credimus in Deum*), it is evident that with promptness, ease, and delectation we believe God as a friend, and in a God, whom we love, and in God, to whom we tend, while being in charity. Thus, as Cajetan rightly observes,[46] the act of faith with charity is even intrinsically more perfect than that without charity; and though that act, as compared to the intellect, be not *simpliciter* more perfect, the perfection added by charity is

[45] "In potentiis vel habitibus, ex duobus attenditur diversitas: scilicet ex obiecto et ex diverso modo agendi. Diversitas autem ex obiecto diversificat potentias et habitus essentialiter; sicut visus differt ab auditu et castitas a fortitudine. Sed quantum ad modum agendi non diversificantur potentiae et habitus per essentiam, sed secundum completum et incompletum: quod enim aliquis clarius vel minus clare videat, vel opus castitatis promptius vel minus prompte exerceat, non diversificat potentiam visivam, vel habitum castitatis; sed ostendit potentiam et habitum esse perfectiorem vel minus perfectum. Fides autem formata et informis non differunt in obiecto, sed solum in modo agendi. Fides enim formata perfecta voluntate assentit primae veritati; fides autem informis, imperfecta voluntate. Unde fides formata et informis non distinguuntur sicut duo diversi habitus; sed sicut habitus perfectus et imperfectus. Unde cum idem habitus qui prius fuit imperfectus possit fieri perfectus, ipse habitus fidei informis fit formatus."

[46] "Licet credere prout spectat ad intellectum non sit perfectius simpliciter, tamen non est perfectius per accidens, ut actus opinionis in habente caritatem, sed per se: quia est actus per se pendens a voluntate." (in *II-II*, q. 4, a. 5, n. 5)

not *per accidens*, but *per se*, because it is a question of an act depending *per se* on the will. By hope also we strive to attain eternal happiness, based chiefly on God's help and secondarily on our merits; and thus hope is perfect as to its state—namely, prompt, solid, and easy—where there is a guage or a condignity with regard to that happiness, where the help is expected from a friend,[47] and where the merits are actual, rather than merely intentional; but a guage or condignity is given by grace, which is always accompanied by charity, and charity means friendship between man and God and is the source of supernatural merit.

Finally, *without faith and hope charity is impossible in a wayfarer*. For charity, again, stands for a friendship between man and God, and friendship bespeaks a mutual benevolent love based on something common. (*II-II*, q. 23, a. 1) Thus it is necessary for man to believe that he has something in common with God, and that, having laid the foundation, God, who is faithful (I Cor. 1, 9), will not fail to complete what He has begun to build.

There is little more to be said on this important, disputed, and at times poorly elaborated question of the connection of the virtues. There is no need for a special consideration of the intellectual virtues, since it is most evident that some can have the virtue called *intellectus* and lack that of science or have one science but not other; although he who has the virtue of science needs also that of *intellectus*. It is also clear that some of the intellectual virtues are not necessarily connected with moral virtues. There are people who possess justice, fortitude, or temperance and lack the mathematical, the physical, or the metaphysical sciences; though prudence cannot be without the moral virtues, nor moral virtues without prudence. It is, finally, obvious that the intellectual natural virtues are not necessarily connected with the theological virtues; even among pagans there were many illustrious philosophers, who had neither faith, nor hope, nor charity.

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[47] "With the advent of charity, hope is made more perfect, because we hope chiefly in our friends." (*II-II*, q. 17, a. 8)

BOOK REVIEWS

The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities. By F. C. S. Northrop. New York: Macmillan, 1948. Pp. 416, with index. $6.00.

The new book of the distinguished philosopher of Yale is not a presentation of the logical principles underlying the work of either science or the humanities; insofar, it cannot be compared to such treatises, for example, to the parts of the *Handbuch der Philosophie* by Weyl and Rothacker respectively. Professor Northrop prefers to unite several essays, some previously published and all dealing with his subject, yet not integrated into a consistent text. Repetitions and gaps result. Particularly, the name "humanities" does not refer here to the whole field it usually denotes; the author is more concerned with normative disciplines than with elucidating the procedures of, say, linguistics or history.

In meeting the world in which he finds himself, man encounters problems of many kinds. These he desires to solve and his endeavors result in inquiry. The most important and most difficult task is to initiate inquiry in the right manner. In a passage reminiscent of the opening lines of the *De Ente*, the author declares that the consequences of a false start cannot be compensated for later by whatsoever rigor of procedure. Contrary to the opinion of many, it is not the method which determines the problem but is determined by it. The false view leads to the rejection of legitimate problems as "pseudo-problems," simply because they do not allow the use of some definite method. Particularly necessary of realization is that besides factual there are also normative problems. Normative social theories are indispensable; without them the idea of bettering the world becomes meaningless. Yet, problems of this kind cannot be handled by the methods of science.

The treating of every problem, says Dr. Northrop, proceeds in three stages: analysis of the problem, collection of relevant facts (inductive stage), and designation of relevant theories. At this point the value of the book would have been enhanced by discussion of the varieties of problems; the reader would appreciate knowing especially whether the author considers the method of science as adequate to all factual problems and inadequate only to those of a normative nature, or whether he is willing to concede that facts are so differentiated among themselves that other than strictly scientific methods must be devised.

The question of an eventual diversity of methods within the empirical disciplines is important, today perhaps more than before. Some branches of knowledge which have enjoyed respectability would definitely lose their

standing should the scientific method solely validate factual observation as reliable knowledge. There are many who are desirous of achieving "scientific" standards for their special disciplines and who further believe that this can be done only by assimilating their methods as far as possible to that of science proper. There are others, however, who feel that the "humanities" and even psychology, all that have lately been named "human studies" (as a translation of Dilthey's *Geisteswissenschaften* by Professor Hodges of Reading University) demand a methodology of their own, not fashioned on the pattern of physics. The question, although of great interest, is not brought within the scope of the present book.

Facts, as studied in the second stage of inquiry, are first "immediately apprehended" and, by being brought under concepts, become "described facts." Professor Northrop calls this the stage of "natural history." The immediately given is ineffable; it can be apprehended and pointed to, but not stated. In commenting upon this feature, Dr. Northrop arrives at a rather startling conclusion. He claims ineffability to be "the defining property of the mystical"; he also declares that therefore "the purely factual . . . positivistic component" of knowledge is the mystical factor and that the "pure empiricists are the mystics of the world, the Orientals." It is regrettable that the precise meaning of "mystical" is not made clear. As it stands, the sentence is hardly acceptable. Ineffability may be one feature of the mystical; it does not follow therefrom that everything ineffable is to be labelled mystical. Ineffability is primarily linked with individuality while all predication is effected by means of universals. Insofar, the individual item is irrational; yet it cannot, for that reason only, be subsumed under the heading of the mystical.

The immediately apprehended is, according to the author, not a *thing*. Sense awareness, he believes, conveys to us but colors, sounds, odors, and so on, but not a thing like a table. Only the ineffable continuum of aesthetic qualities is given, not an external material object. The pure datum resembles, according to Professor Northrop, more a painting of the impressionistic school than one by a classical artist; impressionism, he supposes, renders the "aesthetic continuum," presents only sense impressions and omits the external object.

Both contentions, of the non-giveness of things and concerning impressionism, are open to serious objections. An older psychology conceived of "sensations" as the crude material of all our awareness of things; these sensations were taken as meaningless, as being just this shade of blue, this f sharp, this fragrance of a rose. Of course, as sensations they would not be either blue, or f sharp, or refer to a rose; they would be nothing but simple present data, without belonging to anything or pointing at anything. The awareness of a thing was thought to result from association or some similar integrating process. Dr. Northrop's view is not indeed so simplistic

as that of such a psychology. Yet, it rests on the same supposition, that the mind is supplied, through the senses, with indefinite data, something like the " chaos of sensation " of which Kant speaks, and that it is by some sort of theoretical interpretation that the mind transforms the ineffable aesthetic continuum into separate, definable things. The notion of the aesthetic continuum has to be examined carefully because it is fundamental to the whole conception. Therefore, also the remark concerning impressionism has to examined. Just as, on the one hand, the view that we have primarily such an aesthetic continuum is not countenanced by experience, but it is rather probable that simple sensory data result from a subsequent, if unnoticed, analysis of the complex whole given immediately; so, on the other hand, Dr. Northrop's view does not seem an adequate statement on impressionism if this school is supposed to render the aesthetic continuum. An impressionistic painting, if the name is taken as used by the school itself and in the history of art, looks like such a continuum (e. g., in a so-called pointillistic technique) only if the spectator places himself so close to the canvas that only colored patches are seen. But, envisioned from some distance, the painting presents real and definable things. The definition of the impressionistic work has been given by Zola: *un coin de la nature vu à travers un tempérament.* Such a " corner of nature," however, is not a piece of the aesthetic continuum but an assembly of things, related to one another and definable. French impressionism did not " give the pure fact without an interpretation." What the author has in mind is better called " expressionism," or the kind of art often characterized as " abstract." The name is revealing; such art is, in truth, the result of a transformation of the immediately given in the creative mind, so that pure colors and shapes appear as expressive of something, rather indefinite, and capable of evoking in the mind of the spectator some sort of experience of merging in an indefinite " aesthetic continuum." Such a work is the product of a secondary elaboration.

Further, the tendency in contemporary psychology, represented particularly by the school of " configurationalism " or the psychology of *Gestalt*, is directly opposed to the conception submitted by the author. The experimental and other evidence is of considerable importance and rather convincing; it is somewhat astonishing that no reference is made to these views.

All this is not tantamount to a claim that the experience of the aesthetic continuum does not exist. It does; but not as a primary experience, rather as one resulting from a complex transformation. One may indeed merge, in some state of mind occasionally called the " natural mystic," with the given, lose oneself in it, disregarding all " thingness " and live, as it were, in a stream of impressions without attempting any grouping, ordering, or synthesis of the data. However, this is not the primordial attitude; it is one that is highly artificial or, at least, one in which there is made intentionally an " abstraction " of certain obvious features of that which is, under average conditions, the immediately given.

As in his *The Meeting of East and West*, so also here Professor Northrop stresses the facts of art. Art appears to him, justly, as one revelation of the spirit of a time or a civilization. It is equally true that no civilization can be adequately comprehended unless, besides literature and philosophy, art is considered. This manner of looking at things human is not, indeed, new. Students of civilization, of cultural anthropology, and of art have repeatedly endeavored to develop a comprehensive interpretation of a whole civilization or an age. Yet, it is of merit that this be pointed out anew and as forcefully as does Dr. Northrop.

The mind, in dealing with the given, passes beyond the aesthetic continuum, collects evidence in the stage of "natural history," and then proceeds to "fruitful and relevant hypotheses." Therewith emerges scientific knowledge with its characteristic concepts and methods. The concepts may be of "intuition" as referring to immediately apprehended facts, and hence either of sensation or of introspection. Or, they may be arrived at by "postulation," that is, dependent upon the postulates of the deductive theory within which the interpretation of the inductively collected material is attempted. If these concepts cannot be verified by inspection of the given, that is, when they are of "intellection" (e. g., the four-dimensional space-time continuum, the tensor-equation of Einstein) the identification with facts is no longer possible. The concepts are then related to the facts by what Dr. Northrop calls the "epistemic correlation." Metaphysics not less than physical science can form such concepts by intellection and epistemically correlate them to facts. The method of metaphysics is not less scientific than that of empirical disciplines.

Professor Northrop is not, however, willing to concede to metaphysics any independence of empirical knowledge. All postulates and theorems must be ultimately related to facts (that is, the *salvare apparentia* must be strictly observed). But, argues the author, this invalidates all metaphysics of the past, since the postulates and theorems expressed were correlated to facts which we hold today not to be facts. The old metaphysics is "outmoded" because it lacks "the deductive fertility to give rise by way of epistemic correlations to all empirical data." New times and new science demand new metaphysics. Aristotelian physics does not do justice to facts; hence Aristotelian metaphysics must be abandoned.

The latter thesis is linked with that of the aesthetic continuum. Since things and facts are not simply given nor immediately, but result from a theoretical, if prescientific interpretation, this interpretation depends—such apparently is the author's argument—on the general knowledge, the totality of accumulated principles of interpretation. These principles in turn depend on all we know, *hic et nunc*, of empirical facts.

In other words: metaphysical speculation must progress and change parallel to the progress and change of empirical knowledge. It seems that much could be said against this thesis. First, it is questionable whether

metaphysics does indeed depend to such an extent on empirical, especially scientific knowledge. It is not an *a priori* inacceptable position to claim that metaphysics, by operating on the same basis, may be able to render an account of facts which were unknown when this particular metaphysical system was proposed. The ultimate problems of metaphysics remain the same whatever be the status of empirical knowledge. Reality and appearance, truth and error, the question of the wherefrom and why of anything, the problem of the intelligibility of being, the problem of being itself: all these and many other problems remain identically the same. And, it is difficult to conceive of any stage or status of empirical knowledge that might contribute decisively towards the solution of these problems. Secondly, it is a question of the history of ideas whether the dependence on the scientific views of an age truly determines to such an extent, as is claimed, the nature of metaphysics. One can conceive of a Kant *redivivus* who would arrive at much the same fundamental propositions and nonetheless be not indebted to Newtonian physics. The same is true, maybe to a higher degree, of Aristotelian speculation.

Further, the position taken by Professor Northrop endangers one of his own doctrines, that of the methodology of normative disciplines. If philosophical speculation is concerned, as it seems, exclusively with the theory of physical, biological, and psychological facts, where is there place left for values? These form equally part of common-sense experience, although they may not pertain to the aesthetic continuum. It is our vision of goodness which determines the norms in which we believe. If the "humanities," that is, in the author's parlance, the normative disciplines, in economics, sociology, and so on, if these humanities are to possess a logic of their own, by what criteria can the efficacy of this method be gauged, when all views have to change with a changing science? To claim that such a method of normative disciplines exists, which is surely true, and to make the disciplines themselves at the same time dependent on the continuously changing state of science, because the underlying philosophy is so dependent, seems to imply a contradiction. At least, it opens wide the way for an excessive relativism in regard to values and norms. Relative norms, however, cease to be norms and become simple practical rules, to be abandoned when they no longer suit the mind of an age.

The discussion of a logic other than that of science would have gained had the author seen fit to refer also to non-normative disciplines. There is indeed an interesting essay on "The Functions and the Future of Poetry." Poetry too cannot fulfill, we are told, its function in the modern world unless it becomes imbued with the new spirit of this world and expressive of it; the new spirit being mainly that fashioned by science. Unlike poetry, modern art appears to the author in some of its trends as an adequate expression.

The foregoing remarks summarize but imperfectly the ideas of Professor

Northrop. The general background of his work seems to be a keen awareness of the need of our times that there be brought about a new integration of all the various facets of human life. In this, one cannot but agree with him. One may, however, doubt whether the strong emphasis laid on the scientific aspect will prove very helpful. There is no truly cogent reason for assuming that the common principles underlying human existence and the world wherein man lives can all be stated, as long as they are not normative, in terms of science. Also, one may doubt the statement that philosophy changes because of a different scientific outlook, whereas one must agree that changes in philosophy condition changes in man's whole attitude in regard to society and values. The question then arises whether it is of the nature of values to change; if there are goods which remain such and retain their place in the valuative order under all conditions, then the changing philosophy appears more a threat than a part of real progress towards a better state of the world. Ultimately, Dr. Northrop's conception is tributary to a relativistic interpretation. That such a conception can be the means of reconstructing the world is questionable, if not impossible.

This relativistic attitude and over-emphasis on the actual state of science appear the fundamental weaknesses in Professor Northrop's position. His book contains much that is excellent. Yet, beyond the fundamental error, there are some minor imperfections: the manner in which the Aristotelian conception of intellectual operations is presented is inaccurate (p. 89), and the notion of entropy as given (p. 59) is, to say the least, misleading.

Nevertheless, a work which arouses criticism and proves inacceptable in its basic tenets may be useful and important. Professor Northrop has attempted to envision the present situation and the plight of man from all sides and to draw a picture of man's state and future tasks. His attempt deserves recognition as a voice warning against easy complacency, the disregard of the manysidedness of human existence, and as a serious search of conscience. His work is noteworthy also in this that he stresses, as in his earlier writing, the fundamental unity of human nature, the different roles allotted to different peoples and civilizations in the one march of mankind towards a dimly seen better world.

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Foundations of Democracy. By F. Ernest Johnson, ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Pp. 288, with index. $2.00.

Unity and Difference in American Life. By R. M. MacIver, ed. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947. Pp. 168, with index. $2.00.

The volumes under review are products of the contemporary American concern for national unity. Though manifest in some form during most of our history as a nation, such a concern has assumed new and critical significance as greater international responsibilities have been thrust upon the United States. Movements in "intercultural education" and "intergroup relations" have grown considerably. Typical of some educational efforts in this regard are the addresses and courses offered by the Institute for Religious and Social Studies founded at the Jewish Theological Seminary of America through a gift from Lucius N. Littauer. The present collections include addresses given before the Institute during 1944 and 1945. They are as the third group in the Religion and Civilization Series.

Unity and Difference in American Life follows two volumes in this series which have presented discussions of intergroup antagonisms and conflicts. Though the editor in a foreword promises that the contributors will show how group differences are related to national unity, few take up this theme directly and—undoubtedly because of the popular level of presentation—most seem content to survey existing prejudices and to urge their elimination. E. Franklin Frazier's analysis of the racial issue may be singled out as a clear and compact summary of the esssential character of interracial relations and of the growth of militancy among Negroes. In contrast to the dominantly descriptive emphasis in this book is the concern for doctrine in *Foundations of Democracy,* which social philosophers are likely to find more interesting, if chiefly as a handbook of current notions on the subject. Historical and philosophical discussions of democratic origins make up approximately the first half of the work, while the second half comprises attempted applications of democratic principles to economic, educational, and religious matters. The range of views presented is wide, with liberal Protestantism predominating, but with representation of Jewish, Catholic, and secularist philosophers. Since the interpretations are so varied, perhaps the critical comments offered here will have most worth and the contents of the books will be noted sufficiently if attention is directed toward certain central issues raised rather than toward a separate examination of each contribution.

National unity, as the term is used in most current literature of this kind, refers to the unity of the American nation-state. In a theoretical discussion it would be important to distinguish between the unity of the nation and the unity of the state, since these are actually two different social

groups. Their identification in the modern world has been the result of nationalism, a sentiment which tends to exalt the nation-state as the supreme value. Unity achieved principally through the cultivation of nationalism is thus founded upon a myth which has brought disaster to those people who have been its conscious ardent champions. Carried to its logical conclusion, it is a conception in which persons and groups are regarded ultimately as segments of a monolithic state, without any autonomy except that granted by the state. This is as true of nationalism in a democratic country as in any other, when democracy is linked with the absolutism of majorities, though the tendency to substantialize and hypostatize the state has been carried farthest under contemporary dictatorships.

A proper realistic view, on the other hand, recognizes in the state, as in any social group, a unity of relation, real indeed but accidental (predicamentally), distinguishable from its members but not separate from them. True unity is attained through the right ordering of all the social goods by the state, though these goods are not produced but presupposed by it, and protected, enhanced, and distributed through its agency. Seen in their relation to the state, persons and groups are parts of the whole, since their actions must be ordered to the common good, but they can never be wholly contained in the fabric of the state. The person always remains primary, the common good essentially subsidiary—in other words, the good which is achieved by common action flows back upon the members of the state, serving them ultimately.

Applied to the particular problem of intergroup relations in American society, this conception might be said to be pluralistic. Accepting the political structure of the United States, and confronting the diversity of ethnic, religious, political, economic, and other groups in the country, the sensible citizen would seem well-advised to presuppose differences, rather than attempt to deny or suppress them. What is required is a principle of accommodation on the basis of which all groups can pursue their own legitimate interests and the common good at the same time. Professor MacIver, in his conclusion to *Unity and Difference in American Life*, makes the point in these words: "We are not seeking uniformity and we are certainly not seeking coordination. We do not want simply agreement between groups or even within groups. What we want is that these disagreements, these differences shall not tangle and balk our co-operation in our common concerns." (p. 152)

The wisdom of frankly recognizing differences does not always get the emphasis it deserves, in view of the widespread tendency of Americans to expect conformity in individual and group traits. Where divisions exist, especially in politics and religion, it is too often considered polite to act as if they were unimportant. An editorial writer in a great metropolitan newspaper recently opined, apparently without his tongue in his cheek,

"If all the children of the world could, from the time they came into the world, live and play and work with each other, without the differences of skins and features and religions and political divisions being called to their attention by their elders, they might grow up believing that there were no fundamental differences among human beings." It seems to escape the numerous well-meaning people who reason in this way that such an eventuality would be an irreparable tragedy for the children. Human life cannot be reduced to play and work! Granting that difference of color and features are significant only because some people think them so, the pretense that differences of religious faiths or political and social outlooks are also intrinsically unimportant is the poorest basis for group understanding. Its source is blindness.

None of the contributors to the books at hand ignores differences in this naive manner. Some go so far as to advocate their positive encouragement. Lawrence K. Frank, for example, interprets current social confusion as a concomitant of democratic growth, since it results in part from the fluidity and uncertainty of status systems in the modern world. Rather acutely, he observes that there are "two insecurities" which plague modern man, the insecurity of the former dominant groups and the insecurity of the former submissive groups. There is anxiety because the old patterns which channeled status relationships have been broken and men are grouping for new norms of social intercourse. We face, according to Frank, "the relatively new problem of how we are to conduct our interpersonal relationships with others *as persons,* as individuals" (*Unity and Difference in American Life,* p. 37). A sweeping reorganization of our social order is seen as imperative: ". . . it is a question, not merely of tolerating, but of encouraging diversities, recognizing the different cultural traditions and their meaning for different groups and likewise recognizing the idiomatic personality of individuals. We can build a unity around such diversities to the extent that we accept this common belief in the value of the individual and the equality of human needs and develop the patterns of nonexploitive, nondominanting human relationships in all the varied activities of living." (*Ibid.,* p. 39)

The ring of the language in this formula gives it a certain appeal, but its validity hinges upon Frank's conception of personality, of human nature. Where does he find the basis of man's dignity? What are its social implications? If social order is not given as a part of nature but must be achieved and maintained in human conduct, how are its norms derived? Convention seems to be the only source alluded to in the text. Simple historical evolution has presumably brought us this far on the road to democracy. Man's inherent rationality and the freedom consequent upon it are not brought into the discussion, to say nothing of man's dependence upon his Creator. A clue to Mr. Frank's position is found in his statement

that the concept of individual rights and personal freedom did not really emerge until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. He ignores the whole tradition of Christian thought which recognized the existence of a natural moral law, presenting itself to the human intellect and will, and indicating rights and duties termed " unalienable " in our Declaration of Independence. Instead the individual is made a law unto himself. Is there not perversity in the paradox that we should be asked to recognize the fundamental similarity and equality of all men, yet deny the existence of a universal moral law founded in a common human nature?

Without the conception of a universal rational human nature, a " common belief in the value of the individual " is wholly inadequate as a basis for social unity. It is easy to write that the democratic approach " is essentially that of achieving order by orchestrating the widest diversities of individuality on the common theme of human needs and values." (*Ibid.*, p. 34) By all means let us preserve individuality! But unless the " human needs and values " are adequately conceived and seen as common, the social effect of this approach must be atomistic rather than solidaristic. Social unity is possible only where there are enough shared values to produce at least a minimum of " likemindedness." When these values are conceived as purely subjective—and in our society they tend to be dominantly sensory and material—they become self-limited or group-limited, so that the struggle for their attainment sets men apart instead of uniting them. Because modern secularists are skeptical about objective norms they cannot agree upon what " the value of the individual " really demands in social life. Their own confusions spawn reactions against freedom. Arnold Lunn has pointed to the result in a recent issue of the London *Tablet*: " The trouble about the toleration which has its roots in scepticism and disillusion is that it is the most ephemeral of phenomena. The Age of the Enlightenment led directly to the fanatic persecutions of the Jacobins, and the revolt against orthodoxy among Russian intellectuals to the Bolshevist tyranny. Our modern tolerance of perverse doctrines is preparing the way for the servile State. The Periclean maxim, " We have no sour looks for our neighbor if he enjoys himself in his own way," commends itself to our modern humanists until the neighbor is a Hitler who enjoys himself in *his* own way by putting the tolerant humanist into a concentration camp. The only hope for the world is the tolerance which has its roots not in scepticism but in that respect for human personality which finds its rational justification in the faith."

Division on the foregoing issue is apparent among the contributors to *Foundations of Democracy*. Horace Kallen, secular humanist, presents brashly the philosophical position which is mostly implicit in Frank's remarks. For Kallen the Declaration of Independence marks not only the birthday of democracy but " a definite break with the entire tradition of

the Western world." (p. 71) Before 1776, he maintains, all political and ecclesiastical establishments operated on the assumption that man was made for government, not government for man. Such a supposed state of affairs was purportedly rationalized by the idea of God as the source and sanction of power (an invention of kings and popes). Jefferson is credited with repudiating all this and, in effect, with founding a new faith; his *religious* views, Kallen holds, were "*alone* consistent with the prepositions of the Declaration of Independence." (p. 75; italics supplied) Henceforth man should be the measure of all things, finding in himself the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and even unmasking God as his own creation. Kallen rejoices that the Man he deifies and substitutes for God "is plural, not singular, multitudinous, not totalitarian." (p. 82)

This exposition—based as it obviously is upon a most singular and arbitrary reading of the history of philosophy, religion, and politics—need not detain us further. There is some satisfaction in noting rather general agreement in the other historical contributions to this volume upon the existence of a classical and medieval heritage for American democracy. Thus, Irwin Edman outlines the Greek ideas of man's inherent sociality, equality before the law, government by consent of the governed, and distributed property, and the Roman conception of law. Rabbi Louis Finkelstein goes back to Genesis where it was written that man was made in the image of God, and, in discussing Hebrew developments, draws democratic significance from the controversy between the School of Shammai and the School of Hillel concerning the possibility of immortality for "righteous pagans." He takes his stand with the latter as more democratic, and also stresses the growth of lay scholarship and its increasing influence in the synagogue, and especially the tolerance for deviations which developed among the Jews. George N. Shuster emphasizes that man's freedom is inherent in his nature, as medieval scholastics understood, and further, shows the significance of the liberation of Church from State which Christianity introduced and the bearing of Christian virtues and education upon the social order. Classical and medieval contributions are also recognized by John T. McNeill whose essay on the Reformers is chiefly an evaluation of their teachings from a democratic point of view, rather than a claim for the distinction of their political thought. In a chapter on "The Founding Fathers," Father Moorhouse F. X. Millar, S.J., urges appropriately a general reappraisal of our history to show the recognition of natural law and the ethical notion of the state in the founding of this nation, and the relation of these concepts to divided sovereignty and the principle of majority decision, developments based upon medieval and not French Revolutionary thought.

It is not an exaggeration to remark, in conclusion, that the tensions in intergroup relations within the United States seem in certain respects much

less destructive of unity than some of the principles advanced to reduce them. Perhaps a distinction may be made between the immediate aspects of the problem and the ultimate philosophical basis for unity. American life has embraced wide cultural diversities chiefly because a framework of law and convention and an open class system have facilitated the interaction of different groups and permitted each to make its unique contributions to the common good. It has been possible, as it is still, to appeal to the historic tradition against racial injustice, religious bigotry, and economic greed. With the common good of the body politic as the goal, action programs can be initiated by churches, communities, schools, unions, and all other interested agencies. Catholic and secularist, Republican and Socialist, capitalist and laborer, educator and lawyer and politician, all may cooperate at this level for the civic welfare. The unity which is attained will be short of the ideal, tensions will never be fully resolved. but necessary accommodations can be made.

When it is a question of exploring the basis of the principle of accommodation itself, other tests must be applied. The secularist creed has been subjected to criticism here because of the deficiencies in its logic and its weakness as a foundation of unity. By asserting that man's rights come from himself, not from God, the objective basis of liberty and authority is denied, and not reason but force is finally enthroned. Just as self-centered individuals grow frustrated and neurotic, beset with conflicts, so human society centering upon itself and denying an Ultimate Good must become morbid and divided within. The modern world, permeated by secularism and relativism, has seen the increase, not the diminution of antagonisms. Nor is there a prospect for real improvement, since the very values which are exalted do not inspire a common struggle for their fulfillment but contentions and wars for their exclusive possession. The continuing spread of these values is the real threat to national unity. Under threat of attack from without, modern nations have bought their unity at the price of anachronistic nationalisms and statism.

For peace within and among nations there is only one sure foundation, as Pope Pius XII reminded the world in his first encyclical; it is " that law of human solidarity and charity which is dictated and imposed by our common origin and by the equality of rational nature in all men, to whatever people they belong, and by the redeeming Sacrifice offered by Jesus Christ on the Altar of the Cross to His Heavenly Father on behalf of sinful mankind."

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Evil and the Christian Faith. By NELS F. S. FERRE. New York: Harper and Bros., 1947. Pp. 169, with index. $2.50.

Dr. Nels F. S. Ferre, Abbot Professor of Christian Theology at Andover Newton Theological School, has given us a book which is stimulating but marred by obscurity and error; a book concerned with the problem of evil, which the author calls "my central problem" and to which he brings a solution containing the "very heart of my theology."

The very heart of Dr. Ferre's theology is in *Appendix A: The Christian Faith.* One should read this section of the book first (along with *Appendix B: Faith and Reason*) to do justice to the author's thought. His interpretation of the Christian Faith: it is essentially Agape, "the kind of love which God is, which received conclusive expression in Jesus, and which lives ever as the central and controlling reality wherever there is genuine Christian fellowship" (p. 140). This conception of Agape, the author carefully distinguishes from the highest reaches of the Greek mind and of Judaism and of any pre-Christian religion (pp. 140-142). There follows a brilliant synthesis of the richness of Agape: that God is Agape ("Ultimate is not a principle but a person," p. 148); that Agape is the full and final principle of explanation of any problem (p. 149); that Agape is Holiness and the *raison d'etre* of the sufferings of Christ and of all the saints (p. 150); that Agape is active love and that the central action of God in history was the Crucifixion (p. 152); that Agape is perfect wisdom and power and freedom (pp. 153-155); that Agape is perfect beauty ("beautiful is the face of God drawing our weary earth-stained eyes away from our selfish preoccupation. . . . The beautiful is the still overflowing of the harmony of God's eternity spilling over into our confused self-seeking," p. 156).

The conclusion of *Appendix B: Faith and Reason* is that "all of us inescapably live primarily by faith" (p. 167). But what is faith? Essentially, it is selection. "The only adequate faith is found in the most high. . . . To live in truth as far as one can is thus to keep deciding from within our best knowledge far beyond our best knowledge where the content of faith at the same time both fulfills and yet also denies the best that we can know" (p. 167). "The historic content of right religion, the pivot of faith, must not only be selected in terms of the right knowledge of our process as a whole, but also be assessed and certified in relation to it" (p. 168). "The most high is thus to be discovered by being selected existentially out of a dynamic synthesis of faith and reason" (p. 169).

In his Introduction, Dr. Ferre points out that the problem of evil is a supernatural problem and must be solved in terms of the supernatural; he furthermore warns against partial, as well as mixed, perspectives in attempting a solution to the problem. These perspectives are carefully analyzed and criticized.

a) The Problem of Evil cannot be solved on the level of historic fact (a disjunct, concrete event in our history). No one single historic fact is self-explanatory; nor is the whole historic process self-explanatory. The historic process is not the whole of reality and evil itself is only a 'part of, or an aspect of, some becoming.' Part cannot explain part (pp. 5-8).

b) The Problem of Evil cannot be solved merely on the aesthetic level—where the parts of the historic process might be in continual cacophony, and their symphony apparent to, and appreciated only by, God. Such a solution supposes a distorted view of God, arising from an erroneous theology (e. g. of Calvin) or from a hazy physico-mathematics (e. g. of Whitehead) (pp. 15-19).

The Problem of Evil must be solved on the personal-spiritual level, because 1) only persons can appreciate process and the place of evil in process; 2) only persons can see the fallacy of the pleasure-principle in an attempted solution of the problem of evil; 3) only spiritual persons can see what " makes the cross of Christ, with all that it symbolizes and stands for, the central means for the effecting of the best "; and 4) only spiritual persons are capable of actual and ideal selection of the best in historic process (pp. 20-31).

Evil, therefore, in all its ramifications must be viewed from the personal-spiritual level and " in terms of the reflective superspective, the necessary synthesis of faith and knowledge " (p. 13) or, in other words, in terms of " God in Christ as the embodiment in history of the divine Agape " (p. 19). This objective principle to which the author frequently refers is nothing else than the " very heart " of his theology. The reflexive superspective is both explanatory and existential (p. 123 and following): 1) explanatory or merely abstract, rational knowledge of evil, based on what is actual and possible in evil itself; 2) existential or " the struggling with and under God against evil." " The solution lies in the living synthesis of the explanatory and the existential perspectives made effectual only through deepened concern and trust within the family fellowship of God " (p. 125).

In the moral sphere, evil is sin, " the perverted thwarting of our most basic needs and of our most serious longings " (p. 44). Indirectly, it is the refusal to treat others and nature as we know God would have us; directly, it is defiance of God's will for us. Sin is therefore bound up with time, not with eternity. Though a thing to be deplored, the denial of, and rebellion against God, implicit in sin, is a necessary condition both for the full development of our freedom and of our adoption as " sons of God " (pp. 34-35). " Sin is our wronging God by refusing His fellowship, which alone can fully satisfy us. It is simply wrong, it is, indeed, to wrong God, to think that He holds the finite creature responsible for the infinite law, that he attributes infinite guilt for finite infraction, that the relative can sin absolutely, even though of relative capacity in wisdom and will, simply because the sin is against the absolute. Finite transgression merits a finite guilt; finite capacity involves a finite responsibility; finite wrong deserves

finite retribution" (pp. 44-45). There follows that an eternal hell is unthinkable. An eternal hell would argue against God's Agape and would involve an eternal frustration of God's plans for creatures (p. 117 ff.).

In the physical sphere, evil is either our precarious environment or the sufferings of animals or the death both of animals and men. The relative constancy of our environment makes for initiative, responsibility and creativeness; while its inconstancy and instability makes for our cooperation with one another and for our dependence on God (pp. 55-56). Although no full solution of animal pain may be ours (since the problem of pain in the animal world must not be treated from the perspective of intensive human sensitivity), nonetheless we can affirm that even in that world there is more pleasure than pain, more zest for life than fear of life (pp. 59-61). This much we can say, the rest is mystery and surmise. Neither is there a full solution for the greatest of all physical evils—death. But the death of animals does not seem to be ultimate destruction. "Are the lion and the rabbit, the snake and the mosquito, the horse and the wren," Dr. Ferre asks, "actually in us, not in a general life stream, but individually, finding in us their fuller fruition and eventual individuation in a more permanent form?" (p. 62) "Death is the bright hope of God's fuller history for each man according to His wonderful wisdom, and perhaps for each generation, or for each history as a whole. Though the soul dies, the Spirit lives. The natural man, the capacities and the contents, that is, of his consciousness, perishes. No one is naturally immortal. The Spirit is given new life by the grace of God" (p. 105). "The separateness of our present kind of individuality may not characterize the future life. There may be a degree of freedom and of creative individuality which is also different in kind from our present state" (p. 109).

Dr. Ferre's work fluctuates between light and darkness. His reflections on Agape (p. 139 ff.) are among the most refreshing and most beautiful in recent Protestant literature (although one wishes the author had not expressed doubt about the Epistles of St. Paul, who wrote so lucidly and glowingly of the Divine Agape). Similarly refreshing is the note of optimism struck on the consideration of each kind of evil; that the evils which assail us are ultimately for our good. Rightly, he says that all our woes must be referred to the Cross of Christ, where they find their full and final meaning.

The obscurity of the work centers principally about the principle which is used as a solution to the problem of evil; the "reflexive superspective." What can Dr. Ferre possibly mean by faith and reason as human interpretations and responses being flooded over their banks by revelation; and that revelation is the summation of insight and of intimate fellowship relations between our small i's and God's great Thou? (p. 168). How can genuine faith be at once precisely what the word implies (the acceptance of truth on the authority of one revealing) and a selection? What are the respective provinces of faith and reason?

The most glaring error in Dr. Ferre's work, from the viewpoint of logic, is that he assumes the very attitude he so severely criticizes in others: that of using a partial perspective to solve the complex and knotty problem of evil. The full and final solution is indeed Agape, but God's love must not be considered in utter isolation from His other attributes, notably His justice. "Christian Faith," says the author, "is not on the level of God's justice" (p. 45). Logically, Dr. Ferre does not believe that God's love is consistent with an eternal hell. This is because his perspective of sin is inverted and his perspective of God's love is partial. He views sin primarily as a "wounding of our deepest self in our deepest affections and desires" (p. 44) where he should view it primarily with respect to God who is offended. Under this aspect, the sin of a finite creature is infinite; and a violation of the eternal fitness of things. It therefore calls for eternal punishment. An eternal hell is compatible with God's *just* love and God's loving *justice*. To bolster his position of a non-eternal hell, Dr. Ferre quotes from St. Athanasius. Now the work from which this quotation is taken ("The Incarnation of the Word of God") is a forgery. This book really emanated from some Apollinarist heretics and was attributed by them to St. Athanasius (Cfr. Bardy, G.: *The Greek Literature of the Early Christian Church*, London, p. 99). Because hell is eternal, heaven does not therefore become a place of mourning, for the saved identify themselves with the just wishes and designs of God, and not with the lot of the lost. God indeed wishes all to be saved but in view of the prerogative of freedom which He has given to His intellectual creatures, He permits some to be eternally lost through the wilful abuse of that freedom.

Dr. Ferre affirms the divinity of Christ (p. 163) but it is obvious he does not understand all that the unique Divine Personality of Christ implies. For the author expresses uncertainty as to whether or not Christ "actually rebelled sinfully" against His Heavenly Father. "Whether or not he (Christ) ever defied . . . God's full will we cannot know" (p. 35). Underlying Dr. Ferre's confusion is his misunderstanding of the nature of freedom, even on the existential plane, and his misunderstanding of the temptations of our Lord in the desert (p. 34 ff.). "Freedom," he says, "to be real involves evil, at least the evil of temporary estrangement" (p. 36). On the metaphysical (or psychological) plane, the term of freedom is action; on the spiritual plane, the term of freedom is virtue. It is difficult to see how rebellion (the abuse of freedom) can make for a fuller freedom, even in a spiritual sense. The limbs of the body are not perfected by abuse but through their co-natural activities. Again, Christ was never tempted in the same way we are; the temptations of Christ were factual but external, ours are factual but affect our internal faculties. It was metaphysically impossible for Christ to commit sin.

Dr. Ferre is somewhat confused, too, about a future state for man (pp. 105-109). Is Spirit the third physical component of man, over and above

his soul and body? It does not appear to be so; rather, Spirit is capable of *separate* existence. Spirit might be that into which the individual man is elevated in the after-life; it might be that into which many men or all men are elevated in such a way as to lose their distinctive individuality to take on the individuality of Spirit. Thus the author. Not a very bright prospect for individual men and women, struggling from the grip of this world's travail.

Dr. Ferre's book, however, is worth reading for one who already has an unshakable grasp of orthodox principles. It is not an easy book to read but it is, in many ways, delightful. "Evil and the Christian Faith" is part of a series. Possibly, Dr. Ferre's thought will have matured by the publication of his next work.

IGNATIUS FORMICA, C.P.

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Fearful Symmetry. A Study of William Blake. By NORTHROP FRYE. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1947. Pp. 462, with notes and index. $5.00.

This, the most significant study of the English poet and artist William Blake (1757-1827) that has appeared in some years, may perhaps be considered as an extension of Mr. S. Foster Damon's earlier work, which Mr. Frye admires greatly. Mr. Damon and Mr. Frye have both attempted a synthesis of Blake's thought, especially as it is expressed in the prophetic writings, to which little extensive and serious study has been given by other Blake critics, at least with a view to essaying a sympathetic exposition of Blake's system. M. Denis Saurat, whose study is far more antagonistic, and in some senses more critical, does, however, have the disadvantage, pointed out by Mr. Frye as common to most Blake critics, of considering Blake almost entirely as a product of his sources.

Mr. Frye has bent his energies chiefly toward expounding Blake as he is. It is rather astonishing to discover that Mr. Frye is himself a real disciple—that he believes Blake's view of life, art, and religion to be true, or at least profoundly significant. This complete partisanship, combined with his strong conviction that Blake's thought cannot be explained wholly in the light of his sources, produces a work valuable for readers who have the ability to make their own critical judgments.

Basic to Mr. Frye's study is his instructive and certainly correct belief that the key to Blake's thought is an understanding of his position as a rebel against the tyranny of Locke and the Deists. In support of this reaction, Blake went chiefly to Berkeley, and opposed to the materialism and rationalism of his day an extreme idealism which saw everything as

existing in the mind of man. Blake went further into subjectivism even than Berkeley, and identified the mind of man with the mind of God. It is here that Cabalism enters into his system, so obviously that even Mr. Frye cannot deny Blake's acceptance of its strange hypotheses. Before the Fall, goes the Cabalistic myth, all men were one man, who was God. The Fall caused creation, and the dispersal of the one man into many, and therefore creation was evil.

Such a monstrous concept of God and creation is so basically and obviously false that it is strange to find an intelligent critic such as Mr. Frye seemingly impressed by it. He appears especially delighted with Blake's hatred of all orthodox religions, which Blake believed to be part of the evil brought about by the fall, with their insistence upon law, reason, and morality. These he held to be somehow tied up with the fallen universe, and not necessary to the truly redeemed man. Blake is led by this belief into unfortunate blasphemies, in which God in His Old Testament aspect as a God of law and punitive justice is called "Nobodaddy" and sneered at as a creation of Pharasaical Judaism. It is unfortunate that Mr. Frye should so often cheapen his work by adding his own sneers—far more personal and petty—to Blake's unpleasant but rather more grandiloquent contempt.

Of the myriad ramifications of Blake's involved but fascinating and vital system, especially as adumbrated in the long and to most readers very tiresome prophetic books, little can be said here. Mr. Frye does, however, make us see that Blake's intent in opposing materialism and rationalism was excellent, that he seized intuitively upon their most inhuman errors, whose disastrous effects are still being felt in our own time. The attempt of man to improve his condition by scientific rationalism, the sadistic tyrannies whether of an irresponsible ruling class, as Fascist dictator, or a "dictatorship of the proletariat," which spring from extreme rationalism and materialism, from the failure to understand the true dignity of man, are bringing today evils which are more devastating than the "dark, Satanic mills" of eighteenth century England. Mr. Frye makes it easy for us to see why Blake has had a special influence upon Catholic thought, since in many respects it was the Church's battle he fought, though he certainly was completely unaware he was doing so.

Blake's reverence for art, his belief in creative as opposed to mechanical artistic theory, his view of art as spiritual rather than naturalistic and merely sensory (his hatred of the Renaissance was perhaps more profound than that of any other English writer)—all these mark him as unique in his own time, a great seminal forerunner of the Romantic movement, of Pre-Raphaelitism, and thus even of the English Catholic revival and more recent Catholic thought. His theories on the art of the Bible as the type of all poetry, on its great allegorical significance, his love for communal art and the beauties of medieval painting and architecture, his conception

of history as the great spiritual drama of fall and redemption stamp him as an artist astoundingly perceptive of the truths his own age had denied.

This is not to minimize in any way the grave errors into which Blake fell. In addition to those already mentioned, there must be added countless flaws, stemming largely from the unreasoned, intuitive character of his approach to things and the very violence of his reaction against a false reasoning, an inhuman concept of order and justice. Because he craved consideration for the human person, he cursed all governments, all churches, all law human and divine. Because he knew that sex is spiritual as well as physical, he glorified it to an absurd and antinomian degree. Because he realized that art was a God-given, creative power, he considered the artist superior to the mystic and saint, and believed the artistic imagination (by which he obviously meant the intellectual aspects of the creative faculty and not simply the physical power) to be the only valid means of attaining truth and goodness. It is the chief failure of Mr. Frye's work that he does not discriminate between these excesses and the very real good that there is to be found in Blake for those strong and mature enough not to be carried away by him. We can be grateful, then, only up to a point for Mr. Frye's penetrating, comprehensive, but overenthusiastic and often uncritical study.

Josephine Nicholls Hughes

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Léon Bloy—Pilgrim of the Absolute. Edited by Raissa Maritain, with an introduction by Jacques Maritain. New York: Pantheon Books, 1947. Pp. 458, with index of sources. $3.50.

In her autobiography, Raissa Maritain has already recounted the story of Léon Bloy's profound influence upon her husband and herself. She here presents the life and thought of this extraordinary and uncompromising spirit in extracts from his own voluminous works. Well-chosen selections describe his moral and physical self-portrait, his views on art, poverty, the bourgeois spirit, sanctification and suffering, history and the sense of mystery. Jacques Maritain's introductory essay, adapted from *Quelques pages sur Leon Bloy*, 1927, sets forth Bloy's significance as a man and as a thinker.

Estimates of Bloy vary considerably. People great and small, of all walks of life, have acclaimed him as their spiritual father. Some critics, like Fr. Fulbert Cayré, A. A. (*Patrologie et histoire de la théologie*, III, 588), regard him as a powerful genius who manifested signs of exalted illuminism but gratuitously attributed to himself a mission of reformation in the name of the Holy Ghost. Karl Pfleger, in *Wrestlers with Christ*,

confesses that he was alternately attracted and repelled by Bloy, and then came, in maturity, to revere him more and more.

Those who witnessed Bloy in life and at the hour of death, says Maritain, know that he was a truly humble Christian. Maritain provides perhaps the best explanation for Bloy's alleged uncharitableness, and for his anti-intellectualism. According to Maritain, Bloy dwelt in a sort of fourth dimension of the spirit and envisaged human beings as pure symbols of devouring spiritual realities. Attacking Mr. Jones by name as he did, he really saw through Jones to Pride or Avarice. This explanation does not seem completely satisfactory. I cannot recall or conceive of any of the Church's canonized Saints (I do not say that Bloy was not a saintly man), who would heap such fearful invectives upon actual individuals (who would call Benedict XV "Pilate XV," or rejoice when "bourgeois Catholics" were burned to death at the charity bazaar).

Much more satisfactory is Maritain's explanation of the wisdom of Bloy. The Pilgrim of the Absolute had no taste for rational *discursus*; using reason according to an experimental rather than a demonstrative mode, his powerful gifts of intuition were reënforced by the theological virtues and the organism of the infused gifts. Steeped, not in systematic theology or philosophy, but in Sacred Scripture, Bloy gave utterance to doctrines which should be understood mystically and not literally in a scholastic sense. His true place, then, is more with writers like Saint John of the Cross than with Saint Thomas. (Maritain observes that he is contemporary with Tertullian and Origen rather than with the mediaevals). I would add that, to the extent to which a Bloy is not a Saint John, his reliance upon intuition may lead to extremely subjective judgments. Bloy could, he tells us, think only "in the Absolute" (a favorite nineteenth century term, strangely echoing from the lips of this "hurler of curses" at the bourgeois nineteenth century), and found anyone who did not speak in the Absolute incomprehensible. Sometimes one suspects that this "Absolute" is measured by his own feeling about it, a feeling opposed not only to the lukewarm feeling and relativism of the bourgeois, but not seldom to the vehement feeling of other absolutists. Who is to judge between a Bloy and a Péguy?

What, then, is the significance of the Pilgrim of the Absolute? Thomist philosophers must surely be impressed by the fact that the man who despised philosophy is so revered by an eminent Thomist. (May it not be said that Maritain himself, whose personality shines through all his writings, attracts some people and not others, precisely in those respects in which he is akin to his godfather? Compare his youthful cry—*Vae mihi si non thomistizavero?* To me, this enthusiasm, flowering in solid speculative thinking and unselfish seal in social action, has always been most inspiring). Saint Francis de Sales teaches us that there are some saints, like Simon Stylites, whose lives provide more matter for admiration than emulation;

some, like Saint Francis of Assisi, whose lives cannot be imitated literally by all Christians but can be followed to some degree by all; and some, like Saint Louis, who can be emulated, especially by those living in the world. In this saintly wisdom is the key to the life and thought of Léon Bloy. We are not all called to take up his way of life literally; many of us have been habituated to think in scholastic and not in " absolute " terms. We can all be inspired by him as a seer and as a personality absolutely dedicated to Christ. In one's more mature as well as one's youthful years, Bloy is able, as few others can, to inspire one to be more a pilgrim and more in love with God.

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De Gratia. Praelectiones Scholasticae in Secundam Partem D. Thomae. By Peter Lumbreras, O. P. Rome: Editiones Arnodo, 1947. Pp. 191, with index.

In this small volume, the reverend author has given us his notes on the tract " De Gratia," which were evidently written to assist those who attend his lectures at the Pontifical Dominican College, the " Angelicum." Many learned tomes of commentary have been written on this part of the Summa (I-II, qq. 109-114), and to treat the subject adequately, as well as briefly relate the many conflicting opinions, would require a much larger volume. The author has avoided this by solving most intricate and disputed questions in a few words. Thus, on page 32, in speaking of whether, for a person in the state of mortal sin, a supernatural grace is necessary to overcome a grave temptation, the proof of his affirmative position is as follows: " Quoniam tentatio gravis supponit validum incursum simul atque debilem voluntatem; hanc igitur si Deus muniat naturali tantum auxilio—ad voluntatis dispositionem et exigentias—lapsus indubius." While such a statement may confirm the opinion of one who is already convinced of this, it would hardly be sufficient, even with the long accompanying footnote, to shake the confidence of a theologian who holds the contrary opinion. Thus Tanquerey in his *Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae*, a commonly used text in American seminaries, treating the same question says: " Non negamus hominem lapsum propriis viribus posse levibus tentationibus aut etiam alicui gravi tentationi seorsim spectatae resistere," and in a footnote adds: " Quidam theologi asserunt quidem hominem lapsum non posse, sine gratis, ullam tentationem gravem vincere, sed vel loquuntur de tentatione quae tam diuturna est ut pluribus aequivaleat, vel suam opinionem ex fontibus revelationis probare nequeunt, ut recte animadvertit Pesch, nn. 157, 164: ' Nunquam enim hi fontes loquuntur de aliqua particulari

tentatione, sed de generali illa pugna, in qua homo undique difficultatibus obsessus sine gratia non potest non superari.'" (Vol. 3, ed. 1930, p. 144.)

By far, the best and most completely developed part of the book is that which treats of sufficient and efficacious grace (pp. 71-98). Here, the author with clearness and force states the Thomistic teaching, buttressing this position with many quotations from Scripture and tradition. But he does not stop here; painstakingly, he summarizes adverse opinions, and with clearness and logic explains away the difficulties of those who oppose the traditional Thomistic stand. Had the same tactics been used in other portions of the book, in the opinion of this reviewer, the book would have increased not only in length, but in value.

In speaking of the dispositions necessary for justification, on page 106, the use of the disjunctive "sive fidei, sive spei, sive amoris, sive paenitentiae" can be misleading, even though it is clarified later (pp. 120-138) in speaking of these preparatory acts in detail. Whether or not an explicit act of each of the virtues mentioned in the Council of Trent (Denz. 798) is required for justification, warrants a clearer and more detailed exposition than the footnote on page 130.

To the author's interpretation of q. 114, a. 3, on whether a man in the state of grace can merit eternal life condignly, many theologians will prefer the explanation of Sylvius or John of Saint Thomas as quoted by Billuart (*De Gratia*, Diss. 8, a. 3). Here again, by curtailing his exposition, the author has failed to be convincing.

The publication of class notes can be a real boon to the student who faithfully attends the daily lectures. Authors should remember however, that many who read the published notes will not have the advantage of the accompanying lectures. Consequently, the published work should contain as complete and lucid an explanation and commentary as the lectures themselves provide, as well as supplementary reading for the benefit of both students and readers.

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A Scientist's Approach to Religion. By CARL WALLACE MILLER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1947. Pp. 127. $2.00.

Professor Miller's approach to religion is a purely natural one based upon the scientist's criterion of fruitfulness. His book is an earnest plea for the conservation of our spiritual heritage and for its more extensive application to the problems of progressing mankind. In a series of nineteen meditations the author weaves the warp of scientific theories and findings with the weft of religious belief and practice. The fabric is intended

to clothe those who have been stripped of the comfort and solace of religion by a progressive impoverishment of their spiritual ideals. Unfortunately the fabric will not wear. It lacks strength not by faulty weaving but because the cross-threads themselves have been completely devitalized. The author has chosen to disregard the vital basis for accepting the tenets of religion, their unassailable truth. He proposes in its stead the benefits that accrue to humanity through devotion to Christian ideals, benefits which are temporal for the individual and which acquire immortality by their influence upon future generations of mankind. Unhappily, the few heroes who would keep faith with these ideals under such sanctions could not produce results commensurate with Dr. Miller's hopes. If the fertility of religious principles is their *raison d'être*, then by this criterion they are doomed.

The general tone of the book is one of kindly tolerance. There is no attempt to grapple with the cross-purposes of science and religion. Scientific theories are introduced as illustrations of the religious topic considered. Since there are no necessary correlations drawn between the findings of science and the Christian principles to which they are applied by way of exposition, the author is free to make comparison and elaborate as he will. Considerable thought and frequent beauty of ideas are to be found in the development of such topics as the Concept of God, Love of Neighbor, Good and Evil, Prayer, and Christianity and Education: " . . . this obedience to moral law is in reality the stamp of human greatness." (p. 29) " The fact that the irreversible tendency of natural processes toward chaos, as recognized in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is balanced in God's providence by a practically limitless supply of energy in the ordered structure of the atom, should give pause to the prophets of doom in the spiritual as well as in the material realm. May not man's congenital rebellion against moral law and his proneness to choose the broad way of evil be similarly balanced by the inexhaustible sources of spiritual power? " (p. 56) " Much has been said, and truly, about the necessity for a high level of education in a democracy, but it is far less important than the maintenance of respect for virtue and moral integrity." (p. 114)

Whatever beauty and inspiration may be found within the pages of this little book are rendered ineffectual by the ignorance of Professor Miller with regard to the teachings of Chirst and therefore of Christianity. Many examples of serious error permeate the text. Of these, but a few are given here: " If the fate of an individual soul can be forecast, even by the omniscience of a supreme deity, the idea of free will become an empty fantasy, and we are back to a world of unadulterated determinism. No one can be expected to struggle toward the strait gate if he believes that the result of the struggle is preordained." (p. 106) " The objection is often raised that by removing the sharp line of demarcation between the nature of Christ and other members of the human family it somehow diminishes

the authority which attaches to his teachings. . . . It may seem to a thoughtless person that loss has been suffered in substituting for the vaguely defined ecclesiastical idea of a unique divinity a vital concept that is capable of embracing any sincere individual." (p. 49) "It was the social emphasis in the teachings of Jesus that led to inevitable conflict with the more prosperous elements in the society of his day." (p. 64)

According to Professor Miller, religion is progressive; Christianity represents the best of man's evolving efforts to ennoble his existence. And in its present state of organic development there is no need of supernatural truth divinely revealed, of redemption, of salvation. By the dazzling light of modern scientific achievement, we now can distinguish the moral and spiritual idealism embedded in our history from the entranched superstitions of our dark past and must carry the emergent best of our religious heritage to heights as yet unrealized.

The similarity of Dr. Miller's outlook for religion and science is striking. Beneath this surface resemblance there exists a more fundamental accord. The philosophers of science, confronted with great basic deficiencies in the scientific method such as the relativity and indeterminacy principles, have fallen into the Kantian error of identifying principles of knowledge with principles of being. Nothing exists unless it is known (i. e. in harmony with experimental facts). Truth is created by human genius and must serve its master by being fruitful. Religious truths are no exception.

Knowledge and being are identical in God. In man, being precedes knowledge and is independent of it. We know by *becoming* the object not by creating it. Even those mental constructs, which produce such startling results for the physicist and which, though having no counterpart in the realm of experience, anticipate experimental findings, can be traced to realities which individually have become known.

There is a desperate need among men of science for an epistemology that will bring order to the chaos which has resulted from unassimilated advances in material progress. A satisfactory epistemology will be self-consistent, embracing the best of scientific theory and the commonplaces of our daily existence. In such a system of knowledge religion assumes its primacy because of the truth it teaches. Grounded in truth, the fruitfulness of religion is enhanced, for its role is more than that of a guide to a more abundant life for the individual and for the species; it prepares us for the perfect happiness which is eternal.

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On Understanding Science. By JAMES B. CONANT. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. Pp. 157. $2.00.

This book must not be considered another of the scientific works that have appeared since the atom bomb focussed public attention upon the rapid progress made in atomic physics. It is a professedly popular approach, written by a scientist and educator, to clarify for the layman the meaning of science and its method of development.

Dr. Conant's purpose in understaking this work is the assimilation of a scientific spirit of knowledge into social and political life. When that has been accomplished, and when we no longer fear the discoveries of science, we shall have been led one step nearer to peaceful living. In the Author's own words (pp. 2, 3):

> When what we now roughly designate as science has been fully assimilated into our cultural stream, we shall perhaps no longer use the word as we do today. When that time arrives, as I have no doubt it will, the subject of this book will be fused into the age-old problem of understanding man and his works: in short, secular education . . . My argument, therefore, runs as follows: we need a widespread understanding of science in this country, for only thus can science be assimilated into our secular cultural pattern. When that has been achieved, we shall be one step nearer the goal which we now desire so earnestly, a unified, coherent culture suitable for our American democracy in this new age of machines and experts.

The immediate necessity of such an assimilation is found in the pressing problem of international control of atomic energy. Since national policy rests ultimately upon the people, and since a government should be guided by its citizens rather than by a handful of scientific experts, the people should have an understanding of science when faced with a future largely dependent upon the advance of science.

The method of this work is by far its most interesting feature. For Dr. Conant, understanding science means understanding the advance of thinking in the field of science. Hence, understanding science does not mean understanding the contents of the physical sciences as much as understanding the evolution of scientific thinking. In order to clarify his point, and in order to avoid technicalities difficult to the layman, he adopts an historical explanation. He shows how scientific thinking proceeds by way of a dialectic, namely, the dissatisfaction with an old theory or hypothesis, the toying with an alternative, the investigation of the alternative under the compelling force of new data accidentally discovered or planned experimentally. He illustrates his history by three case histories: (1) the evolution of the water pump into the vacuum pump, involving entirely new concepts of the weight and resiliency of air; (2) the transition from Galvani's 'animal magnetism' to the Voltaic pile; (3) the overthrow of the 'Phlogisten' theory of combustion. In this section, the book is especially interesting, written in a clear and limpid style. It flashes with

humor when Dr. Conant shows the historian's tendency to read into history and to score the scientist's natural reluctance to abandon an old theory. Of atomic physics, the author has little to say, since his purpose is to avoid technicalities rather than to investigate them.

On this point, it is, perhaps, necessary to differ with the author. Taken in connection with other popular presentations of science, it has value as an exposition of specialized, scientific thinking. In itself, however, it adds little to man's information about science. The every term 'science' connotes content-value, knowledge of things in their causes and principles, not merely a method of reasoning which, after all, is as common to the mechanic as to the scientist. If some of the scientists at work on the Manhattan Project have been able, successfully, to present a popular understanding of nuclear physics, surely this work, if it is to give an understanding of science, and if it is to contribute to the education of the ordinary layman in an atomic world, should have more of a content-value than three case histories.

Furthermore, when the author includes in the purpose of the book aid in clarifying some of the spiritual problems of the world, he should have a deeper approach to human problems than this work offers. When he makes a knowledge of science the answer to many ethical and spiritual problems, we must again disagree with him. It is true that much contemporary distress has been brought about by the substitution of technocracy for culture. Yet that is not the fault of the contents of science, but rather the fault of those who have substituted materialistic values for spiritual and ethical values. Better science is not the answer to a problem that is deep within man himself. History has shown us that unscrupulous men can take advantage of scientific discoveries to bring about evils. Scientific discoveries have their own intrinsic value, but it is the use which men make of them that makes the difference between good and evil, spiritual satisfaction or spiritual distress.

In such light we must question Dr. Conant's basing his work and his point of view on Emerson's *Law of Compensation*—a principle which states that for every good wrested from the universe, nature demands a price. We cannot convert that proposition—if it is true—into saying that for every price demanded by nature we shall receive a good. Nor can we state that law to be a necessary law of nature. If we investigate the historical precedents of that law we will find that the case is not that of nature demanding a price as much as men abusing the secrets wrested from nature. How to use scientific discoveries for good or for evil is not in itself a scientific question to be automatically settled by a deeper knowledge of science, but a question of the proper use of things, by man's action, for an end. Such has always been and always will be a question of ethics, rather than an understanding of science.

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BRIEF NOTICES

Europaïsche Philosophie der Gegenwart. By I. M. Bochenski. Berne: A. Francke, 1947. Pp. 304, with index. 11.50 s. fr.

Philosophy has long stood in need of a single-volume work that would sift through the welter of contemporary trends, reducing them to an order for study by the professional and for presentation to college students, who are preparing to face present-day problems with the Thomism of their classrooms. The claim to fulfill this need is not made by the author of the present book. But his work, even though confining itself to European philosophy, seems almost tailored for the tremendous need in Thomistic, indeed in all philosophical, literature today.

Dr. Bochenski's book can lay claim to unusual character if only because it is the sole book of its type now available. When its general excellence is totalled with the fact of its uniqueness, the combination is inviting to all thinkers who are interested in the modern problem. Such a problem makes a special appeal to the Thomist. It is in the essence of Thomism to deal with all other philosophies not in the spirit of *a priori* dismissal that St. Thomas' thought so often receives from present-day adversaries but to sift out its truths, signalize its errors, and assimilate the result in a way that cannot but make Thomism more conscious of itself, of its rich progressive, and strictly modern—because perennial—character.

This book opens with a concise background chapter on the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Its ambition is to explore the European period between the two wars. Considering space requirements and the vast dimensions of the material to be surveyed, a truly remarkable map of modern thought has been plotted out. The chapter subjects run like this: the philosophy of matter, including the doctrines of Russell, logical positivism, and dialectical materialism; idealism, a treatment of Croce, Brunschvicg, and the branching German schools after the first war; the philosophy of experience, including Bergson, Pragmatism, and German historicism; the philosophy of essence, a discussion of Husserl and Scheler; existentialism, including Heidegger, Sartre, Marcel, and Jaspers; the philosophy of being, a study of Whitehead, Hartmann, and the Thomists.

Each chapter is followed by a succinct summary and a swift critical estimate. The end of the book boasts a chronology of modern philosophy year by year from 1900 to 1943 and a classification of contemporary European philosophers according to schools—seventeen such schools are listed. There is an index of important contemporary journals and a bibliography on all the important men treated in the text. There are two indices, one of topics and the other of names.

Dr. Bochenski admits in his preface that the history of philosophy cannot be written as one would describe a work of art. A viewpoint is essential, and Bochenski's is that of Thomistic realism. Such a viewpoint does not maim the thoughts of the men being treated. It simply provides a pattern of organization, a reference system. After all, Thomism is a realistic philosophy, and to assess other thought in its white light is like comparing these systems with reality itself.

Unfortunately the author does not do justice to the *philososphie de l'esprit* movement in France which was even stronger before the war than now and which has contributed two of its members to leading philosophy posts in French university life. To emphasize where emphasis is due, a special section might have been in order on the philosophy of method which is even more important for Russell and the logical positivists than their views on matter. But such criticisims are likely to be flooded out by the otherwise outstanding merits of this book.

Modern philosophy is unusually unfamiliar except to those who make special efforts to understand it; in fact the understanding requires the time and patience of the professional philosopher. Hegel boasted at the beginning of his *Logic* that philosophy, unlike science, was too deep, abstract, and complicated for the ordinary mind. Today, those tables would be turned. It is science and the philosophers who repeat it for their philosophy which remove thought from ordinary experience, and it is genuine philosophy that can maintain contact with the familiar world. Modern philosophy, in the twentieth century especially, has grown in irregular rows of seasonal twigs in contrast to the perennial branches of Thomism which take deep root in common experience and immutable reason. As a guide through the irregularities of the modern wilderness, this book will prove invaluable.

The men treated will need further study from their own works, but their essential doctrines have, it appears, been included in all cases. The result cannot escape being of considerable aid in organizing survey courses and in treatments of the introduction to philosophy.

It usually happens in the history of philosophy that men do not receive adequate critical treatment until after death has silenced their answers. This, in philosophy, is a great misfortune. How much of the treasure of St. Thomas' work was due to his struggle against Siger, for example! It is usually their contemporaries that men influence most actively, and it is of contemporary problems that they treat. Such efforts as Professor Bochenski's will help to make philosophy more of a vital debate by contemporary men on contemporary problems instead of the historical treatment, which it often becomes, of the way in which past philosophers faced past problems.

Existentialism. By Guido de Ruggiero. New York: Social Sciences Publishers, 1948. Pp. 96, with index. $2.50.

This little book, of which, when the preface and supplementary material are counted, only fifty-three pages are devoted to an exposition and critique of existentialism, is the first of its kind to appear in English. Such a dearth of literature is by no means alarming. Existentialism is not a major problem in America, and so the subject has historical appearances rather than a vital meaning. It takes a long time for thought to cross the ocean in either direction, as modern philosophy from Kant down to James and Dewey attests by its travel. Considering the puzzle of American thinkers as to what current existentialism is and how what they call its absurdities could take hold, a rather simple digest of the movement was in order.

Those who, in such a confronting of what is wholly alien to the present-day American mind, open Ruggiero's book are not likely to be disappointed. Though not realistic in his formal philosophy elsewhere, Ruggiero unfolds on his present subject his undoubted synthetic talent, seeing and setting forth the spirit of existentialism with a simplicity of thought that is matched by incisiveness of phrase. His book will be of service as an exposé of existentialism and as a critical display of what are not only its intellectual errors but its practical evils.

Notable is the theme that existentialism is a nihilistic answer to man's problems, an irrational and morbid use of his noblest powers, a splitting, as the book's subtitle suggests, that may well be labelled the "disintegration of man's soul." It used to be an argument against a false doctrine that it was at variance with experience. But with those who believe, after Hume, that experience is an illusion, reason cannot help striking a total retreat into its absolute absurdity. Existentialism leads the present-day retreating army; it is an absurd answer to the absurd.

Ruggiero proceeds with an introductory chapter on existentialism in general and a meaty twenty-six pages of explaining Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Marcel. The inclusion of Marcel is not a happy climax to a a discussion of the others. His thought runs sufficiently at a slant from that of Heidegger and Jaspers to exempt him from the fury of criticism in the next and final chapter on evaluation. The absence of Sartre from the book is not so serious. For all of his undoubted talent, he is simply Heidegger, translated, when the broader issues are summed up.

Those familiar with existentialism are not likely to be engaged deeply by the historical summaries of the four samples which are here selected. For those who have not found it possible or even worthwhile to study existentialism, this book is of genuine expository merit. Completion of treatment has managed to keep place with the author's simplicity in a way that

stands in contrast to the tomes which the existentialists have found necessary to plead their thought.

The chapter on evaluation will be read with interest by those who believe that philosophy is not merely an arbitrary game but a realism, capable of rigorous evaluation. If one is unduly alarmed over the irrationalities which the existentialists advocate, the author's historical parallelisms will be of interest. He finds existentialism prefigured in the ancient sophists and in the German romanticists, even though, it may be added, this latter group was opposed by Kierkegaard. The author might have profitably alluded at this point to the debt of Heidegger toward Dilthey, especially in the questions of time and of history. It is difficult to understand Ruggiero when he holds that Heidegger's analysis of time "will remain a lasting contribution to philosophy" (p. 86). The realist will want to know exactly what positive philosophical contribution Heidegger has made.

More decisive is the author's criticism of existentialists for holding to being's abrupt emergence out of nothing; for their doctrine of pure becoming with no subject; for degrading life into a mere death-directed absurdity; for putting nothing but leaps in place of the continuity required for thought; for vitiating reason; and for lowering the person to a life of misery and despair.

Of noteworthy interest in this book is the long preface of Rayner Heppenstall in which is included pertinent historical and critical materials on existentialism that forms a worthwhile study in itself.

Technically, the book is interspersed with frequent subtitles that definitely enhance its readability and its value for reference.

Dreadful Freedom. By Marjorie Grene. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948. Pp. 150. $2.75.

This book is like a neon sign in that darkness of the city of man which existentialism advances as the authentic human homeland. Unfortunately, the sign turns on and off. More unfortunately still, the dark periods are annoyingly long by comparison with the flashes of brilliance which Mrs. Grene displays. It is as though—especially in the later chapters of the book—she were focusing on the consequences of existentialism rather than its premises. A reader not previously alerted to these premises is likely to find the matter of the book more as an assembly of curious facts rather than as an array of problems. In favor of Mrs. Grene's approach, there is something to be said from her title, if we take freedom as a psychological or moral reality and hence a consequence of metaphysics. But her subtitle announces: "A Critique of Existentialism." This would lead one to expect a view of existentialism as a whole.

Mrs. Grene, according to the jacket of her book, studied Kierkegaard

in Denmark and was a student of Heidegger and Jaspers during two years as a German exchange fellow. Though her book has many critical features to recommend it and displays an occasional greatness of thought and phrase, its final dimensions reflect a concern with non-essentials where simplicity of insight might have been more satisfying to the reader.

After an introductory chapter in which some highly interesting parallels are traced between existentialism and American pragmatism, there is a treatment of the Kierkegaardian endeavor to restore the concept of self against the depersonalized system of Hegel. This chapter reflects a patient scholarship but neglects some of the passages where Kierkegaard is clarifyingly Kierkegaardian. The critical comments in the final section are eminently worthwhile. Kierkegaard's friends may be provoked when they find their master labelled as a small man in a small world. But Mrs. Grene's judgments remain on the whole convincing. If Hegel was too broad in his system, Kierkegaard was too narrow in his selfhood.

The second chapter, dealing with freedom in Heidegger and Sartre, would lead one to believe that atheism is a premise which prompts the two thinkers to reduce their philosophy to a study of the merely human. It may be questioned whether this is true and whether atheism is not the fruit of the exclusive concern with the finite rather than its seed. In the same context, Mrs. Grene apologizes for the rejection of Aristotle's doctrine on the fixity of essences by pointing out its variance with modern transformism. But if this logic holds, then how could St. Thomas hold to creationism and even spontaneous generation while maintaining that an essence is what it is? In brief, it is obvious that Mrs. Grene is not familiar with the Thomistic doctrine on essence and existence developed out of Aristotle. Other reasons for rejecting Aristotelianism, Mrs. Grene declares, are modern developments in physics and in the psychology of the unconscious. A careful distinction between empirical and philosophic science settles such difficulties as these. Scientism and existentialism can be paralleled as easily as pragmatism and existentialism, and Mrs. Grene becomes involved in the very position which she would reject by according an ontological status to the theories of science. In this same chapter (p. 48), professing a failure to understand the identification of appearance and reality in Heidegger and Sartre—a reflection on Husserl might have clarified this matter—the author decides to neglect "the aims and achievements of existentialism as a metaphysical revolution." But this is the very nucleus of existentialism, and without knowledge of it, the reader can expect difficulty in following subsequent chapters.

There is a chapter devoted to our knowledge of others, as Heidegger and Sartre depict it, and a chapter on the revolutionary character of existentialism. This theme is an aspect of existentialism of which American critics are not generally aware, and Mrs. Grene's exposition is a genuine contribution. Of particular weight is the criticism (p. 114) that Sartre's philosophy

of " perpetual revolution " must, when his free society is established, entail a revolution against freedom itself. This is a capital point. Indeed, a philosophy of absolute revolution, Sartrean or Marxist, must always be destructive rather than progressive, suicidal rather than emancipating.

The treatment of Jaspers and Marcel in a chapter entitled " The New Revelation " does not do justice to either and dismisses both for a failure to probe their principles to their bedrock of dread. The reader of their works is likely to find them of much larger spirit than those of Heidegger or Sartre whose virtuosities often consist in punning rather than philosophizing. The so-styled refusal of Jaspers and Marcel to elaborate " a precise and vigorous method " is not historically documented by Mrs. Grene. There can be serious doubt whether this refusal, if it is really true, is not the sign of a deeper method than that of the aprioristic descendents of Kant who make method a prolegomenon.

In the final and critical chapter, Mrs. Grene takes existentialism to task for denying the Kantian moral maxim of treating other men as ends, not as means. The attack argues that existentialism denies the public character of morality and would thus make community impossible. The existentialists would, of course, let this volley bounce off their armor with the reply that their philosophy of transcendence (which, as it was said, Mrs. Grene does not develop), is immune from attack by principles of the derivative, empirical order. More realistically, it can likewise be asked whether we can, as Mrs. Grene would seem to suggest, set up what is demanded of a morality before examining the beings who are to be moral. God did not make morality for man but man for morality. More accurately, man and morality cannot be considered apart from each other. At any rate, morality is not a conventional and arbitrary goal that we construct. It is found by examining man. Such an examination the existentialists undertake. But in their analytic they do not see the whole man, whose duties are the basis of his rights and whose nature must be considered before his preferences. On what does Mrs. Grene rest her pattern of morality?

Systems like pragmatism, scientism, and even Marxism profess to be philosophies of consequences and could be forcefully rebutted by analyzing the real consequences to which they lead. But existentialism, for better or for worse, is a metaphysic, " a fundamental ontology " in Heidegger's language, and it cannot be dismissed without treading metaphysical ground. The typical American habit for the practical cannot cope with existentialism's challenges. Mrs. Grene shows, throughout her book, an appreciation of the metaphysical and has made distinct contributions to the understanding and criticism of existentialism. But her work should be a second volume after a first one that would search into the metaphysical substructure of existentialism. It is to be hoped that Mrs. Grene with her fine background and the philosophical talent which she shows in this work might eventually supply American philosophy with this companion volume.

Court Traité de L'Existence et de L'Existant. By JACQUES MARITAIN. Paris: Paul Hartmann, 1947. Pp. 239. 90 fr.

Jacques Maritain is one of the leading spirits in the work of keeping the timeless organism of Thomistic philosophy in touch with the timely. His has been the genius of finding *that*, and indeed *how*, the partial approaches of modern thought could only gain the completion of meaning and of life in the perennial, universal vitality of Thomism. Such a spirit, after all, is the Thomism of St. Thomas.

But whether Maritain has always been successful is another matter. The present volume in bulk is a development of earlier ideas on the emphasis which a genuine philosophy must accord to existence as distinguished from essence. The urging of this point in modern Thomistic circles is owed largely to Maritain and Gilson.

The first chapter of the book treats of the fecundity of existence in being; the second concerns action, which is likewise dominated by existence—in particular by the existential faculty of man's will. There are provocative chapters on man as subjectivity; on premotion; and on the prospects of philosophy especially in the wake of modern existentialism. Maritain has driven some tremendous shafts in a short space, but there is question as to whether the shafts have been thickened enough in reference to reality to be followed by lesser men than Maritain who like to buttress their philosophy on the ordinary world.

Despite its obvious riches which recommend the book to all philosophers, there are two theses that will no doubt be challenged within the Thomistic tradition. The first is the doctrine that being is intuited. The second is man's intuition of his own subjectivity.

Readers who are confused by Maritain's definition of intuition in earlier works are not likely to be any further satisfied by the present treatment, even though it stretches over twenty-three pages. In *Sept Leçons sur l'Être*, the intuition is said to grasp the transcendental and analogical character of being (p. 52). But in view of the mode of existence of the transcendental and analogical, can we venture to say that being as being is intuited? In Maritain's earlier words, he is opposed to the Bergsonian intuition. But the same difficulty turns up in his intellectual intuition as in the Bergsonian *sympathie*. The concrete is singular. How can we intuit the general, transcendental, analogical? If such an intuition did occur, it would solve no problem for criteriology since account must still be given of the way in which we move away from it toward the abstract. Maritain's views, on earlier evidence, would seem to involve the anomaly of intuiting a concrete abstraction or, if one prefers, an abstract concretion.

In a long footnote of the present work (p. 50), Maritain says of the intellect: "Il atteint ainsi l'*actus essendi* (en jugeant)—comme il atteint

l'essence (en concevant)—*par la médiation de la perception sensorielle.*" The following difficulties occur: Does the " is " of judgment yield the object of our intuition and, if so, how do we get it into stride with intelligible content, as characterizing the subject and predicate? If the whole judgment is necessary to complete our knowledge of being, as St. Thomas seems to hold, then is judgment intuition? Finally, if by the mediation of sensory perception we intuit the act of existing, how do we avoid being limited to *this* act of existing, intuiting the individual but by that token forbidden to say that we have a knowledge of being in general? Can we intuit the analogical? If the intuition depends on judgment and sensory intuition as Maritain states in the same footnote, the difficulties apparent from his *Sept Leçons sur l'Être* recur, namely, the problem of bridging between the abstractions of the intellectual order and the concretions of sense.

In discussing the second form of intuition, that of our subjectivity, Maritain seems to hold that it is simultaneous with our intuition of being but that it is an existential intuition which does not inform us of an essence (p. 114). It is difficult to see what this means. Maritain goes on to say that such an intuition is knowledge that is not according to the mode of knowledge, the kind of knowledge involved in the practical intellect and in mystical intuition. But how can we speak of subjectivity at all unless we have some more contentual approach to it than Maritain is willing to accord in this pure existentiality?

These may not be grave objections to those who understand just what Maritain means by intuition, being, subjectivity. But they are at least obscurities, leaving the conclusions which Maritain draws from such premises to remain unsatisfying.

The section on premotion is noteworthy. Balthasar has recently revived the discussion of this point also. In the post-war disillusionment which is recruiting for the existentialist camp, it is interesting to note that realistic thinkers have found it necessary to recur to the genuine facts of God's causality in the world as an answer to the cry that man is abandoned. Maritain's ideas on premotion are expressed in original form that will be value to all those interested in the controversy.

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